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STELLINGEN BEHORENDE BIJ HET PROEFSCHRIFT




"Motorracing is dangerous by definition. Motorracing is exciting. Motorracing is a sport that
brings people to the limit, man and machine, and it must be seen as that. And people that
are on the limit and equipment that work on the limit are bound to go wrong from time to time,
and that must be taken into consideration to be a part of the game. "
Ayrton Senna (1960 - 1994)
In een sociaal keuze probleem waar de individuen hun preferenties over de te kiezen
altematieven baseren op quasi-lineaire nutsfuncties, is de klasse van zogenaamde Groves-
mechanismen de enige klasse die voldoet aan de eigenschap 'incentive compatibility' dan en
slechts dan als het domein van preferenties graaf-samenhangend is.
zie ook: Sui~s, J.: 'On Incentive Compatibility and Budget Balancedness in Public Decision Making ,' Economic
Design, 2 (1996), 193-209.
Voor de klasse van cooperatieve spelen gebaseerd op machinevolgorde problemen zoals
beschreven in CuRIEL et al. (1989) is de Split Core de grootste verzameling die voldoet aan
efficientie, monotonie en de dummy eigenschap.
zie OOk: HAMERS, H., J. SuiJS, S. Ti~s en P. BoRM: 'The Split Core for Sequencing Games,' Games and
Economic Behavior, 15 (1996), 165-176 en CURIEL, I., G. PEDERZOLI en S. TiJS: 'Sequencing Games,'
European Journal of Operational Research, 40 (1989), 344-351.
De EGS-regel en de Split Core, twee oplossingsconcepten die de kostenbesparingen
voortvloeiend uit een machinevolgorde probleem verdelen over de aanwezige jobs, kunnen
gekarakteriseerd worden met behulp van consistentie indien men de niet-geaggregeerde
variant van deze oplossingsconcepten beschouwd.
zie ook: Suus, J., H. HAMERS en S. Tus: 'On Consistency of Reward Allocation Rules in Sequencing Situations,'
in Ten Years LNMB, ed. by W. Klein Haneveld, O. Vrieze en L. Kallenberg. Amsterdam: CW I Tract, 1997.
V
Cooperatieve spelen die gebaseerd zijn op machinevolgorde problemen met meerdere
machines en identieke bewerkingstijden voor de jobs zijn gebalanceerd.
zie ook: HAMEas, H., F. KuJN en J. Suws: 'Balancedness of m-Machine Sequencing Games,' Working Paper
Tilburg University.
VI
De Formule 1 Grand Prix races zullen nog spannender worden wanneer het gebruik van
voor- en achtervleugels tot een minimum beperkt wordt, en het gebruik van het zogenaamde
`ground-effect' weer wordt toegestaan in het ontwerp van Formule 1 racewagens.
VII
De voornaamste reden waarom zowel kinderen als volwassenen vallen wanneer zij voor het
eerst leren fietsen, is niet zozeer het gebrek aan evenwicht door het ontbreken van een of
meer extra wielen, maar wel het feit dat men niet bekend is met het stuurgedrag van een
fiets: bij normale snelheden heeft een stuurbeweging naar links een bocht naar rechts tot
gevolg en omgekeerd.
zie ook: Co~E, K.: A Twist of the Wrist ll - The Basics of High-Performance Motorcycling Riding, Motorbooks
International, 1993 en RoaiNSON, J.: Motorcycle Tuning - Chassis, Butterworth-Heinemann, 1994.
In tegenstelling tot hetgeen voetbalverslaggevers regelmatig beweren, is geluk niet
afdwingbaar.
IX
Mensen die van zichzelf zeggen dat ze prettig gestoord zijn, zijn inderdaad gestoord.
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Many of the notations we use are defined in the text at their first appeazance. The following
symbols and notations aze used troughout this monograph.
The set {0,1, 2, ...} of natural numbers is denoted by IlV and the set of real numbers is
denoted by R. For any finite set N we denote the power set by 2N, that is, 2N -{S~S C N},
and the number of elements by ~N. Furthermore, RN denotes the set of all functions from N
to R. An element of RN is denoted by a vector x-(x;)iEN.
The set of real valued stochastic variables with finite expectation is denoted by L' (R).
For a brief survey on probability theory and stochastic vaziables we refer to Appendix B.
To improve the readability of this text, we try to keep to the following notations as much
as possible. Given a finite set N, the elements of RN are denoted by lower case letters and
subsets of RN aze denoted by upper case letters. So, x E RN and X C RN. Similarly, random
variables belonging to the set L' ( R) are denoted by bold faced upper case letters while sets of
random variables are denoted by calligraphic letters. Thus, X E Ll(R) and X C L'(R).
~ari~~ta~~
Intr~duction
Three women, who once made their way to the pinnacle of show business but are now down
and out, live their lives drifting about on the streets reminiscing the good old days. One day,
when going through their daily routine of seazching other people's garbage for food, something
strange happened. As they lifted the lid of yet another garbage can, deepest thunder shook
the skies. Suddenly a Genie appeared - right before their very eyes! "I'm the Genie of the
garbage can," said the Genie with a laugh. "I've been stuck inside this garbage can for over
three weeks! You opened the can and set me free. As a sign of my gratitude, I will let you
have a wish each and make them all come true." The women, let us call them Linda, Roos, and
Jessica, are stunned. Not completely back to their senses, they happily accept the Genie's offer
and, God knows why, wish for two spades and a Ph.D. in economics, respectively. "Oh dear,"
says the Genie, "I think you poor little girls have slightly overestimated my magic powers. The
spades are no problem, I can do that, but a Ph.D. in economics, that is way beyond my powers
... You know what, let me give you this old treasure map instead. It goes better with the spades
anyway," after which he disappears into distance leaving the girls behind with two spades and
a treasure map.
Dreaming of all the riches that will be theirs soon, Linda, Roos, and Jessica go on their
way hunting the treasure. Once arrived on the spot, Linda and Roos immediately put their
spades into action and, after a few hours of digging, they have finally found it: a huge fridge
filled with 24 kilos of food. Though not quite the treasure they expected, the sight of all that
delicious food makes their mouths water. Especially Linda and Roos, who worked up quite an
appetite by digging up the fridge, can hardly wait to divide the food. But how are they going
to divide the food?
Suppose Roos proposes an equal division of the food, that is, 8 kilos each. Then Jessica
may claim a higher share by azguing that, without the use of her map, the other two would
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never have found the treasure. She should, however, not forget that without a spade she would
not have dug out the treasure either, making her claim for a larger share rather weak. Her
claim for more food would be much stronger though, if she collaborates with Linda. Presently,
Linda and Jessica would receive 8 kilos each, making a total of 16 kilos for the both of them.
Since Linda and Jessica together possess the map as well as a spade, they could have found
the treasure without any help from Roos. In that case, they would have 24 kilos for the two
of them. Compared with the 16 they get at the moment, their claim for a larger share of the
food is reasonable, if not obvious. Moreover, Roos cannot claim anything; she would never
have found the treasure on her own. This means that Linda and Jessica can claim all of Roos's
share, leaving Roos with 0 kilos and Linda and Jessica with 12 kilos each.
This distribution is, to say the least, not Roos's favorite. But what can she do? On her
own, there is no way she can convince the others to give her a share of the food. So for any
chance to get some food, she has to turn to either Linda or Jessica for support; and for this
case, she should turn to Jessica. For if Roos and Jessica collaborate, they can claim Linda's
share of 12 kilos by using a similar argument as Linda and Jessica used to claim Roos's share.
Now Roos receives 6 kilos, Jessica receives 18, and Linda receives nothing. Linda for her
part then unites again with Jessica, to claim Roos's 6 kilos of food. The resulting distribution
gives 3 kilo to Linda, 21 to Jessica, and nothing to Roos. These claims will go back and forth
until Jessica receives all 24 kilos of food and Linda and Roos receive nothing. Though this
distribution seems unfair to both Linda and Roos, they cannot really object against it. Since
they do not possess the map, they would never have found the treasure, making any claim for
more food not very convincing.
The situation described in the example can be interpreted as a cooperative decision
making problem: a situation involving several persons with possibly diverse interests, who can
benefit from cooperating with each other. Linda, Roos, and Jessica, for instance, got some food
by cooperating with each other. When dividing the money, however, mutual conflicts arose
because each of them wanted her share to be as large as possible. For analyzing such situations
we can turn to cooperative game theory. In fact, the allocation that gives everything to Jessica
is a so-called core-allocation of the game played by Linda, Roos, and Jessica. But cooperative
game theory, of course, has not been developed for analyzing fictitious examples like this one.
Since its introduction in vON NEUtvtANtv and MoRCENS~E[tN (1944), cooperative game theory
serves as a way to model the economic behavior of individuals. To illustrate, consider the
following examples of cooperative decision making problems that have been subject to a game
theoretical analysis in the past.
Example 1.1 In an exchange economy, each agent is endowed with a certain bundle of con-
sumption goods. Now, each agent can just consume his own bundle, but it could well be
possible that an agent possesses some commodities he does not like. He would rather like to
exchange these ones for goods he likes better. So, agents may benefit from exchanging their
initial endowments. The question that remains is, which commodities will eventually change
hands? These cooperative decision making problems, also referred to as mazket games, are
analyzed in e.g. Scnxl: (1967) and SxAPLEY and Sxuslx (1969).
Example 1.2 The following class of so-called linear production games is introduced in OwEtv
(1975). These games aze derived from the following type of situations. Consider a group
of agents, each having a bundle of resources which can be used to produce a number of
consumption goods. For the production of these goods, every agent has access to the same
linear production technology. Once the goods are produced, they are sold for given prices.
In this situation the agents could individually use their own resources to produce a bundle
of consumption goods that maximizes the revenues. But they can probably do better if
they cooperate with each other and combine their resources. For instance, there may be a
consumption good that an agent cannot produce on his own, because he lacks some of the
resources to produce it. Cooperating with agents who do possess the absent resources, [hen
enables them to produce this good, and, subsequently, pocket the corresponding revenues. The
problem that needs to be solved is, how to divide the revenues among the agents.
Example 1.3 Consider a large firm that consists of several divisions, which all have to make
use of the same facility - for instance, a repair and maintenance facility - that can only serve one
division at a time. When divisions ask for service of the repair and maintenance facility, each
division incurs costs for the time it is waiting for service. Now, suppose that a fixed number
of divisions has requested service from this facility and that initially they will be served on a
first come first served basis. Since the service demanded by the several divisions need not be
equally urgent, a division with relatively high urgency may significantly decrease its waiting
costs if it could move further forward in the queue. So, by rearranging their positions in the
queue, the divisions might decrease the total waiting costs. These situations aze known in the
literature as sequencing games and were introduced by CuttIEL, PF.I)EItzOLI, and TI7s ( 1989).
They proposed a`fair' division of the total benefits, that is, the difference in total waiting costs
between the initial serving order and the optimal serving order.
Cooperative game theory is a mathematical tool to analyze decision making problems
like the ones presented in Examples 1.1 - 1.3. A cooperative game is usually either of two
types: a cooperative game with transferable utility, henceforth referred to as a TU-game,
or a cooperative game with non-transferable utility, henceforth referred to as an NTU-game.
The main difference between these two types of games is the way in which the benefits of
cooperation aze described. Roughly speaking, a TU-game describes for each subgroup the
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benefits from cooperation by a single number, while an NTU-game describes these benefits by
a set of utility vectors. In fact, the games referred to in Example 1.2 and Example 1.3 are both
TU-games while the market games discussed in Example 1.1 are of the NTU-type.
These examples all have one common aspect though, namely, that all benefits from
cooperation are deterministic. When several persons decide to cooperate with each other, they
exactly know beforehand what the benefits will be. One can, however, think of situations
where this is not the case. In our introductory example, for instance, Linda and Roos have
to decide whether or not they make the effort to dig up the treasure before they know what
this treasure will bring them. The situations described in Example 1.2 and Example 1.3 can
also be formulated in an uncertain setting. To start with the linear production situations, when
productíon takes a considerable amount of time, prices may have changed during production.
So, at the time that agents decide upon their production plan, they are not exacdy sure at
what prices these goods can be sold. As a consequence, they may have to choose between a
production plan that yields high revenues with only small probability and a production plan
that yields only moderate revenues with high probability. A similar reasoning holds for the
sequencing situations described in Example 1.3. The service time a division needs is only
known with certainty once the service has ended. So, when divisions rearrange the serving
order, the benefits they generate are uncertain due to the unknown serving times.
An example of a different order involves insurance problems. A health-insurance, for
instance, can be interpreted as cooperation between an individual and an insurance company.
An individual may find the costs resulting from any health problems too high to bear on his
own. Therefore, he could turn to an insurance company, who, in exchange for an insurance
premium, takes over part of these costs. So, an insurance is just a redistribution of yet unknown
costs between an individual and an insurance company. Furthermore, cooperation yields no
decrease in the total costs, both parties possibly benefit from redistributing these costs only.
These kind of cooperative decision making problems, where the benefits from coopera-
tion are not known with certainty, are the subject of this thesis. The aim is to develop a theory
for these so-called stochastic cooperative games by using traditional cooperative game theory
as a guideline. Here, traditional alludes to both TU-games and NTU-games. For these types
of games, attention has been and still is focused on two issues, namely, which individuals
will eventually cooperate with each other, and how should the resulting benefits be divided?
Although both questions may be considered equally important, most of the past research on
cooperative game theory has focused on the latter question. In fact, the same thing can be
said about this monograph; it does not focus on the problem of coalition formation. Instead, it
presumes that one large coalition will be formed, and focuses on the allocation problem of the
corresponding benefits.
This monograph is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the reader into determinis-
tic cooperative game theory. We formulate a mathematical framework to describe cooperative
decision making problems in general. For analyzing these problems we then tum to cooperative
game theory. Which type of cooperative games to use depends on the characteristics of the
cooperative decision making problem that is under consideration. Examples of cooperative
games are, of course, TU-games and NTU-games, but also chance-constrained games. In
Chapter 2 we provide a brief survey of each of the three types of games.
We start with explaining when a situation can be modeled as an NTU- or TU-game,
followed by a short survey of both areas. For TU-games we provide the definitions of some
well-known solution concepts like the core, the Shapley value, and the nucleolus. Furthermore,
we state the main results in this regard. With respect to the class of NTU-games, we show to
what extent the concepts that we discussed for TU-games also apply to NTCJ-games. It should
be noted, however, that both surveys are rather concise. They confine to providing only those
concepts that are needed in the forthcoming chapters on stochastic cooperative games.
In a separate section we discuss chance-constrained games. These games are introduced
in CxAxNES and GRANO'r (1973) to encompass situations where the benefits obtained by the
agents are random variables. Their attention is also focused on dividing the benefits of the
grand coalition. Although the benefits are random, the authors allocate a deterministic amount
in two stages. In the first stage, before the realization of the benefits is known, payoffs are
promised to the individuals. In the second stage, when the realization is known, the payoffs
promised in the first stage are modified if needed. In several papers, Charnes and Granot
introduce some allocation rules for the first stage like the prior core, the prior Shapley value,
and the prior nucleolus. To modify these so-called prior allocations in the second stage they
defined the two-stage nucleolus. We will discuss all these solution concepts and illustrate them
with some examples.
Chapter 3 is partly based on SUDS, Boxtvt, DE WAEGENAERE, and Tus (1995) and SUUs
and BoFUvt (1996). It introduces stochastic cooperative games, a class of games that deals with
the same kind of problems as the chance-constrained games do, albeit in a completely different
way. A drawback of the model introduced by CHAR1~1ES and G~1voT (1973) is that it does not
explicitly take into account the individual's behavior towards risk. The effects of risk averse
behavior, for example, aze difficult to trace in this model. The model we introduce includes the
preferences of the individuals. Any kind of behavior towazds risk, from risk loving behavior
to risk averse behavior, can be expressed by these preferences. Another major difference is the
way in which the benefits are allocated. As opposed to a two-stage allocation, which assigns
a deterministic payoff to each agent, an allocation in a stochastic cooperative game assigns a
random payoff to each agent. Furthermore, for a two-stage allocation the agents must come to
an agreement twice. In the first stage, before the realization of the payoff is known, they have
to agree on a prior allocation. In the second stage, when the realization is known, they have
to agree on how the prior payoff is modified. For stochastic cooperative games on the other
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hand, the agents decide on the allocation before the realization is known. As a result, random
payoffs are allocated so that no further decisions have to be taken once the realization of the
payoff is known.
Besides the definition of the model, Chapter 3 also provides some examples arising from
lineaz production situations, sequencing situations and financial markets. A sepazate section
is devoted to the preferences of the agents. We show which type of preferences allow for risk
averse, risk neutral, or risk loving behavior. Furthermore, we define several conditions that will
be imposed upon the preferences in future chapters. In particulaz, we introduce a special class
of preferences such that the random benefits can be represented by a deterministic number,
also known as the certainty equivalent. For this specific class we can describe a stochastic
cooperative game by a TU-game.
In Chapter 4 we ex[end the notions like core, superadditivity, and convexity of TU- and
NTU-games to the class of stochastic cooperative games. In a nutshell, the core consists of
those allocations that please each coalition in the sense that this coalition receives at least
as much as it can obtain on its own. For TU-games, there is the well-known result that a
core-allocation exists if and only if the game is balanced. For NTU-games, a balancedness
condition also exists, except that in this regard it is only a sufficient condition for nonemptiness
of the core. For stochastic cooperative games, we formulate such a balancedness condition for
a pazticulaz subclass.
Superadditivity and convexity tell us something about how the benefits increase with
the coalition size. To be more precise, superadditivity implies that two disjoint coalitions are
better off by forming one large coalition. Hence, disjoint coalitions have an incentive to merge.
Convexity then implies that this incentive increases as the size of the coalitions increases.
Thus, for a coalition it is better to merge with a large coalition than with a small one. For
TU-games it is known that every convex game is superadditive. Furthermore, a TU-game is
convex if andonly if all marginal vectors are core-allocations. For explaining a marginal vector,
suppose that the grand coalition is formed in a specific order. Thus we begin with a one-person
coalition, then an other agents joins this coalition, followed by another one, and so on. The
marginal vector with respect to this order then assigns to each agent his marginal contribution,
that is, the amount with which the benefits change when he joins a coalition. With respect to
NTU-games, again only weaker results hold. For an NTU-game, two definitions of convexity
exist. Both imply superadditivity and a nonempty core. Neither of the two, however, implies
that all marginal vectors belong to the core. For stochastic cooperative games, we extend the
definitions of superadditivity and convexity for TU-games, along the lines of SUUS and BoxNt
(1996). Our extension of convexity is based on the interpretation that a coalition can improve
its payoff more by joining a lazge coalition instead of a small one. We show that convex
stochastic cooperative games are superadditive. Furthermore, we show that convexity not only
implies that core-allocations exist, but also that all marginal allocations belong to the core of
the game. The reverse of this statement, however, is shown to be false: a stochastic cooperative
game is not necessarily convex if a11 mazginal vectors belong to the core. Finally, we show that
this new notion ofconvexity also leads to a new notion of convexity for NTU-games. Since the
same result can be derived for NTU-games, that is, all marginal vectors are core-allocations,
this new type of convexity thus differs from the existing notions of convexity for NTU-games.
Chapter 5 discusses a nucleolus for stochastic cooperative games that is introduced in
SUUS (1996). The nucleolus, a solution concept for TU-games, originates from SCHMEIDLER
(1969). This solution concept yields an allocation such that the excesses of the coalitions
are the lexicographical minimum. The excess describes how dissatisfied a coalition is with
the proposed allocation. The lazger the excess of a pazticular allocation, the more a coalition
is dissatisfied with this allocation. For Schmeidler's nucleolus the excess is defined as the
difference between the payoff a coalition can obtain when cooperating on its own and the
payoff received by the proposed allocation. So, when less is allocated to a coalition, the excess
of this coalition increases and the other way around.
Since the nucleolus depends mainly on the definition of the excess, we only need
to specify the excesses for a stochastic cooperative game in order to define a nucleolus.
Unfortunately, this is not that simple. Defining excess functions for stochastic cooperative
games appeazs to be not as straightforwazd as for TU-games. How should one quantify the
difference between the random payoff a coalition can achieve on its own and the random
payoff received by the proposed allocation when the behavior towards risk can differ between
the members of this coalition? Moreover, the excess of one coalition should be comparable to
the excess of another coalition.
For defining the excess for stochastic cooperative games we interpret the excess of
Schmeidler's nucleolus in a slightly different way. Bearing the conditions of the core in mind,
this excess can be interpreted as follows. Given an allocation of the grand coalition's payoff
we distinguish two cases. In the first case, a coalition has an incentive to part company with
the grand coalition. Then the excess equals the minimal amount of money a coalition needs
on top of what they already get such that this coalition is willing to stay in the grand coalition.
In the second case, a coalition has no incentive to leave the grand coalition. Then the excess
equals minus the maximal amount of money that can be taken away from this coalition such
that this coalition still has no incer,tive to leave the grand coalition. This interpretation is used
to define the excess for stochastic cooperative games.
Once the excess is defined, the nucleolus is defined in a similar way as for TU-games.
We show that the nucleolus is a well-defined solution concept for stochastic cooperative games.
Furthermore, we show that the nucleolus is a subset of the core, whenever the core is nonempty.
Chapter 6, the final chapter, contains an application of stochastic cooperative games to
insurance problems and is based on SUUS, DE WAEGENAERE, and Bottl~t (1996). The insurance
of possible personal losses as well as the reinsurance of the portfolios of insurance companies
is modeled by means of a stochastic cooperative game. For, by cooperating with insurance
companies an individual is able to transfer (part of) his future random losses to the insurance
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companies. Thus, in doing so, he concludes an insurance deal. Similazly, by cooperating with
other insurers an insurance company can transfer (parts of) her insurance portfolio to the other
insurers. So, the insurance company concludes a reinsurance deal.
In this chapter our attention is focused on Pareto optimal allocations of the risks, and
on the question which premiums aze fair to charge for these risk exchanges. A Pazeto optimal
allocation is such that there exists no other allocation which is better for all participants. We
show that there is essentially a unique Pazeto optimal allocation of risk. It will appeaz that this
Pazeto optimal allocation of the risk is independent of the insurance premiums that are paid
for these risk exchanges. For determining fair premiums, we look at the core of the insurance
game. We show that the core is nonempty and that the zero utility principle for calculating
premiums results in a core allocation.
Co~operative Game Theory
This chapter provides the reader with a brief introduction into cooperative game theory, making
the usual distinction between games with transferable utility (TU-games) and games with non-
transferable utility (NTU-games). A cooperative game mathematically models a multi-person
decision making problem, in which individuals can obtain certain benefits by cooperating with
each other. The questions it tries to answer are which individuals will eventually cooperate,
and how do they divide the resulting benefits. The first question concerning the formation
of coalitions falls outside the scope of this text. Instead, it is assumed that all individuals
cooperate, so that our attention is restricted to dividing the benefits only.
We start with defining amathematical framework to describe cooperative decision making
problems in general. Section 2.2 then shows under which conditions such a problem gives rise
to an NTU-game and a TU-game, respectively. By means of an example we try to explain when
utility is transferable and when not and what the consequences are for describing the benefits.
Subsequently, we state the formal definition of transferable utility. Next, in Section 2.3, a brief
survey of TU-games follows. We discuss properties like superadditivity and convexity and
define the solution concepts the core, the Shapley value, and the nucleolus. Furthermore, we
state the main results concerning these concepts. The succeeding section then shows to what
extent these results cary over to the class of NTU-games. Note, however, that both surveys are
far from complete. They only provide the concepts necessary for understanding the remainder
of this monograph. The chapter ends with a summary of chance-constrained games, in which
the benefits from cooperation are stochastic vaziables. This summary is based on CHa~tES and
GRANOT (1973),(1976),(1977), and G[t~vo'r (1977) and states the definitions of the so-called
prior core, prior Shapley value, prior nucleolus, and the two-stage nucleolus. Furthermore, we
compaze these definitions with the corresponding ones for TU-games.
~~3F~t~É~v~ ~.rAhfiE TxPf.]xY
2.1 Cooperative Decision Making Problems
A cooperative decision making problem describes a situation involving several persons who
can obtain benefits by cooperating. The problems they face are who will cooperate with whom,
and how will the conesponding benefits be divided. Obviously, in which coalition someone
is going to take part, depends on what part of the benefits this coalition has to offer. So, a
coalition is only likely to be formed, if all the members of this coalition agree on a specific
distribution of the benefits. Finding such an agreement, however, could be troublesome when
these members have mutually conflicting interests.
For analyzing such situations, let us formulate a general mathematical framework that
captures various cooperative decision making problems. For starters, let N-{ 1, 2, ..., n}
denote the fini[e set of individuals. To specify the benefits from cooperation, let Y be some
topological space representing the outcome space, whose interpretation depends on the decision
making problem that is under consideration. Moreover, this outcome space Y is such that the
benefits generated by each coalition S C N, can be represented by a subset Ys C jl;ES Y.
An outcome (y;);ES E Ys then yields the payoff y; to agent i. In order to evaluate different
outcomes, each individual i E N has a preference relation ~; over the outcome space Y. So,
agent i is only interested in what he himself receives. He does not take into account the payoffs
of the other agents. Then given any two outcomes y, y E Y, we write y ~iy if individual i
finds the outcome y as least as good as the outcome y. If agent i finds the outcome y strictly
better than the outcome y we write y~; y. The preference relation ~; is called the asymmetric
part of ~;; it holds that y Y-; y if y ~~y but not y Z~y. If agent i is indifferent between the
outcomes y and y we write y~; y. The preference relation ~; is the symmetric part of ~ti; it
holds that y ~; y if both y ~iy and y~~y. Summarizing, a cooperative decision making model
can be described by a tuple (N, {Ys}scN, {~;};EN). Let us illustrate this notation with some
examples.
Example 2.1 For the situation described in Example l.l , the set N- { 1, 2, ... , n} represents
the individuals participating in the exchange economy. Let w` E R~ denote the bundle of
consumption goods owned by agent i. So, there are m types of consumption goods and w~ is
the amount that agent i possesses of good j. Since an outcome describes a redistribution of
the available consumption goods yielding each agent a commodity bundle in Rt , the outcome
space Y equals the commodity space R~ . Next, consider a coalition S C N of agents. The
total number of commodities available to coalition S equals ~;ESw`. Hence, the outcome
space Ys equals
Ys - {(c')tES E (Rt)sI ~c` C ~w`},
iES - iES
with c` E R~ representing the bundle of consumption goods assigned to agent i E S. Note
that the C-sign allows the agent the dispose some of the goods if they want to. Furthermore,
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since ci ) 0 for all i E S the set YS is compact in (R~)s. Now, a coalition S can benefit from
cooperation if there exists an outcome (c');ES E Ys such that ci ~; w` for each i E S, that is,
each agent i E S strictly prefers the bundle ci to his initial endowment w'.
Example 2.2 Consider the linear production situation presented in Example 1.2. This situation
can be formulated as a cooperative decision making problem in the following way. Let
N- { 1, 2, . .. , n} denote the set of agents. To specify the benefits from production, let r be
the number of different resources and let m be the number of different consumption goods.
Furthermore, let p~ be the price at which good j - 1, 2, . . ., m can be sold. Since the benefits
consist of a division of the revenues generated by the sale of consumption goods, an outcome
specifies for each individual i his share in the revenues. Hence, the outcome space equals
Y- R. The resources that aze needed to produce a consumption bundle c E R} equal Ac,
where A E RTxm represents the lineaz production technology, which, by the way, is available
to each agent. Now, if b' E R~ denotes the resource bundle of agent i, then the consumption
bundles c that agent i can produce are C({ i})- { c E R~ ~ Ac C bi }. Hence, the conesponding
revenues he can obtain equal
Y{i} -{~ E RI 3cEC({i}) :~i ~ pTC}.
Since a coalition S C N can use the resources of all its members, the feasible consumption
bundles aze C(S) - {c E R~ ~ Ac C ~;ES bi}. An outcome for coalition S then equals a
distribution of the revenues this coalition can obtain, that is,
YS -{(~i)iES E RSI ~cEC(S) : jJxi G pTC}.
iES
Finally, it seems likely that the preferences of an agent are such that the more money he receives
the better. So, for ~, ~ E R we have that x~i~ if x 1~.
Example 2.3 Let us return to the sequencing situation described in Example 1.3. When
modeling this sequencing situation as a cooperative decision making problem, the set N-
{ 1, 2, ..., n} denotes the divisions of the firm. Next, let Q: N-~ { 1, 2, ..., n} denote the
order in which the divisions are served, with Q(i) - j meaning that division i takes position
j in the queue. Furthermore, denote the initial serving order based on the `first come first
served' principle by vo. Now, it would be straightforward to take the outcome space Y to
be the set of all possible serving orders a. For this situation, however, this outcome space
is too restrictive. For if two divisions i and j trade places in the serving order, the waiting
time increases for, say, division i, and the waiting time decreases for division j. Since an
increase in waiting time for division i increases its costs, division i only agrees to trade places
with division j, if division i is compensated for her increased waiting costs. To enable such
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compensations we allow transfer payments of money between the divisions. The outcome
space thus becomes Y- R x IIN, where R represents the amount of money a division
receives and II," - {v : N~ {1,2,...,n}~ d;,~EN:;~; : o(i) ~ v(j)} denotes the set of all
possible serving orders. To determine the outcome space of a coalition S of divisions, note
that a restraint is put on the rearrangements this coalition can make with respect to the serving
order. Two divisions i and j of a coalition are only allowed to change places if all divisions
that are waiting in between these two divisions also participate in the coalition. The outcome
space for coalition S thus equals
Ys -{(~i,~)ies E~(R x IIs)~ ~~i C 0},
iES iES
with IIS -{o E IIN~ diESd;~s : ~(j) C a(i) q~o(j) G Qo(i)} the set of feasible
rearrangements for coalition S. The vector (x;);ES represents the transfer payments between
the divisions in coalition S. Since the amounts of money received by some divisions have to
be paid by the other divisions, we have that ~;ES x; C 0.
Over the years, several game theoretical models have been introduced to deal with
cooperative decision making problems like the ones presented in Examples 2.1 - 2.3. From all
of these models, TU-games and NTU-games certainly are the most commonly used. Other, less
frequently appearing cooperative games are, amongst others, multi-criteria games, multi-choice
games and chance-constrained games. Which of these models best suits a specific cooperative
decision making problem depends on the characteristics of the problem under consideration.
The exchange economy presented in Example I.1 and Example 2.1, for instance, can
be modelled as an NTU-game if the preferences of each agent can be represented by a utility
function. This means that for each agent i E N there exists a function U; : R~ ~ R such
that for any c`, c` E R~ it holds that ci ~ic` if and only if U;(c`) 1 U;(c`), i.e., a bundle ci
is preferred to êi if and only if the utility agent i gets from c` exceeds the utility he gets from
ci. If, however, the preferences are such that agent i prefers the bundle ci to ci if and only if
c`~ ) c"'~ for j- 1, 2, . .., m, then a multi-criteria game applies best. Multi-choice games on
the other hand, apply when an agent not only has to decide which coalition to join, but also
has to decide upon the activity level of his cooperation. Such situations occur, for example, in
construction work, where several firms work together on the construction of a building. Now,
if these firms get paid dependent on the completion date, the revenues not only depend on
which firms participate in the construction, but also on the effort they put into it.
Multi-criteria games and multi-choice games though, are not further discussed in this
monograph. The interested reader is refened to BERGS'rRESSER and YU (1977) and ANAt~rD,
SHASHISHEKHAR, GxosE and PRASAD ( 1995) for multi-criteria games and to Hs~AO and
RAGHAVAN (1993) and NOUWELAND, PoTTERS, Tus and ZARZUELO (1995) for multi-choice
games. In the forthcoming sections we focus on TU-games, NTU-games, and chance-
;
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constrained games only. The next section explains when a cooperative decision making
problem can be modeled as an NTU-game and TU-game, respectively.
2.2 T~ransferable and Non-transferable Utility
The terms transferable and non-transferable utility refer to the agents' preferences in a cooper-
ative decision making problem. First of all, they imply that the preferences can be represented
by a utility function. Given a cooperative decision making problem (N, {YS}SCN, {;u;};Erv) ,
this means that for each agent i E N there exists a utility function U; : Y-~ R such that for
any y, y E Y it holds that y Z;y if and only if U;(y) ? U;(y). Not every preference relation,
however, can be represented by such a utility function. For this to be the case, consider the
following three properties.
(P1) A preference relation ~; is complete if for any two outcomes y,y E Y it holds that
y~;y, or y~;y, or both.
(P2) A preference relation ~; is transitive if for any y, y, y E Y such that y~;y and y~;y,
it also holds true that y~;y.
(P3) A preference relation Z ; is continuous if for every y E Y the sets {y E Y~ y Y~; y} and
{y E Y~ y~; y} are open in Y.
Property (P1) states that an agent can rank any two outcomes y and y. So the case that
they are incomparable does not occur. Property (P2) states that if an agent prefers the outcome
y to the outcome y, and he prefers y to y, then he also prefers y to y. Property (P3) is a kind of
smoothness condition. Roughly speaking, it states that if an agent strictly prefers the outcome
y to the outcome y, then he also strictly prefers the outcome y to all outcomes y that differ only
slightly from the outcome y.
The following result, which can be found in D~sREU ( 1959), provides sufficient condi-
tions on ~; so that it can be represented by a utility function.
Theorem 2.1 Let ~; be a preference relation on a connected topologic,al space Y. If ~;
satisfies conditions ( P1) -(P3), then there exists a continuous utility function U; : Y-~ R such
that for any y, y E Y we have that y~;y if and only if U;(y) ? U;(y).
Note that this utility function U; is not uniquely determined. For if U; represents the
preferences ~;, then so dces any monotonic transformation of U;. This means that if f : R-ti
R is a strictly increasing function, then the utility function U; defined by U;(t) - f(U;(t)) for
all t E R also represents the preference relation ~;.
For the remainder of this section assume that the conditions ofTheorem 2.1 are satisfied.
So, given a coalition S and its outcome space YS, we can determine the utility levels the
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agents in this coalition can obtain individually. Then a cooperative decision making model
(N, {Ys}scN, { ~i};EN) can be modelled as an NTU-game (N,V), where N is the set of
agents and V(S) C Rs is the set of utility levels coalition S can obtain, that is,
V(S) -{(zi);ES E RSI 3~Y~).ESEYs d;ES : Z; G U;(y;)~. (2.1)
Note that for mathematical convenience the set V(S) not only includes the utility levels
(U;(y;));ES for all (y;);ES E Ys, but also the utility levels z E Rs which are worse. Finally,
note that the preferences ~; need not be induded in the description ( N, V) of an NTU-game,
because for each agent it holds that the higher his utility the better.
NTU-games were introduced in A[1tvlArnv and PELE~ (1960) and generalize TU-games,
which were already introduced in voN NEUtvtAl~trt and MoxoErrs~tuv (1944). Whether or not
an NTU-game can be reduced to a TU-game, depends on the agents' utility functions. In fact,
it depends on whether or not adding the individual utilities makes any sense. If so, the benefits
from cooperation may be determined by adding the individual utilities and maximizing the
resulting sum over all available outcomes. A TU-game can thus be described by a pair (N, v),
where N is the set of agents and
v(S) - max ~ U;(y;)
~Y~)~esEYs ;ES
(2.2)
are the benefits for coalition S C N. Note that, by the same argument as for NTU-games, we
do not need to include the preference relations ~t for i E N, in the description (N, v) of a
TU-game.
To explain the difference between transferable and non-transferable utility, let us return
to the introductory example involving Linda, Roos, and Jessica. Jessica feels a bit sorry for
Linda and Roos that they are left empty handed. For consolation, she therefore gives them her
ticket to a Marco Borsato concert. Now Linda and Roos have one ticket for the both of them.
Obviously, only one of them can actually go and attend the concert. So, who will be the lucky
person to get the ticket?
Let us begin with specifying the outcome space Y and Y{~,R}, respectively. To describe
a distribution of the benefits, let the vector y-(y~, yR) denote a distribution of the ticket.
Since the ticket is useless when divided into smaller parts, it can be given to either Linda,
to Roos, or, in case of disposal, to neither of them. Hence, the only possible allocations are
(1, 0), (0,1), and (0, 0). Now, if the ticket is given to, say, Linda then Roos receives nothing.
Obviously, Roos disapproves of this allocation. Similarly, if Roos receives the ticket, then
Linda gets nothing and she disapproves of the allocation. In order to make some progress in
this bazgaining process, let us introduce transfer payments. So if, for instance, Linda receives
the ticket she can pay money to Roos to compensate her for not receiving the ticket. Let
the vector (xL, ~R) denote these transfer payments. So, an outcome for, say, Linda states the
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amount of money she receives and who receives the ticket. This means that we can take the
outcome space Y equal to
Y- R x{(1, 0), (0,1), (0, 0)}.
Now, let us determine the outcome space Y{L,R} C Y x Y. Since the amount of money received
by one person has to be paid by the other one, we have that xL ~- xR C 0. The outcome space
Y{t„rt} thus equals
Y{~,R} -{((x~, y), (zR, y)) E Y x YI xt -{- xR c 0 and y E {(1, 0), (0,1), (0, 0)} }.
Next, let the preferences of Linda and Roos be described by the following the utility
functions:
UL(x, y) -( x ~- 200, if y -(1, 0),
x, if y ~ (1,0)
UR(x, y) -; x ~ 400, if y -(0,1),
x, if y ~ (0,1),
ThismeansthatLindaprefersan allocation ( x, y) to theallocation ( ~, y) if UL(x, y) ) U~(~, y).
Similazly, Roos prefers (x, y) to (~, y) if UR(x, y) ~ UR(~, y). For instance, if (x~, xR) -
(-100,100) and y- ( 1, 0) then Linda's utility equals -100 f 200 - 100 and Roos's utility
equals 100. Furthermore, if the ticket is given to Roos instead of Linda, that is, y-(0,1),
then Linda's utility equals - 100 and Roos's utility equals 500. Hence, Linda prefers the first
allocation to the latter, while Roos prefers the latter to the first.
Now, let us start with describing the benefits in terms of NTU-games. For this purpose
we determine the utility levels of all possible allocations. First, consider the allocations that
assign the ticket to neither Linda nor Roos, that is, y-(0, 0). Then given an allocation
(xL, xR), Linda's utility equals xL and Roos's utility equals xR. Since xL f xR C 0, the utility
levels Linda and Roos can obtain are
i(xL, xR)I xL -~ xR G O}.
Second, consider the allocations that assign the ticket to Linda, that is y-(1, 0). Then Linda's
utility equals xL ~ 200 and Roos's utility equals xR. The utility levels they can obtain in this
way are
{(xL -i' 200, xR)I xL -}- xR G 0}.
Finally, consider the allocations that assign the ticket to Roos, that is, y-(0,1). In that case,
Linda's utility equals x~ and Roos's utility equals xR f 400. Hence, the corresponding utility
levels aze
{(xL,xR f 4OO)I xL -F x~q G 0}.
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As can be seen in Figure 2.1, which pictures these three sets, the set {(xL, xR -F 400) ~ xt -l- xR G
0} contains both {(xL ~ 200, xR)~ xL ~ xR C 0} and {(xL, xR)~ xL -} xR C O}. SO, instead
of stating that Linda and Roos's benefits are a ticket for a Marco Borsato concert, we can say
that cooperation earns them
V({L, R}) -{(xL, xR f 4OO)~ xL ~ xR G O}.
Formulating the benefits in this way is typical for NTU-games.
Roos
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Next, let us describe the benefits in terms of TU-games. This means that we add the
individual utilities and maximize this sum over all possible allocations. Solving
maximize xL f xR ~(200, 400)yT
subject to: xL ~ xR G 0,
y E {(1,0),(0,1),(0,0)}
yields a maximum of 400. So, instead of stating that Linda and Roos's benefits are a ticket for
a Mazco Borsato concert, we can say that cooperation earns them 400 units of utility. What
is left to check is if adding the individual utilities is a justified operation, that is, does it make
any difference whether we state the benefits as 400 or as {(xL, xR ~- 400)~ xL -}- xR c 0}. In
answering this question, let us examine the utility levels Linda and Roos can obtain when they
may allocate 400 units of utility. If uL denotes the amount of utility that Linda receives and uR
the amount that Roos receives, then the utility levels they can realize are described by the set
{(uL, uR)I uL ~ uR G 4OO}.
This set is pictured in Figure 2.2. Comparing Figure 2.1 to Figure 2.2 reveals that the
set {(uL, uR)~ uL ~ uR G 400} coincides with the set {(xL, xR f 400)~ xL f xR G 0}.
Hence, each allocation ( (xL, y), ( xR, y)) corresponds with an allocation u-(uL, uR) of 400
units of utility, and the other way azound; for each allocation u- (uL, uR) there exists an
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allocation ( (xL, y), (xR, y)) E Y{t,R} such that the corresponding utilities coincide, that is,
UL(xL, y) - u~ and UR(xR, y) - uR. This implies that it is indeed correct to state Linda and
Roos's benefits to be 400.
Determining the benefits by maximizing the sum of the individual utilities does not work




f(x) f 200, if y- (1, 0),
f(x), if y ~ (1, 0)
f(x) ~- 400, ify - (0,1),
f(x), ify ~ (0,1),
f(t) ~{ 2t, if t C 0
Zt, ift~0.
So, Linda's utility for money depends on whether she receives money or has to pay it. Of
course, a similar argument holds for Roos.
Again, let us start with describing the benefits in terms of NTU-games. To determine all
utility levels Linda and Roos can realize, we distinguish three cases. In the first case, neither
of them gets the ticket, that is, y- (0, 0). This means that Linda's utility equals f(xL) and
that Roos's utility equals f(xR). Since xL f xR C 0, the utility levels they can obtain are
{(.f(xL)~ f(~R))I xL ~- xR G O}.
In the second case, Linda gets the ticket, so that y-(1,0). Then Linda's utility equals
f(x~) ~- 200 and Roos's utility equals f(xR). The utility levels they can achieve in this way
thus are
{(f(xL) ~ 200e f(xR))~ xL ~ xR
C 0}.
Finally, in the third case, Roos gets the ticket. Hence, y - (0,1) so that Linda's utility equals
f(xL) and Roos's utility equals f(xR) f 400. The feasible utility levels then equal
{(f(xL)if(xR) ~ 4OO)I xL f x}~ G 0}.
Combining these three possibilities, yields the utility levels presented in Figure 2.3.
In contrast to the previous situation, describing the benefits by the maximal sum of the
individual utilities is not possible. This can be seen as follows. The maximum equals 400 and
is attained in the allocation ((xL, y), ( xR, y)) -((0, ( 0,1)), ( 0, (0,1)), which corresponds to
the poin[ (0, 400) in Figure 2.3. Now, if we state that the benefits equal 400 units of utility,
then Linda and Roos may allocate this 400 between the two of them. This means that they can
obtain the following utility levels
{(wL, wR)~ wL ~- wR C 400},
Roos
,. ........ ,~ )
Figure 2.3
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which, among others, also includes the allocation (300,100). But as Figure 2.3 shows, there
exists no allocation ((xL, y), (xR, y)) E Y{t,tt} that yields Linda and Roos a utility level of 300
and 100, respectively. Apparently, allocating 400 units of utility is not similar to allocating the
ticket. So, what makes the difference then? Why does adding the utility functions UL and UR
not raise any problems, while adding WL and WR dces?
The answer to this question is the following property, which UL and UR possess, namely,
that a transfer of money from one person to another, corresponds with a transfer ofutility, hence
the distinction between games with transferable utility and games with non-transferable utílity.
To explain this transferable utility property in more detail, consider an arbitrary allocation
((x~, y), (xR, y)) E Y{L,R} such that y - ( 0, 1), that is, Roos receives the ticket. The utility
levels UL(xL, y) and UR(xR, y) that correspond with this allocation thus are xL for Linda and
xR f 400 for Roos. Now, suppose that an amount of t dollar is transferred from Roos to
Linda, then Linda receives t dollaz and Roos receives the ticket and - t dollar. This transfer
payment increases Linda's utility with t units to x~ -~ t, and it decreases Roos's utility with t
units to xR - t -~ 400. In other words, transferring t dollar from Roos to Linda corresponds
with transferring t units of utility from Roos to Linda. So instead of transferring money they
transfer units of utilities.
A consequence of this transferable utility property is that each individual's valuation for
the ticket does not depend on the amount of money she receives. Indeed, Linda's utility equals
xL ~ 200 if she gets the ticket and xL if she does not get it. The difference always amounts to
200, whatever the value of xL. So Linda's value for the ticket is 200 units of utility. Similazly,
it follows that Roos's value for the ticket is 400 units of utility.
Since utility is transferable, the more units ofutility Linda and Roos can divide, the better
it is for the both of them. This means that we need to focus on the allocations that maximize
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the sum of the utilities. This sum equals 0 if no one receives the ticket, 200 if Linda receives
the ticket, and 400 if Roos receives the ticket. Hence, the ticket should be given the Roos, so
that the benefits equa1400 units of utility.
That the utility functions WL and WR do not satisfy the transferable utility property is
easily seen as follows. Consider the allocation ((x~, y), (xR, y)) - ((0, ( 0,1)), ( 0, (0,1))),
which conesponds to the point (0, 400) in Figure 2.2. Now, if we transfer ~ 200 from
Roos to Linda, so that Linda receives ~ 200 and Roos pays ~ 200, then Linda's utility only
increases with 100 to f(200) - 100. Roos's utility, on the other hand, decreases with 400 to
f(-200) -}- 400 - 0. Hence, transferring ~ 200 dollar from Roos to Linda does not transfer
200 units of utility. In fact, it decreases the total utility with 300. Although total utility
has decreased, this does not mean that the allocation ((200, (0, 1)), (-200, ( 0,1))) is worse
than (( 0, (0,1), ( 0, (0,1))); both allocations aze optimal in the sense, that there exists no other
allocation that yields a higher utility to both Linda and Roos ( see also Figure 2.3).
The example above shows that not every utility function satisfies the transferable utility
property. So, what utility functions do satisfy this transferable utility property, and, maybe
even more important, which preferences can be represented by such utility functions? To start
with the first question, recall that utility is transferable if a transfer of money between agents
corresponds to a transfer of utility. For this to occur in the first place, the outcome space Y
must at least allow for transfer payments between the agents. For if agents cannot transfer any
money, a transfer of money can certainly not correspond to a transfer of utility. This means
that Y can be written as R x Y, where R represents the amount of money an agent receives
and Y represents all other outcomes (see also Example 2.3 on sequencing situations). Then
the outcome space Ys for coalition S is a subset of jj;ES(R x Y). The utility that agent
i E S assigns to an outcome ((x„ y;));ES E Ys equals U;(x;, y;). Moreover, it satisfies the
transferable utility property if the utility function U; is lineazly separable in money, that is, if
there exists a function v; : Y-r R such that for each outcome ( x;, y;) E R x Y it holds that
Ut(x~, yt) - x~ ~- vt(y:). (2.3)
To see that utility is indeed transferable, consider two agents i and j such that U;(x;, y;) -
x; f v;(y;) and U;(x„ y~) - x~ -~ v~(y;). Let i, j E S and take an outcome ((xk, yk))kES E Ys.
Next, let r be a transfer payment of t dollars from agent i to agent j. Hence, agent i receives
x; - t dollar and agent j receives x~ f t dollar. Then U;(x; - t, y;) - x; - t-F v;(y;) and
U~ (x~ f t, y~) - x~ f t~ v;(y; ) . Since the transfer payment of t dollars from agent i to agent
j decreases agent i's utility with t, and increases agent j's utility with t, it corresponds to a
transfer of t units of utility. Furthermore, if all utility functions are of the form (2.3) then the
benefits of coalition S can be described by the maximum sum of the individual utilities. The
proof is straightforward. Since transfer payments between the agents aze allowed, this means
tha[ for each outcome ((x;, y;));ES E Ys it holds that ~;ES x; C 0. Then given the utility
~r~R~;rtv~ ~r~i~t~ T~~ai2Y
functions U;(x;, y;) - ~; ~ v;(y;) for all i E S the benefits in terms of an NTU-game equals
V(s) -{Z E RSI 3~~2„Y~))~ESEYSdiES : Z; C~; ~ vi(yi)}.
Assuming that the maximum of ihe sum of the individual utility levels exists, it equals
v(S) - max S~(~i ~ vi(yi))I ((~ii yi))iES E Ys~
I~ES
- maxS ~v;(yi)I ((~i,yi))iES E Ys1 .IiES
When coalition S allocates v(S), the utility levels the members of S can obtain equal {z E
Rs~ ~;ES z; C v(S)}. Hence, it is sufficientto show that V(S) -{z E Rs~ ~;ES z; C v(S)}.
That V(S) C{z E Rs~ ~;ES z; C v(S)} follows immediately from -
v(S) - max{~(x; -~ v;(y;))~ ((xi, yi))ies E Ys} - max ~ z;.
iES ZEV~SI iES
For the reverse inclusion, take ~ E{z E Rs~ ~;ES z; C v(S) } and let ((0, y;)),ES E Ys be such
that~;ESV;(y;) - max{~;ESV;(y;)~ ((~;,y;));ES E Ys} - v(S). Next,define~; -~;-v;(y;)
for all agents i E S. Then
~~i -~~i - vi(yi) C v(S) - max 1 ~v;(yi)I ((~,yi))iES E Ys1 - 0,iES iES :ES J
and, consequently, ( (x;, y;));ES E Ys. Since U;(x;, y;) - x; f v;(y;) - t;; for all i E S it
follows that {z E Rs~ ~;ES z; C v(S)} C V(S).
Summarizing, if the utility functions are linearly separable in money we can model a
cooperative decision making problem as a TU-game.
Next, let us turn to the second question, that is, which preferences can be represented
by a utility function that is linearly separable in money. For characterizing these preferences
we need the properties (P1), (P2) and three additional properties. So, let ~; be a preference
relation on an outcome space Y - R x Y.
(P4) The preferences ~i are strictly monotonic in x if for any (~, y), (x, y) E R x Y it holds
that (~, y) ~; (i, y) if and only if x) i.
(PS) For any outcomes ( x, y), (~, y) E R x Y with (~, y) ~;(i, y) there exists t E R such
that (~i y) ~i ( ~ -}- t, y)~
(P6) For any outcomes ( x, y), (i, y) E R x Y with ( x, y) ~; (~, y) and every t E R it holds
that (x f t, y) ~; (i f t, y).
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Property (P4) means that agent i prefers more money to less. Property (PS) states that
a change in the outcome from (x, y) to (i, y) can be compensated by an amount of money t.
Finally, property ( P6) implies that agent i's preferences over the outcome space Y does not
depend on the amount of money x; he receives.
The following theorem is due to AUtvtnrllv (1960) and KA1vExo ( 1976) and characterizes
preference relations with transferable utility.
Theomm 2.2 Let ~i be a preference relation on the outcome space Y- R x Y. If ~i satisfies
conditions (P1), (P2), and ( P4) -(P6), then there exists a utility function v; : Y-~ R such that
for any ( x, y), (~, y) E Y it holds that (x, y) ~~(~, y) if and only if x-~ v;(y) ) i-}- v;(y).
Remark that if U; represents the preferences ~i, then so does any monotonic trans-
formation of U;. The property of linear separability in money, however, may be lost after
such monotonic transformations. For instance, suppose U;(x, y) - x f v;(y) represents agent
i's preferences ~i on R x Y. The utility function U; defined by U;(x, y) - e~~(z~yl for all
(x, y) E R x Y also represents ~i. The utility function U;, however, is not linearly separable
in money since U;(x, y) - extv'(yl for all (x, y) E R x Y.
2.3 Cooperative Games with 1~ansferable Utility
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or TU-game, is described by a pair (N, v), where
N- { I, 2, . .., n} is the set of agents and v : 2N -~ R is the characteristic function assigning
to each coalition S C .N a value v(S), representing the benefits from cooperation. In particular
we have that v(0) - 0.
Example 2.4 Our introductory example involving Linda, Roos, and Jessica was considered to
be a three-person NTU-game with N-{L, R, J} and v(S) - 24 if S E{{L, J}, {R, J},
{L, R, J}} and v(S) - 0 otherwise. Thus the value of a coalition S is worth 24 if coalition S
can find the treasure on its own, and its value is zero if this is not possible.
Example 2.5 For the linear production situation formulated in Example 2.2 we have the
outcome space Y- R and for each S C N
YS -{(xi)iES E RSI ~cEC(S) .~xi C i~TC}
iE5
with C(S) - {c E R} ~ Ac C ~;ES bi } the set of feasible production plans. Since the outcome
space Y represents allocations of money only, transferable utility implies that U;(x) - x for
all x E R and all i E N. A linear production game (N, v) is then defined by
v(S) - max{~ U;(x;)~ ( x;);ES E Ys} - max { pTC~ Ac C~ bi )
iES l iES JJJ
for all S C N.
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Example 2.6 Recall that for the sequencing situation described in Example 2.3 we have
N-{ 1, 2, ..., n}, the set of divisions waiting for service,
Y - R x IIN,
the outcome space, and
Ys -{((x„ ~))~ES E~ Y~ ~ x; G 0 and ~ E IIs}
iE5 iES
the outcome space for coalition S, where IIS denotes the set of admissible rearrangements
with respect to the initial serving order vo. To comply with Ct7RtEL ~r AL. (1989), let the
waiting costs for division i E N be given by k;(Q) -~;EN,ol;l~ol;l a;p; with p; the service
time of division j and a; 1 0. Thus, the waiting costs increase linearly with the waiting time.
Then given a serving order v the cost savings for division i equal k;(oo) - k;(v). Next, let
U;(x,v) - x f k;(vo) - k;(Q) for all (x,Q) E Ys. So, given an outcome (x,v) division i's
utility equals the amount of money x it receives plus the cost savings that correspond with the
serving order v. A sequencing game (N, v) is then defined by
v(S) - max {~ Ut(xr, a)~ ((xt, ~))tES E Ys JiES
- max S~(k~(ao) - k;(a))~ ~ E IIs 1 ,I aES
for all S C N.
A TU-game ( N, v) is called superadditive if for all disjoint S, T C N it holds that
v(S) f v(T) c v(S U T). (2.4)
This means that two disjoint coalitions do not suffer from forming one large coalition. Many
economic situations will lead to superadditive games, for if two disjoint coalitions S and T join
forces, they can often guarantee themselves the payoff v(S) ~- v(T) by operating separately.
A TU-game ( N, v) is convex if for all i E N and all S C T C N`{i} it holds that
v(S U{i}) - v(S) G v(T U{i}) - v(T). (2.5)
Convexity thus implies that an agent contributes more to the benefits of a coalition when
this coalition becomes lazger. Convexity first appeared in SxAPLEY ( 1971), and besides the
definition given by ( 2.5), several other, equivalent definitions exist. Two of those are the
following. The first one is quite similar to (2.5) and reads as follows: for each U C N and
each S C T C N`U it holds that
v(S U U) - v(S) c v(T U U) - v(T). (2.6)
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So, also if more than one agent joins a coalition, the change in the benefits increases when this
coalition increases. The second alternative definition, on the other hand, differs significantly
from expression (2.5), namely, for every S, T C N it holds that
v(S) ~ v(T) ~ v(S n T) f v(S u T). (2.7)
One can show that expression (2.7) implies that v(S U T) - v(S) - v(T) is increasing in both
S and T. Since v(S U T)- v(S) - v(T) can be interpreted as the incentive for coalitions S and
T to merge, convexity thus means that larger coalitions have a bigger incentive to join forces.
Hence, convexity is a much stronger condition than superadditivity, which only states that two
disjoint coalitions have an incentive to merge; superadditivity does not say anything about the
magnitude of this incentive. That convex games aze superadditive also follows immediately
from (2.7) by taking S and T disjoint. Convexity, however, is not as generally satisfied as
superadditivity. The linear production games described in Example 2.5, for instance, are
superadditive but not necessarily convex.
What we are interested in aze `fair' allocations of the benefits v(N). So, assuming that
all agents are willing to cooperate with each other, how should the benefits v(N) be divided so
that each agent is satisfied. The game theoretical literature proposes many allocation rules as a
solution to this problem. As we will show, some of these rules aze generally applicable while
others aze designed to suit only very specific TU-games. Each of these nales, of course, has it
own pros and cons and deciding which allocation rule applies best is a problem in itself.
An allocation of v(N) is described by a vector x E R~` such that ~;ENxt G v(N).
Moreover, an allocation ~ is called efficient or Pareto optimal if there exists no allocation ~
that yields every agent a higher payoff, i.e., ~; ) x; for all i E N. Obviously, each agent i
is only willing to participate in the grand coalition if it pays him at least as much as he can
obtain on his own. This means that an allocation x must be such that ~; 1 v({i}) for all
i E N. These allocations are called individually rational. The set of all individually rational
and Pazeto optimal allocations is called the imputation set and is defined by
1(V) - {2 E RNI ~~i - v(N), diEN : 2i ~ 77({
iEN
(2.8)
Note that the imputation set is nonempty if the game is superadditive.
The argument that an agent dces not participate in the grand coalition N if he dces not
receive at least v({i}) is reasonable. Moreover, it dces not only apply to individuals, but also
to coalitions. A coalition S has incentives to part company with the grand coalition if it can
improve the payoff of each member. Mathematically, this means that given an allocation ~ of
v(N), coalition S has incentives to leave coalition N if there exists an allocation y of v(S)
such that y; ~~; for all i E S. It is a straightforward exercise to check that such an allocation
y dces not exist if and only if ~;ES x; 7 v(S). Hence, no coalition has incentives to separate
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from the grand coalition if the allocation x is such that ~,ES x; ? v(S) for all S C N. Such
an allocation x is called a core-allocation. The core of a TU-game (N, v) is thus defined by
C(v) - {~ E I(v)~ dscN : ~ ~; ? v(S)}. (2.9)
~ES
Although core-allocations provide the agents with an incentive to maintain the grand
coalition, they need not always exist, as the following example shows.
Example 2.7 Consider a three-person TU-game (N,v) with v({i}) - 0 for all i E N and
v(S) - 1 for all S C N with ~S~ 1 2. Note that this game is superadditive but that its core
is empty. To see that no core allocation exists, take ~ E I(v). So, ~;EN ~; - 1 and ~; 1 0
for i - 1, 2, 3. If x would be a core-allocation it must satisfy ~1 ~~2 ) 1, ~1 f x3 1 1, and
~2 f x3 ) 1. Adding these three inequalities yields 2(xl f~2 -~ ~3) ~ 3. Since ~, f~2 f a3 - 1
this inequality cannot be satisfied. Hence, the core is empty.
A necessary and sufficient condition for nonemptiness of the core is given in BorvDAxEVn
(1963) and SxnPLEY (1967). In order to formulate this condition we use the notion of balanced
maps. Therefore, define for each S C N the vector es E RN by es - 1 if i E S and
es - 0 if i~ S. A map ~: 2N -~ [0,1] is a balanced map if for all i E N it holds that
~scN ~(S)es - eN.
Theorem 2.3 Let (N, v) be a TU-game. Then C(v) ~ 0 if and only if for each balanced map
a it holds that
~ ~(S)v(S) C v(N). (2.10)
SC N
TU-games that have a nonempty core are called balanced games. Furthermore, if also
every subgame (S, v~s) of the TU-game (N, v) has a nonempty core, the game is called totally
balanced. Here, the characteristic function of a subgame (S, v~s) is defined as v~s(T) - v(T)
for all T C S. The linear production games and sequencing games presented in Example 2.5
and Example 2.6, respectively, are examples of totally balanced games.
A sufficient but not necessary condition for nonemptiness of the core is provided in
SHAPLEY (1971) and reads as follows:
T'heorem 2.4 Let (N, v) be a TU-game. If (N, v) is convex, then C(v) ~ 0.
When dividing the benefits of the grand coalition N, it is likely that the agents focus on
core-allocations only. For if an allocation outside the core is proposed, at least one coalition
can threaten to leave the grand coalition if it does not receive a larger share of the benefits.
The core, however, need not give a decisive answer to wha[ allocation the agents should agree
upon. Although the core can consist of only one allocation, most of the time it turns out to be
a fairly large set of allocations. For illustration, consider the following two examples.
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Example 2.8 Consider the game (N, v) of Example 2.4 with N-{L, R, J} and v(S) - 24
if S E{{L, J}, {R, J}, {L, R, J}} and v(S) - 0 otherwise. So, (xL, xR, ~~) E R~ is a
core-allocation if xL ~~~ ? 24, xR f~~ 1 24 and ~~ f xR f~~ - 24. Adding the two
inequalities yields ~~ f xR -F- ~~ f a~ ~ 48. Substituting aL ~}- ~R ~- ~~ - 24 gives that
x~ ~ 24. Together with xL ~ 0 and ~R 1 0 this implies that ( x~, xR, x~) -(0, 0, 24) is the
only solution. Hence, C(v) - {(0,0,24)}.
Example2.9 Consider a three-person TU-game (N,v) with v({i}) - 0 for all i E N,
v({1,2}) - 4, v({1,3} - 3, v({2,3} - 2, and v({1,2,3}) - 8. The core C(v) of this
game is depicted in Figure 2.4 and contains infinitely many allocations.
Agent 3
Figure 2.4
In contrast with the core, which can be a set of allocations, an allocation rule assigns
to each TU-game (N, v) exactly one allocation. A well known allocation rule is the Shapley
value, introduced in SHAPLEY (1953). This allocation rule is based on the marginal vectors
of a TU-game (N, v). To explain the definition of a marginal vector, let v be an ordering of
the agents. So, Q: N-~ { I, 2, ..., n} is a bijection with Q(i) - j meaning that agent i is
in position j. Next, let the agents enter a room one at a time according to the order Q. Thus,
agent v-1(1) enters first, then agent v-t(2), and so on. When an agent enters the room, he
joins the coalition that is already there. Furthermore, the payoff he receives equals the amount
with which the benefits of the coalition changes. The resulting allocation is called the marginal
vector with respect to the order Q and equals
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m;(v) - v({~ E NI ~(~) ~~(i)}) - v({~ E NI ~(~) ~~(i)}), (2.11)
for all i E N. Note that mo(v) is indeed an allocation since ~;EN m;(v) - v(N). Presuming
that each of the n! different orders occurs equally likely, the Shapley value ~(v) assigns to each
agent i his expected marginal contribution, that is,
~;(v) - l~ ~ m;(v)
n. oEnN
- ~ ~S!(n ~~ - ~S)!(v(S u {i}) - v(S)),
scN`{;}
(2.12)
with II~, - {v : N-~ { 1, 2, ..., n} ~ t1;,;EN:i~; :~(i) ~ v( j) } the set of all orderings of N.
Let us calculate the Shapley value for the game given in Example 2.9.
Example 2.10 Consider the game defined in Example 2.9. Let v;, i- 1, 2, ..., 6 denote
the orders 123, 132, 312, 321, 231, and 213, respectively. Then mi'(v) - v({1}) - v(0) -
0, m2'(v) - v({1,2}) - v({1}) - 4, and m3'(v) - v({1,2,3}) - v({2,3}) - 4. So,
m" (v) -(0, 4, 4). Similarly, one calculates mo' (v) -(0, 5, 3) , mo3 (v) - (3, 5, 0), mo' (v) -
(6, 2, 0), mo' (v) -(6, 0, 2), and mofi (v) -(4, 0, 4). The Shapley value thus equals ~(v) -
s~6 1 mo~ (v) - 6(19,16,13) ( see also Figure 2.4).
As can be seen in Figure 2.4, the Shapley value is a core-allocation for this particular
game. In general, however, this is not the case as the following example shows.
Example 2.11 Consider again the game presented in Example 2.4. To calculate the Shapley
value, let o;, i- 1, 2, ..., 6 denote the orders LRJ, LJR, JLR, JRL, RJL, and RLJ,
respectively. Then m~' (v) - v({L}) - v(0) - 0, mR (v) - v({L, R}) - v({L}) - 0, and
m~' (v) - v( {L, R, J} )- v( {L, R}) - 24. So, mo' (v) -(0, 0, 24). Similarly, one calculates
mv~ (v) - (0, 0, 24) , mv3 (v) -(24, 0, 0), mo' (v) -(0, 24, 0), mo' (v) - (0, 0, 24), and
moe(v) -(0, 0, 24). The Shapley value then equals ~(v) - 6~6 1 mo~(v) -(4, 4,16). Note
that ~(v) is not a core-allocation since ~L(v) f~~(v) - 20 c 24 - v({L, J}).
So, the Shapley value need not result in a core-allocation. SxAPt~Y (1971) provides a
sufficient condition for ~(v) to be an element of the core.
T'heorem 2.5 Let ( N, v) be a TU-game. If (N, v) is convex, then ~(v) E C(v).
The proof of this proposition follows from a result also due to SHnPLEY (1971), namely,
that for convex games all mazginal vectors belong to the core. The converse of this statement
is given in Icxnsxi (1981). Hence, a TU-game (N,v) is convex if and only if all mazginal
vectors aze elements of the core C(v).
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As opposed to the Shapley value, the nucleolus is an allocation rule that results in a
core-allocation whenever the core is nonempty. The nucleolus for TU-games is introduced
in ScHMEIDLF1t ( 1969) and minimizes the maximal complaint of the coalitions. Given an
allocation x E I(v), the complaint of a coalition S expresses how dissatisfied this coalition
is with the proposed allocation ~. The complaint of coalition S is defined as the difference
between what this coalition can obtain on its own and what the allocation x assigns to the
members of S. So, the less x assigns to the members of S, the higher the complaint of this
coalition will be. Then, roughly speaking, the nucleolus is that allocation of the imputation set
I(v) that minimizes the maximal complaint of all coalitions.
For a formal definition of the nucleolus, let (N, v) be a TU-game such that the imputation
set I( v) is nonempty. Given an allocation x, the complaint, or excess, of coalition S is defined
by E(S, x) - v(S) -~;ES a;. Note that the excess E(S, x) increases if ~;ES x; decreases.
Next, let E(~) - (E(S, x))scN be the vector ofexcesses and let B o E(x) denote the vector of
excesses with its elements azranged in decreasing order. The nucleolus is then defined by
n(v) -{x E I(v)~ b'yErl„1 : 9 o E(~) Clex 8 o E(y)}. (2.13)
Here, G~ex denotes the lexicographical ordering on RZN. Given two vectors x, y E R2N we
have ~ G(ex y if there exists k E YV such that x; - y; for i- 1, 2, ..., k and xkfl G yktl. So,
when comparing two vectors, the lexicographical ordering first compares the first element of
each vector, if they are equal it compares the second element of each vector, and so on. The
following result is due to SCHMEIDLER (1969).
Theorem 2.6 Let (N, v) be a TU-game. If I(v) ~ 0, then the nucleolus n(v) is a singleton.
Moreover, n(v) C C(v) whenever C(v) ~ 0.
Example 2.12 Consider again the game presented in Example 2.9. The nucleolus for this game
equalsn(v) - ( 3z,2~,2)withthemaximalcomplaintbeingE({3},n(v)) - E({1,2},n(v)) -
-2. Figure 2.4 shows that the nucleolus n(v) is indeed a core-allocation.
Although the nucleolus has the nice property that it always results in a core-allocation,
provided one exists, it is not that easy to calculate. Even for a[hree person example the
calculations are extensive, hence the absence of any calculations in Example 2.12. There
are special classes of TU-games though, for which the nucleolus is determined more easily.
Examples of such TU-games aze big boss games (see Mv'ro, N.axnY.~vt.4, Po7TE[ts, and Tus
(1988)) and airport games (see LrrrLECtID,D (1974)).
The two allocation rules discussed thus faz are applicable to every (superadditive) TLJ-
game. When considering a particular class of TU-games though, a more intuitive allocation
rule may exist that applies to this particulaz setting only. Besides having a more appealing
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interpretation, these rules are often easier to determine than both the Shapley value and the
nucleolus. This, for instance, is the case for linear production games and sequencing games.
We therefore conclude this section on TU-games with two examples of such specific allocation
rules, one applying to linear production games and the other applying to sequencing games.
Example 2.13 Recall that a linear production game (N, v) is defined by
v(S) - max { pT c~ Ac C~ b', c J O 1l iES -
for all S C N. One can, of course, calculate the Shapley value and nucleolus for these
games. Since linear production games are totally balanced, we even know that the nucleolus
results in a core-allocation. The following, relatively easy procedure, however, also yields a
core-allocation for every linear production game (N, v).
Consider the following linear program to determine the value v(N) of the grand coalition
v(N) - max ( pT c~ Ac G~ b', c? O 1 .l iEN
The dual of this linear program is
min(yT~b'~yTA~p,y)O 1 .l iEN
Now, if y E R~ denotes an optimal solution of the dual program, OwFtv (1975) shows that the
allocation ~ defined by ~i - yTbi is a core-allocation of the linear production game (N, v).
For interpreting this allocation, note that the optimal solution y represents the shadow prices
of the resources. This means that if, say, the amount of resource j increases with 1 unit, then
the maximal revenues increase with approximately y;. In other words, y; .~iEN b~ denotes the
contribution of resource j in the maximal revenues. The allocation (yTbi);EN then gives each
agent the value of his resource bundle.
Example 2.14 For the sequencing games described in Example 2.6, CuxiEt. ~[' AL. (1989)
introduced the Equal Gain Splitting rule. For understanding how this rule works, let us go
into more detail on the optimal serving order. For this purpose, consider two divisions i and j
such that division j is the immediate follower of division i. Recall that the waiting costs for
divisions i and j are given by ki(U) -~kEN:o(k)Go(i) aipk and k;(a) -~kEN:o(k)Go(j) aipk.
respectively. Now, if division i and j change their positions in the serving order, then division
i's waiting time increases with p;. Hence, the waiting costs for division i increase with cx;p;.
Similarly, the waiting time for division j decreases with p;, so that its waiting costs decrease
with cr;pi. The benefits from this change in position thus equal a;pi - aip;. This implies that
division i and j trade places if and only if the benefits are positive, that is, a;pi - aip; 1 0.
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It can be shown that an optimal order is reached by consecutively switching the places of
two divisions, one succeeding the other, whenever such a change is beneficial. Moreover, all
beneficial switches occur in this procedure. The Equal Gain Splitting rule, or EGS-rule, then
divides the benefits of each switch equally among the two divisions that are involved in this
switch. Hence, division i receives
EGJiIV) - ~ 2(~)1)i - CYil~1) f ~ 2(~i~k - ak~i)~
1EN: oo(~) ~ oo(q kEN: oo(k) G oo(~)
ajP~ - a~Pj ~ 0 a~Pk - atP~ ~ 0
CURIEI. i;r AL. (1989) shows that the EGS-rule always results in a core-allocation of the
corresponding sequencing game. Other allocation rules arise when the benefits ~;p; - a;p;
aze not divided equally among the divisions i and j, but according to some distribution code
~Y - {7ij}i,iEN:iGj. ThIS means that if divisions i and j change their positions, division i
receives the fraction y;; E[0,1] of the benefits a;p; - a;p; and division j receives the fraction
1- y;; E[0,1]. These allocation rules are considered in HAMEIts, SUIJS, ~.IS and Boltlvt
(1996). For an extensive study on (generalized) sequencing situations we refer to HA1vtElts
(1996).
2.4 Cooperative Games with Non-transferable Utility
A cooperative game with non-transferable uti[ity, or NTU-game, is described by a pair (N, V),
where N- { 1, 2, . . ., n} denotes the set of agents and V is a map assigning to each coalition
S a nonempty and closed subset V(S) of Rs such that
V({i}) - (-oo,v({i})], v({i}) E R (2.14)
for all i E N,
if x E V(S) and ~ c x then also ~ E V(S), (2.15)
for all S C N, and
V(S) n{x E RSI b';ES : x; ~ v({i})} (2.16)
is bounded for all S C N. The set V( S) represents the utility vectors the members of coalition
S can obtain when cooperating (see also ( 2.1)). For mathematical reasons it is sometimes
useful to extend the utility vectors in V(S) with zeros for the agents that do not belong to
coalition S. So, let us also define
V(S) -{a E RN~ (x;);ES E V(S), b;gs : x; - 0} (2.17)
for all S C N.
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Example 2.15 Every TU-game (N, v) can be modelled as an NTiJ-game (N, V) by defining
V(S) - {~ E RS~ ~x; ~ v(S)}
for all S C N.
~ES
Example 2.16 Consider the model of an exchange economy presented in Example 2.1. As-
suming that the agents' preferences can be represented by a continuous utility function U;, this
situation gives rise to the following NTU-game (N, V) with
V(S) - {z E RS~ 3~~~1,ESEysb';ES - z; G U;(c')},
for all i E S. Note that since YS is compact and U; is continuous for all i E N, condition (2.16)
is satisfied.
An NTU-game (N, V) is called superadditive if for all disjoint S, T C N we have that
V(S) xV(T) C V(SUT). (2.18)
Similar as for TU-games, superadditivity implies that two disjoint coalitions do not suffer
from merging into one lazge coalition. Usually, superadditivity is satisfied. For two disjoint
coalitions S and T can at least generate the benefits V(S) x V (T ) by pretending a merger
and, in the meantime, operating separately. An equivalent statement for superadditivity is that
V(S) f V(T) C V(S UT) forall disjoint S,T C N.
An NTU-game (N, V) is called ordinal convex if for all S, T C N and all x E RN the
following statement is true: if (a;);ES E V(S) and (x;);ET E V(T) then either (~;);ESnT E
V(S fl T) or (~; );ESuT E V(S U T). Ordinal convexity is introduced in V1Lxov (1977) and
extends the definition of convexity as given in (2.7) to NTU-games. Another such an extension
is cazdinal convexity, introduced in SHARxEY ( 1981). For defining cardinal convexity, let
(N, V) be an NTLJ-game such that V({i}) - (-oo, 0] for all i E N. Then (N, V) is cardinal
convex if for all S, T C N it holds that
v(s) ~ v(T) c v(s u T) ~- v(s n T). (2.19)
Note that V({ i})- (-oo, 0] isnot really a restriction because of the monotonic transformations
we may take from the utility functions. Ordinal and cardinal convexity aze not equivalent
though, SH,4RKEY ( 1981) provides two examples of NTU-games, one being ordinal but not
cardinal convex and the other being cardinal but not ordinal convex.
As was the case for TU-games, we assume that the grand coalition N is formed and
focus on `fair' allocations, that is, utility vectors x E V(N) at which all agents are satisfied. In
this context, an allocation for coalition S is a utility vector x E V(S). An allocation x E V(S)
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is called efficient or Pareto optimal if there exists no other allocation ï E V(S) that yields
all agents in S a higher utility, i.e., ~; ) x; for all i E S. Furthermore, an agent will only
participate in the grand coalition if this yields him as least as much as he can obtain on his own.
This means that only those allocations x E V(N) are eligible such that for each agent i E N
it holds that x; ? v({i}). These allocations are called individually rational . Furthermore, the
set of all efficient and individually rational allocations is called the imputation set and is given
by
1(V) -{x E V(N)I ~iEV(N)diEN - xi i xi, diEN . x; 1 TI({2})}. (2.2~)
Analogous to TU-games one can define the core of an NTU-game. A core-allocation is such that
no coalition S can improve the payoff ofeach member by separating from the grand coalition
N and operating on its own. A coalition S can improve upon the allocation x E V(N) if there
exists an allocation ~ E V(S) such that x; 1 x; for all i E S. The core of an NTU-game is
thus given by
C(V) - {x E V(N)~ `dscN~xEV(s)diES : ~i ~ xi}. (2.21)
Example 2.17 Consider the following two person market game with two consumption goods.
Let wl -( 2, 3) and w2 -(4,1) be the endowments of agents 1 and 2, respectively. Next,
let ci -(ci, c2) denote the consumption bundle for agent i. The preferences for agent 1 are
described by the utility function Ul(cl, c2) - 2 c~ f cZ and the preferences for agent 2 are
described by U2(ci, c2) - ci -}- 2 c2. The corresponding NTU-game equals
V({1}) -{x E R~ x c Ul(2,3) - 2~~ f}
V({2}) -{x E R~ x c Uz(4,1) - 4}
V({1,2}) - {x E R2I 3c~,czER~:(c~,cs)G(6,4) : xi ~ U;(C~), 2- 1,2}
and is depicted in Figure 2.5. As one can see, the core C(V) of this game is nonempty and
equals I(V).
From Example 2.15 we know that every TU-game can be modelled as an NTU-game.
Since the core of aTU-game consists of the same utility vectors as the core of the corresponding
NTU-game, it follows from Example 2.7 that also for NTU-games the core can be empty.
Furthermore, a necessary and sufficient condition like the balancedness condition for TU-
games does not exist. Although a notion of balancedness exists, it only provides a sufficient
condition for nonemptiness of the core. The following result is a consequence of the main
theorem in SCA~tF (1967).
Figure 2.5
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Theorem 2.7 Let ( N, V) be an NTU-game. If for all balanced maps a(see page 28) it holds
that ~SCN a(S)V(S) C V(N), then C(V) ~~.
As was the case for TU-games convexity is also asufficient condition for a nonempty core.
The following two results can be found in VII,KOV (1977) and SHARKEY (1981), respectively.
Theorem 2.8 Let (N, V) be an NTU-game. If (N, V) is ordinally convex, then C(V )~ 0.
Theorem 2.9 Let (N, V) be an NTU-game. If (N, V) is cardinally convex, then C(V) ~ 0.
An NTU-game with a nonempty core is called balanced. Furthermore, if for every
subgame ( S, VS ) the core is nonempty, then the game is called totally balanced. The subgame
(S,Vjs) is defined by VS(T) - V(T) for all T C S. Market games, for example, are totally
balanced NTU-games.
As shown above, properties like superadditivity, convexity, and balancedness extend
reasonably well to the class of NTU-games. The same can be said for the Shapley value,
as opposed to the nucleolus which has yet to be defined for NTU-games. For the Shapley
value several extensions have been introduced. For example, the Hazsanyi-value (H.atts.4Nn
(1963)), the Shapley NTU-value (Sx,~[,EY ( 1969)), the egalitarian solution ( KA[.At and SAMEr
(1985)), the consistent Shapley value ( MASCHLF~t and OwEtv ( 1992)), and the marginal based
compromise value ( OITEN, Bo[tNt, PEL.EG and Tus ( 1994)). In the remainder of this section
we confine ourselves to a brief discussion of the Shapley NTU-value and the mazginal based
compromise value only.
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Since the Shapley value was introduced in the previous section as the average of all
marginal vectors, a straightforward extension to the class of NTU-games would thus be aver-
aging the marginal vectors. Unfortunately, this procedure does not work. Although marginal
vectors can be defined, the average of all these allocations can fail Pareto optimality. So, when
extending the Shapley value to NTU-games, one has to employ a different approach.
Let us start with explaining Shapley's approach that led to the Shapley NTU-value for
an NTU-game (N, V). For this purpose, assume that for each allocation x E V(S) the total
utility for coalition S can be represented by a weighted sum of the individual utility levels. So,
given a weight vector w E R~ with ~;EN w; - 1, the total weighted utility that coalition S
assigns to the allocation x equals ~iES w;x;. If we also assume that these weighted utilities
are transferable, each weight vector w gives rise to a TU-game ( N, v,,,) with
v,~(S) - suP{~wixil x E V(S)}, (2.22)
iES
for all S C N. For these games we can determine the Shapley value ~(v,,,). Since the Shapley
value ~(v,,,) represents an allocation of the weighted sum of utilities, the resulting allocation
need not be attainable for coalition N. So, what we are interested in are the attainable allocations
x E V(N) for which the vector of weighted utilities (w;xi);EN coincides with ~(v,,,). The
Shapley NTU-value is thus defined by
~(V) - {x E V(N)I ~wEONdiEN . ~i(vw) - wixi}i (2.23~
where ON -{w E R~~~;EN wi - 1}.
Example 2.18 Consider the following two-person NTU-game ( N, V) with V({ i}) -(-oo, 0]
for i- 1,2 and V({1,2}) as depicted in Figure 2.6. Let w- (wl,wz) be a weight vector.
Then for all w E ON it holds that v,,,({1}) - v,,,({2}) - 0 and
vw({1, 2}) -
4- 2wi, if wi G~
2~- 3w1, if wl ~ s.
This yields
(2 - wl, 2 - wl), if wl G 5
~(vw) - (1 -I- zwi, 1 f zwl), if wl 1 5.
Next, let w-( 5i s) and consider the allocation (4, 3) E V ({ 1, 2}). The corresponding
weighted utilities equal 5. 4- 5 for agent 1 and s~ 3- s for agent 2. Since this coincides
with ~(v,,,) it holds that (s, 5) E~(V).
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Example 2.19 Consider the two-person NTU-game (N, V) depicted in Figure 2.7. So,
V({i}) - (-00,2] fori - 1,2 and
V({1,2}) -{(~i,~z) E R~~ (~i,~2) c(2,4)} U{(~i~~z) E R~~ (~i,~z) C(4,2)}.
For this game it holds that ~(V) - 0. To see this, let w-(wl, w2) be a weightvector. Then
vw({1}) - 2w1, vw({2}) - 2w2 - 2(1 - wl), and
v,,,({1,2})
4 - 2w1i if wl C
i- 2 f 2wi, if wi 1 z
Hence, the Shapley value ~(vw) equals
~(vw) (1 f w1, 3- 3w1), if w1 G i
- (3w1,2 - wl), if wl ) 2
Now, if wl - 0 then ~(v,,,) -(1,3). Since wr - 0 there exists no x E V({1,2}) such that
1- wlxl and 3- w2x2. If wl E(0, 2), the only candidate to belong to ~(V ) is the allocation
(2,4). But if (2,4) E~(V) it must hold that ~1(v,,,) - 2w1 and ~2(v,,,) - 4w2 - 4(1 - wl).
Since both equations imply that wl - 1, we have a contradiction. Similar contradictions follow
if w, E[2,1], hence ~(V) - 0.
As Example 2.19 shows, the Shapley NTU-value need not always exist. SHAPLEY (1969)
provides sufficient conditions for nonemptiness. It does, however, not guarantee unicity of the
Shapley NTU-value.
Theorem 2.10 Let ( N, V) be a superadditive NTU-game. If V(N) is a convex subset of RN
then ~(V) ~ 0.
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As follows from the definition of [he Shapley NTU-value, the mazginal vectors of the
NTLJ-game itself are not taken into account. The marginal based compromise value, as its
name implies, dces make use of these marginal vectors. For defining a marginal vector of an
NTU-game (N, V ), let a E IIN be an ordering of the agents. Similaz to TU-games, we assign
to each agent i his marginal contribution to the benefits of the coalition that is formed by the
agents preceding agent i in the order Q. The marginal vector mo (V ) is thus defined recursively
as follows. Le[ il be the first agent in the order o, that is v(il) - 1. He receives
mo (V) - sup{x;l~ z' E V({il})}.
The second agent iz then receives
rn2(V) - sup{x;,~ ~ E V({il,iz}) : x;l - m; (V)}.
Continuing this procedure yields agent ik a payoff equal to
mk(V) - sup{xtk~ ~ E V({ii,zz,...,ik}) : di-1,z,..,k-i : x,~ -mo(V)}. (2.24)
Note that a mazginal vector mo(V) is well defined if the game is superadditive. Furthermore,
note that by definition mo(V) E V(N) and that mv(V) satisfies Pareto optimality. Moreover,
if this procedure is applied to TU-games the original marginal vectors result.
The marginal based compromise value is defined for NTU-games ( N, V) with V({i })-
(-00,0] for all i E N. Let m(V) -~oEnN mo(V). Then the marginal based compromise
value, or MC-value, is defined by
MC(V) - aym(V), (2.25)
where ay is such that ay - sup{a E R.~~am(V) E V(N)}. So, the MC-value is the
largest multiple of the vector m(V) that still belongs to V(N). Hence, it is Pareto optimal.
Furthermore, the MC-value coincides with the Shapley value on the class of TU-games and
with the consistent Shapley value on the class of so-called hyperplane games (see MASCFn.E[t
and OwF1v ( 1989)).
Example 2.20 Consider the game illustrated in Figure 2.6. Since it is a two- person game,
there aze only two different mazginal vectors. Let vl denote the order 12 and oz the order 21.
Thenmi'(V) - sup{x~x E V({1})} - 0 andm2'(V) - sup{~z~(~i,~z) E V({1,2}) :~, -
0} - 4. Similazly, m2~(V) - sup{x~x E V({2})} - 0 and mi2(V) - sup{xl~(~l,~z) E
V({1,2}) : xz - 0} - 5. This implies that m,(V) -(0,4) ~- (5,0) -(5,4) and that
MC(V) - (3ii, 2;;). Finally, note that the average of the marginal allocations equals (2Z, 2)
and that it violates Pareto optimality since it is in the interior of V(N).
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2.5 Chance-Constrained Games
Chance-constrained games as introduced by Cx,al~s and GRANO'r (1973) extend the theory
of cooperative games in characteristic function form to situations where the benefits from
cooperation are random variables. So, when several agents decide to cooperate, they do not
exactly know the benefits this cooperation generates. What they do know is the probability
distribution function of these benefits. Let V(S) denote the random variable describing the
benefits of coalition S. Furthermore, denote its probability distribution function by Fv~s).
Thus,
Fv~s)(t) - P{V(S) ~ t}, (2.26)
for all t E R. Then a chance-constrained game is defined by the pair (N, V), with V the
characteristic function assigning to each coalition S the nonnegative random benefits V(S).
Note that chance-constrained games are based on the formulation (N, v) of TU-games with
the deterministic benefits v(S) replaced by stochastic benefits V(S). This, however, does
not imply that the preferences of the agents are also linearly separable in money. In fact, the
individual preferences are of no account in this model.
For dividing the benefits of the grand coalition, the authors propose two-stage allocations.
In the first stage, when the realization of the benefits is still unknown, each agent is promised
a certain payoff. These so-called prior payoffs are such that there is a fair chance that they are
realized. Once the benefits are known, the total payoff allocated in the prior payoff can differ
from what is actually available. In that case, we come to the second stage and modify the prior
payoff in accordance with the realized benefits.
Let us start with discussing the prior allocations. A prior payoff is denoted by a vector
x E RN, with the interpretation that agent i E N receives the amount x;. To comply with the
condition that there is a reasonable probability that the promised payoffs can be kept, the prior
payoff x must be such that
~(N) c P({V(N) C~ x;}) - Fv1N)(~ xi) C á(N), (2.27)
iEN iEN
with 0 G a(N) G á(N) G 1. This condition assures that the total amount ~iEN x; that is
allocated is not too low or too high. Note that expression (2.27) can also be written as
Sa~(N)(v(N)) ~ ~ xi ~ Sá(N)(v(N))~
iEN
To come to a prior core for chance-constrained games, one needs to specify when a
coalition S is satisfied with the amount ~;ES x; it receives, so that it does not threaten to leave
the grand coalition N. CHARNES and GRANOT ( 1973) assume that a coalition S is satisfied with
what it gets, if the probability that they can obtain more on their own is small enough. This
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means that for each coalition S~ N there exists a number a(S) E (0, 1) such that coalition
S is willing to participate in the coalition N whenever P({V(S) c~;ESx;}) ) a(S). The
number a(S) is a measure of assurance for coalition S. Note that the measure of assurance
may vary over the coalitions. Furthermore, they reflect the coalition's attitude towards risk, the
willingness to bargain with other coalitions, and so on. The prior core of a chance-constrained
game (N, V) is then defined by
N dSCN:S~N . FV(S)(~iES xi) ~ a(S),C(V )- x E R
a(N) C Fv(M(~iEN )- a(N) .
(2.28)
xi ~ -
Note that the prior-core is an extension of the core for TU-games. To see this, consider
the deterministic benefits v(S) of coalition S. Since a(S) 1 0 the condition P({v(S) C
~;ES x; })) a(S) is satisfied if and only if ~;ES x; ) v(S).
Example 2.21 Consider the following three-person chance-constrained game (N, V) with
V({i}) - 0, i- 1, 2, 3, V(S) ~ U(0, 2) if ~S - 2, and V (N) ~ U(1, 2). Furthermore, let
a(S) - 2 for all S~ N, a(N) - s, and á(N) - s. Next, let x E R3 be a prior allocation.
Since
0, if t C 1,
F~.(N)(t)) - t- 1, if 1 G t G 2,
1, if 2 c t,
condition ( 2.27) implies that 1 s C~iEN xi C 15. For the one-person coalitions we have that
Fv({i})(xi) ~ 2 if x; ) 0. Furthermore, since for all two-person coalitions S it holds that
0, if t C 0,
F~.(s)(t)) - zt, if 0 c t c 2,
1, if 2 C t,
it follows that ~;ES x; ) 1 if Fv(s)(~;ES x;) ~ 2. Hence, the prior core of this game is given
by
C(V )-{x E R~ ~ dscN:~s-a :~ xi ~ 1,15 C~ x; C 15 }.
iES iEN
A necessary and sufficient condition for nonemptiness of the core is given bythe following
theorem, which can be found in CHARNFS and Gi~o'[' (1973).
Theorem 2.11 Let (N, V) be a chance-constrained game. Then C(V ) -~ if and only if
~, ~ á(N) with
~.l - m1II Fv(N))(~iEN xi)
S.t.: F~r(S)(~iES xi) ~ a(S)
FV(N)(~iENxi) 1 CY(N).
~~ Cor~~.RArtv1~ ('r,~1~~ Tt~t~c~R~~
A prior Shapley value is defined in the same way as for TU-games. The agents enter
a room one at a time and, subsequently, receive their contribution to the benefits. The prior
Shapley value then assigns to each agent the expected payoff of this procedure. Thus, given a
chance-constrained game (N, V), the priorShapley value ~(V ) is defined by
~i(V) - ~ ~SI(n ~i - ~S)~ (E(V(S U {i})) - E(V(S))) , (2.29)
scN`{i}
for all i E N.
Note that the prior-Shapley value extends the Shapley value for TU-games. This follows
immediately from the fact that E(v(S)) - v(S) in the deterministic case.
Example 2.22 Consider the game defined in Example 2.21. We have that E(V ({ i})) - 0 for
i- 1, 2, 3, E(V(S)) - z if ~S - 2, and E(V(N)) - 1 z. This implies that
~i(V) - s(2(E(V({1})) - E(V(0))) f E(V({1,2})) - E(V({2}))f
E(V({1,3})) -E(V({3})) f 2(E(V({1,2,3})) -E(V({2,3}))))
- s(2.(0-0)-~2.(~-0)f2'(Iz-z))
~- z.
Similazly, it follows that ~2 ( V)- z and ~3( V)- 2. Note that ~( V) E C( V).
For defining a prior nucleolus, one needs to specify the excess of a coalition at a given
allocation x. Applying the definition used for TU-games results in the excess E(S, x) -
V(S) -~;ES x;. Since V(S) is a stochastic variable, the excess is also a stochastic variable.
But this raises a problem, because for determining the nucleolus we need to arrange the excesses
in a decreasing order. For stochastic variables, however, there is no straightforward criterium
that states when one stochastic variable is larger than another one. So, for chance-constrained
games another definition of the excess is needed. CHARNFS and GR.4rroT ( 1976) express the
excess of coalition S at an allocation x by 1- Fvls~(~iES~i), the probability that V(S)
exceeds ~;ES x;. This implies that the excess decreases with ~;ES x;. With this definition the
prior nucleolus is defined similarly to the nucleolus for TU-games. This means that for each
feasible allocation x E Y, where
Y-{x E RN~ b' iEN :~i ? O,cx(N) G Fv1Nl(~ x;) C á(N)},
iEN
we have E(S, ~) - 1- Fvtsl(Eies ~i) for all S C N. Furthermore, E(a) -(E(S, x))scN is
the vector of excesses and B o E(x) denotes the vector of excesses with its elements arranged
in decreasing order. The prior nucleolus of a chance-constrained game is then defined by
n(V )-{x E Y~ b'yEy : B o E(x) ciex B o E(y)} (230)
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The prior nucleolus is not an extension of the nucleolus for TiJ-games. For if the
benefits are deterministic, the excess E(S, x) - 1- Fv(s)(~;ES x;) equals either zero or one,
depending on whether ~;ES x; ~ v(S) or ~;ES x; C v(S).
Example 2.23 Consider again the game presented in Example 2.21. Then for each feasible
allocation x we have that E({i}, x) - 0 for i - 1, 2, 3, E(S, x) - 1- z~;ES x; if ~S - 2
and E(N, x) - 2-~;EN x;. The prior nucleolus of this game equals n(V )- is (8, g, 8).
Notethatn(V) E C(V) andthatn;(V) )~;(V) fori - 1,2,3.
CH.a.RNES and GxANO'[' (1976) show that the prior nucleolus is a well defined allocation.
The prior nucleolus, however, need not be in the prior core, as the following example shows.
Example 2.24 Consider the following three-person chance-constrained game (N, V) with
V({i}) - 0, i - 1,2,3, V(S) ~ U(0,2) if ~S~ 1 2. Furthermore, let ~({i}) - z for
i- 1,2,3, a({1,2}) - 8, a({1,3}) - 8, cY({2,3}) - 8 , and a(N) - á(N) - á. Then












The only solution of this system of inequalities is x- (0, 4 , z). Hence, C(V) -{(0, q, z)}.
For determining the nucleolus, note that for any feasible allocation x it holds that E( { i}, x)- 0
for i- 1, 2, 3 andthat E(S, x) - 1- zx(S) for ~S - 2. One can check that the priornucleolus
then equals n(V )- ;(1,1, 1), which is not contained in the prior core.
Thus far, we only discussed first stage allocations. As mentioned before, once the
realization of the benefits is known, the first stage allocation might need some modifications.
For these modifications, CHACtNES and GttAlvo'r ( 1977) introduce the two-stage nucleolus.
Given the prior allocation x, for instance, the prior Shapley value, and the realization v(N) of
V(N), the two-stage nucleolus allocates v(N) in such a way that the maximal complain[ of
the coalitions is minimized. An allocation of v(N) is a vector y E Y- {y E R~~ ~;EN y; -
v(N)}. Given an allocation y E Y the complaint ofcoalition S with respect to this modification
is defined by
E(S,y;x) - P({V(S) ~ ~;ESy;}) - P({V(S) ~ E;ESx~})
- Fv(s)(~~es x;) - Fv(s)(~~ES yr).
So, the complaint increases if ~;ES y; decreases and the other way around. Now, if E(y; x) -
(E(S, y; x))scN denotes the vector of excesses and B o E(y; x) the vector of excesses with
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the elements ordered in a decreasing way, the two-stage nucleolus with respect to the prior
allocation ~ is given by
n(V i~ ) -{y E YI dyEr : B o E(yi ~) ~lex B O E(yi ~)}. (2.31)
Example 2.25 Consider the game defined in Example 2.21. Recall that the prior Shapley
value equals ~( V)- Z(1,1,1). Now, suppose that the realization of V(N) is 1, then the prior-
allocation needs to be modified. Let Y-{y E R~~ ~iEN yi - 1}. Furthermore, for y E Y
we have that E({i}, y; ~(V )) - 0 for i - 1, 2, 3, E(S, y; ~(V )) - z(~;ES ~;(V)-~iES yi)
if ~S - 2, and E(N, y; ~(V)) - 1 z -~iEN y;. This implies that n(V; ~(V)) - 3(1,1,1).
Stoch~~tic Cooperative Games
For TU-games, the payoff of a coalition is assumed to be known with certainty. In many cases
though, the payoffs to coalitions can be uncertain. This would not raise a problem if the agents
can await the realizations of the payoffs before deciding which coalitions to form and which
allocations to settle on. But if the formation of coalitions and allocations has to take place
before the payoffs are realized, the theory of TU-games does no longer apply.
Section 2.5 of the previous chapter discussed chance-constrained games that are intro-
duced in CHARNES and G~NO'[' (1973). For these games the value of a coalition S is allowed to
be a stochastic variable. They suggested to allocate the stochastic payoff of the grand coalition
in two stages. In the first stage, so-called prior payoffs are promised to the agents. These
prior payoffs are such that there is a good chance that these promises can be realized. In the
second stage the realization of the stochastic payoff is awaited and, subsequently, a possibly
nonfeasible prior payoff vector has to be adjusted to this realization in some way.
In this chapter we will not follow the route set out by CH.aRNES and GRA1vo'['(1973).
Instead we will introduce a different, more extensive model. The main reason for this is that the
model used by CHAxrrES and Gttntvo'r (1976) leaves the preferences of the agents unspecified.
The model we introduce includes the agents' preferences so that we can take into account each
individual's behavior towards risk. Furthermore, it allocates random payoffs to each agent
instead of the two-stage deterministic allocations in chance-constrained games.
3.1 The Model
For a better understanding of our definition of a stochastic cooperative game, let us start with
describing some examples of cooperative decision making problems in a stochastic environ-
ment. So, let us return to the linear production and sequencing situations and formulate them
S1T'JC~iAS1'EC CE~OP1iRATii~E Cr~~~tE
in a stochastic setting.
Example 3.1 Recall from Example 2.2 that for the deterministic case the outcome space Y in
a linear production situation equals R and that for each coalition S it holds that
Ys - {(x;);ES E Rs~~~EC(sl : ~x; - pTC},
;ES
with C(S) -{c E R~~Ac G~;ESb'} the set of feasible production plans. As already
mentioned in the introduction, we can formulate this problem in astochastic setting. Presuming
that production takes a considerable amount of time, prices can change between the moment
that a decision is taken on the production plan and the moment that this production plan is
realized. So, the individuals do not exactly know the prices when they have to decide on their
production plan. Let the stochastic variable P; E L'(R) describe the price of commodity
j - 1, 2, ... , m. Then given a feasible production plan c E C(S) for coalition S, the revenues
equal PT c with P-(P~, PZ, ..., Pm). In our model the revenues are stochastic, each
individual receives a stochastic payoff and we choose the outcome space y to be L1(R).
Furthermore, an allocation of the revenues PTC to the members of coalition S is a vector
Y E IZ;ES Y - L'(R)s such that ~;ES Y; C PT c. The outcome space ys thus equals
ys -{(Y;);ES E L'(R)s~~~EC(sl :~Y; C PTC}. (3.1)
;ES
If ~t describes the preferences of agent i E N over the set of random payoffs L1(R), then the
triple (N, {ys}scN, {~;};E,.~) describes a linear production situation with stochastic prices.
Example 3.2 Consider the sequencing situation described in Example 2.3. In the more realistic
case, the service times of the divisions are only known with certainty once the service has
ended. As long as they are waiting for service, the divisions only know their serving times
by approximation. So, let the stochastic variable P; E L'(R) describe the service time of
division i. Furthermore, let k; : R-~ Rf be the cost function of division i. Thus, division i
incurs costs k;(t) íf the waiting time equals t. Then, given a serving order ~ E IIN, the total
cost savings equal
Since these cost savings are stochastic the outcome space can be chosen y- Ll (R). Similarly
as in Example 3.1 one defines
P; k; ( P; .~ ki ~ ~ - ~ I ~ ~
iEN )EN:oaO)Coo(i) ~EN `jEN:o(7)~0(~)
ys -{(Y;);ES E L'(R)s~3oEns :~Y; c Ks(o)}, (3.2)
;ES
with Ks(Q) -~;ES ki (~jEN:oo(j)Goo(i) P;) -~iES ki (~jEN:ol;)~olil P;~ the random cost
savings for coalition S. Note that the serving order is no longer explicitly contained in the
outcome space, as is the case in Example 2.3. A sequencing situation with stochastic processing
times can thus be described by (N, {ys}scN, {~i}iEN), where ~i aze agent i's preferences
over the set L' (R) of random payoffs.
The third and final example concerns financial markets. For a general equilibrium model
on financial markets the reader is referred to MAGILL and SxnFER ( 1991). The example we
provide will show some substantial differences with the model considered by MAGn.L and
SHnr~[t ( 1991). First, our example focuses on cooperation between the agents, and second,
the assets we consider are indivisible goods.
Example 3.3 Let N be a set of agents, each having an initial endowment mi of money.
Furthermore, we have a set F of assets, where each asset f E F has a price ~r f and stochastic
revenues Rf E Ll(R). Each agent can inves[ his money in a portfolio of assets and obtain
stochastic revenues. We allow the set F to contain identical assets, so that we do not need
to specify the amount that each agent buys of a specific asset. Instead of buying portfolios
individually, agents can also cooperate with each other, combine their endowments of money,
and invest in a more diversified portfolio of assets. Although cooperation enables them to
make their investment less risky, they also have to agree on a division of the joint revenues. To
model this as a cooperative decision making model, note that the agents only need to divide
the stochastic revenues of their portfolio, so that we can again choose the outcome space y
to be L'(R). Next, let A C F be a portfolio of assets. Then a portfolio A is affordable for
coalition S if they can pay for all the assets in the portfolio, that is, ~fEA a1 ~~;ES m'. Let
A(S) -{A C F~ ~fEA ~t c~;ES m'} denote the set of affordable portfolios for coalition S.
The outcome space ys then equals
ys -{(Yi)iES E L'(R)s~3AEAls1 :~Y; C~ Rf}. (3.3)
iES JEA
In the above mentioned examples coalitions have to choose between several actions,
each action possibly yielding different stochastic revenues. In other words, each coalition can
choose their benefits from a collection V(S) C L'(R) of random vaziables. This observation
leads to the following definition of a stochastic cooperative game.
A stochastic cooperative game is described by a tuple (N,V, { ~i}iEN), where N-
{ 1, 2, ..., n} is the set of agents, V a map assigning to each coalition S acollection of stochastic
payoffs V(S), and ~i the preference relation of agent i over the set of random payoffs L' (R).
So, in particulaz, it is assumed that the random payoffs are expressed in some infinitely divisible
commodity like money. Benefits consisting of several different or indivisible commodities are
excluded.
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Besides the preferences, note that the collection of random payoffs V(S) is another
difference with a chance-constrained game, which only assigns one random payoff V(S) to
each coalition. This would not be a restriction though, if it is possible to pick a`best' stochastic
payoff V(S) E V(S). For the linear production situations with stochastic prices, however, it
is usually not possible to determine unambiguously the production plan that yields the best
revenues. Hence, such situations cannot be modelled as chance-constrained games. The same
holds for the other two examples we discussed.
Example 3.4 Consider the linear production situation with stochastic prices presented in Ex-
ample 3.1. This situation is described as a stochastic cooperative game (N, V, {~;}iEN)
with
V(S) -{X E L'(R)~ ~~EC~sI : X- PTC},
for each S C N.
Example 3.5 The sequencing situation with stochastic serving times as described in Example
3.2 is written as a stochastic cooperative game (N, V, {~;};EN), where
V(S) -{X E L'(R.)~ 3oEns : X- Ks(~)},
for all S C N.
Example 3.6 The financial markets presented in Example 3.3 are described by the following
stochastic cooperative game (N, V, {~i};EN) with
V(S) -{X E Li(R)~ ~AEA(S) : X -~ Rl~i
JEA
for all S C N.
As is the case for TU- and NTU-games, the main issue for stochastic cooperative games
is to find an appropriate allocation of the stochastic payoff of the grand coalition. In Examples
3.1 - 3.3 an allocation of a random payoff X for a coalition S is a vector (Y;);ES E L'(R)s
such that ~;ES Y; C X. The interpretation is that agent i E S receives the random payoff Y;.
This definition induces a very large class of allocations, which, on the one hand, is nice, but,
on the other hand, will give computational difficulties. Therefore we restrict our attention to a
specific class of allocations.
Let S C N and let X E V(S) be a stochastic payoff for coalition S. An allocation of
X can be represented by a pair (d, r) E Rs x Rs with ~;ES d; C 0, ~;ES r; - 1, and r; ~ 0
for all i E S. Given a pair (d, r), agent i E S then receives the random payoff d; -~ r;X . So,
l~~~n~c~s al~`s~~r~s~ eaYt~~s ': . ~~
an allocation consists of two parts. The first part represents deterministic transfer payments
between the agents in S. Note that the C-sign allows the agents to discard some of the money.
The second part then allocates a fraction of the random payoff to each agent in S. Note that
we can indeed allocate fractions of the stochastic revenues X because of our assumption that
X represents money or any other comparable commodity. The class of stochastic cooperative
games with agent set N adopting this restricted definition of an allocation is denoted by SG(N)
and its elements are denoted by I'. Furthermore, let ~r ( S) denote the set of allocations coalition
S can obtain. Hence,
Sr(S) -{(d; -F r;X);ES~ X E V(S),(d,r) E Hs x Os}, (3.4)
where Hs - {d E Rs~ ~;ES d; G 0} and Os - {r E R~ ~~iES r~ - 1}.
3.2 Preferences on Stochastic Payoffs
One of the main differences between stochastic cooperative games and chance-constrained
games is that the former explicitly takes into account the preferences of the individuals.
Reason for this is that the behavior towards risk may vary between different individuals. In
general, three different kinds of behavior are distinguished, i.e., risk averse, risk neutral, and
risk loving behavior. To formalize these three types, consider the space Li(R) of stochastic
variables and let ~; describe the preferences of individual i over L'(R). Then individual i is
said to behave risk averse if for all Y E L1(R) it holds that E(Y) ~tiY. So, he rather receives
the expected payoff with certainty than the random payoff itself. Similarly, individual i is risk
loving if the reverse holds, that is, for all Y E L1(R) it holds that Y~;E(Y). Thus he prefers
receiving the random payoff to receiving its expected value. Finally, individual i is called risk
neutral if Y~; E(Y) for all Y E L' (R). This means that he is indifferent between receiving
the random payoff and receiving the certain payoff E(Y). So a risk neutral person is only
interested in the expected payoff he receives. He does not caze about the difference between
the possible realizations. Note, however, that these conditions only specify whether an agent
is risk averse, risk neutral, or risk loving. It dces not say anything about, say, the degree of risk
aversion.
Next, let us consider some examples of preferences on stochastic variables and see how
they express different kinds of risk behavior.
A natural way of ordering stochastic payoffs is by means of stochastic dominance. Let
X, Y E L'(R) be stochastic variables and denote by FX and FY the probability distribution
functions of X and Y, respectively. Then X stochastically dominates Y, in notation X~FY,
if and only if for all t E R it holds that FX(t) G Fy(t). Moreover, we have X rF Y if
and only if for all t E R it holds that FX(t) G FY(t) with strict inequality for at least one
t E R. Hence, X stochastically dominates Y if for any t E R the random variable X yields
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at most the value t with a lower probability than Y does. Note that this preference relation is
incomplete. Many stochastic variables will be incompazable with respect to ~F. Unless Y is
degenerate, the random payoff Y and E(Y), for instance, are incomparable. Consequently,
~F does not imply risk averse, risk neutral, or risk loving behavior. Intuitively though, one
may expect that every rationally behaving agent, whether he is risk averse, risk neutral or risk
loving, will prefer a stochastic payoff X to Y if X~FY. So for any other preference relation
~~ one may at least expect that X ~sY whenever X~FY.
In Section 2.2 we saw that under certain conditions, the preferences of an agent can
be represented by a utility function. Since in that case the outcome space Y only needs to
be connected, Theorem 2.1 also holds if Y- L'(R). So, if an agent's preferences ~; are
complete, transitive, and continuous on L1(R), then there exists a continuous utility function
W; : U(R) -~ R such that for any X, Y E U (R) the following statement is true: X~;Y
if and only if W;(X ) 7 W;(Y). Note that if the preferences in a stochastic cooperative game
I' -(N, V,{~; };EN) are represented by a utility function W; : U(R) -~ R, then we can also
define an NTU-game (N, V) by
V(S) - { x E RS~ 3(d,~.,x) ,ESE2~(S)d~ES : x; G W;(dr f rrX)},
for all S C N.
A special subclass of utility functions are the ones that correspond to expected utility.
This means that there exists another utility function U; : R-~ Rsuch that W; ( X)- E(U;(X))
for all X E L'(R). The utility function U; is also called a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function. It implies that individual i prefers one random payoff to another one if and only
if the expected utility of the first exceeds the expected utility of the latter, that is, for any
X,Y E L'(R) it holds that X~;Y if and only if E(U;(X)) ~ E(U;(Y)). Agents having
such preferences are called expected utility maximizers.
Note that if U; is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function representing the pref-
erences ~;, then so does the utility function U;(~) - aU;(~) -~ b(x E R) with a) 0 and
6 E R. Note that only positive linear transformations aze allowed instead ofarbitrary monoton-
ictransformations. Furthermore,notethatE(U;(X)) ) E(U;(Y))wheneverXstochastically
dominates Y.
Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are commonly used to model the preferences
of an individual. In particular, they can express different kinds of behavior towazds risk. So
dces risk averse behavior correspond to a concave utility function, risk neutral behavior to a
lineaz utility function, and risk loving behavior to a convex utility function. Furthermore, if
the utility function is twice differentiable, one can determine other measures of risk aversion
like absolute risk aversion, relative risk aversion, and partial risk aversion, which all express a
degree of risk aversion. We will not explain these terms in detail though, the interested reader
is referred to EECxI-totrDT and Got.t.mt (1995).
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Besides maximizing expected utility, one can think of other ways to describe a preference
relation over stochastic payoffs. One such away considers a particular quantile of the stochastic
payoff. This means that for a given value of a E(0,1) it holds that X~aY if and only if
~a(X) )~a(Y). Furthermore, note that X~aY if X~FY and that X~FY if for all
a E(0, 1) it holds that X~aY. These type of preferences occur, for instance, in insurance
problems when the insurance premium is based on the percentile-principle. As Example 3.7
will show, these preferences do not allow for risk averse, risk neutral, or risk loving behavior
in the sense as defined on page 49. Nevertheless, a low value of a can be associated with some
kind of `risk averse' behavior. For a low value of a implies that attention is focused on the
worse outcomes, which is more likely behavior for people who do not like to take risks than
for people who do like it. Using a similar argument, a high value of a shows some kind of
`risk loving' behavior.
Example 3.7 Consider ~a-preferences with a E(0,1) and define
X -
and
{ 0, with probability p1, with probability 1- p,
~, - ( 0, with probability q
Sl 1, with probability 1- q,
whereOGqGaGpG 1. Then~a(X)-0and~a(Y)-lwhilei;a(E(X))-E(X)-
1- p and ~~(E(Y)) - E(Y) - 1- q. Hence, E(X ) ra X and Y ra E(Y), so that iva
implies neither risk averse nor risk neutral nor risk loving behavior.
The third type ofpreferences we consider appear in portfolio decision theory. An agent's
preferences over different portfolios often depends on the expected returns of this portfolio
and - provided that it exists - the variance of the returns, which is interpreted as a measure for
the risk of a portfolio. Formally, this means that agent i has a u[ility function U; : R2 -~ R
such that he weakly prefers ihe portfolio with returns X E L'(R) to a portfolio Y if and
only if U;(E(X),V(X)) ~ U;(E(Y),V(Y)). A simple example of such a utility function
is U;(E(X),V(X)) - E(X) f b V(X), where 6 E R. Then b G 0 implies risk averse
behavior, b- 0 implies risk neutral behavior, and b~ 0 implies risk loving behavior. This
utility function, however, violates the condition we posed at the beginning of this section,
namely, that X is prefened to Y if X stochastically dominates Y.
Example 3.8 Given X,Y E L'(R) let X~Y if E(X) - 2 V(X) 1 E(Y) - 2 V(Y).
Take X ~ U(0,2) and Y -r U(0,1) so that X is stochastically dominant to Y. Since
E(X) - 1, V(X) -;, E(Y) - z, and V(Y) - ,z it follows that E(X) - 2 V(X) -
1- 3f G z- 3~ - E(Y) - 2 V(Y). Hence, X ~ Y.
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In the forthcoming analysis of stochastic cooperative games, our attention is focused on
two different subclasses of games that are characterized by the conditions we impose on the
preferences of the individuals. The first class is mainly determined by a continuity property.
As we will show, the standard continuity condition is too restrictive for our model. Therefore,
we introduce a weaker form of continuity. For the second class, we consider preferences for
which a random payoff can be represented by its so-called certainty equivalent.
3.2.1 Weakly Continuous Preferences
Consider the following three properties for the preference relation ~; of agent i:
(C1) ~; is complete and transitive on L1(R);
(C2) for all X E Lt (R) and all d 1 0 we have that X~- d~; X;
(C3) for any X, Y E L' ( R) there exist d, d E R such that X f d~; Y~; X f d;
(C4) ~; is continuous, i.e., the sets { FX E~~ X~; Y} and { FX E.F~ X ~; Y} are open
in the metric space (.F, p) (see ( B.6)) for all Y E L' (R).'
Condition ( C2) states that the preferences are strictly increasing in the deterministic amount of
money one receives. Condition ( C3) then states that by adding the appropriate deterministic
amount of money a stochastic payoff X can be made strictly worse than the stochastic payoff
Y and the o[her way around. Finally, the continuity condition (C4) can be interpreted as
follows. Given that a stochastic payoff Y is strictly preferred to the stochastic payoff X, then
Y is also strictly preferred to all stochastic payoffs that differ only slightly from X. Note
that the conditions (C 1) -(C4) imply that for any X , Y E L~ (R) there exists d E R such
that d f X~; Y. Condition (C4), however, turns out to be rather strong. As the following
examples show, neither ~a-preferences nor preferences based on von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions satisfy continuity.
Example 3.9 Consider ~a-preferences with a- 2. Take Y- 4 and X k such that
0, iftGO
FXk(t) - 2-kfkt, ifOctGl
1, if 1 C t.
for all t E R and k~ 2. The random variable Xk attains the values 0 and 1 with probability
2-,'-t each, while the remaining k is equally distributed over the open interval ( 0,1). Then
~a(Xk) - Z C ;- ~a(Y) so that Xk E {FZ E.F~Z ~;Y} for all k~ 2. Since the sequence
Xk weaklyconvergestoX withP({X - 0}) - P({X - 1}) - 2 itfollowsthat~á(X) - 1.
Hence, X~{FZ E.F~Z ~;Y} so that ,va is not continuous.
lIf the preferences aze complete, an equivalent statement is that {FX E.F~X ~;Y} and {Fg E.F~X ~~Y}
are closed sets in (.F, p) for all Y E L' (R).
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Example 3.10 Let U; : R~ R. be a utility function defined by U;(t) - -e-` for all t E R.
Take Y-- log 2 and
Xk - J 0, with probability 1- k
Sl - log(2k), with probability k
for k? 2. Then E(U;(Xk)) -(1 -,'-E)(-1) ~- k(- 2k) -,'F - 3 c -2 - E(U;(Y)) so that
X k E {FZ E.F~Z ~;Y} for all k) 2. Next, let X E L'(R) be such that P(X - 0) - 1.
Since E(U;(X )) - -1 we have that X ~{FZ E.F~Z ~;Y}. From the fact that the sequence
Xk weakly converges to X it then follows that {FZ E.F~Z ~;Y} is not closed. Since the
preferences based on L1; are complete, this implies that they are not continuous.
Note that the utility function in Example 3.10 is unbounded. For bounded utility func-
tions, expected utility does lead to a continuous preference relation. This follows directly from
Helly's Theorem B.1 that is stated in Appendix B.
As the two examples show, continuity is too strong a condition. So, if we want something
like continuity to be satisfied, we need some further assumptions. Actually, only one additional
assumption and a weaker form of continuity is what we need. Let I' E SG(N) be a stochastic
cooperative game such that V(S) is finite for every S C N. So, each coalition only has a
finite number of random benefits to choose from. Note that this is the case for the sequencing
games and financial markets presented in Example 3.5 and Example 3.6, but not for the linear
production games described in Example 3.4.
For our weaker form of continuity, we make use of the special structure of the alloca-
[ions. This means that we only need continuity on specific subsets of random variables only.
Therefore, let I' -(N, V, { Z;};EN) E SG(N) and suppose that coalition S C N has formed.
Then the set of payoffs agent i E S possibly obtains equals
{ d; ~- r;X ~ X E V( S) , d; E R, r; E[0, 1]}.
Consequently, the set of payoffs agent i possibly obtains in the game I' equals
{d; -F r;X I ~SCN:;ES,~s~z : X E V(S), d; E R, r; E[0,1]} U V({i }). (3.5)
So, what we actually need is that the preferences ~; are continuous on the set defined in (3.5).
Formulating continuity in this way though, implies that continuity depends on the game I'.
Since that is not desirable, we formulate it in the following, more generalized way. For this
purpose, let X C Ll(R) be a finite subset of random variables. Define
,C(X) -{d -F rX ~ X E X, d E R, r E [0, 1]}, (3.6)
and
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,F(X) - {FZ~ Z E G(X)}, (3.7)
as the set ofprobability distribution functions corresponding to the random payoffs of the form
d~- rX that can be constructed out of the set X. Note that (,F(X), p) constitutes a metric
space (see also B.6). The modified continuity condition then reads as follows
(CS) ~i satisfies weak continuity if for all finite subsets X C L'(R) it holds that the sets
{FZ E.F(X)~Z r; Y} and {FZ E~(X)~Z ~; Y} aze open in the metric space
(.F(X),P) for all Y E G(X). z 3
Note that since V(S) is finite by assumption, weak continuity implies that the preferences aze
also continuous on the set formulated in (3.5). Furthermore, note that weak continuity dces
not depend on a stochastic cooperative game I' E SG(N).
Let CG(N) C SG(N) denote the class of stochastic cooperative games for which V(S)
is finite for each S C N and the preferences ~; of each individual i E N satisfy the conditions
(CI), (C2), (C3), and (CS).
3.2.2 Certainty Equivalents
In this section we focus on a special class of stochastic cooperative games to which one can
associate a TU-game. For the games in this subclass the preferences {~i};EN are such that
for each i E N there exists a function m; : L' (R) -~ R satisfying
(M1) forall X,Y E L'(R) : X~;Y if and only if m;(X) ) m;(Y);
(M2) for all d E R: m;(d) - d;
(M3) forall X E L'(R) : m;(X - m;(X)) - 0,
(M4) for all X E L' (R) and all d, d' E R with d C d' : m;(d -~ X) C m;(d' ~- X).
The interpretation is that m; ( X) equals the amount of money m for which agent i is indifferent
between receiving the amount m;(X) with certainty and receiving the stochastic payoff X.
The amount m; (X) is called the cenainty equivalent of X. Condition (M1) states that agent i
weakly prefers one stochastic payoff to another one ifand only if the certainty equivalent of the
former is greater than or equal to the certainty equivalent of the latter. Condition (M2) states that
the certainty equivalent of a deterministic payoff d equals d itself. From the conditions (M1)
and (M2) it then follows that X~; m;(X) for all X E L'(R). Condition (M3) states that
an agent is indifferent between receiving the stochastic payoff X- m; ( X) and receiving the
ZIf the preferences are complete, an equivalent statement is that {FZ E.F(X)~Z ~~Y} and {FZ E
.F(X)~Z ~~Y} are closed sets in (~(X), p) for all Y E C(X).
3For ease of notation, the sets {FZ E~(X)~Z Z~Y} and {FZ E.F(X)~Z ,S~Y} are often denoted by
{Z E G(X)~Z ~~Y} and {Z E G(X)~Z ~~Y}, respectively.
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payoff zero. Finally, condition (M4) is equivalent to (C2); it implies that the preferences over
stochastic payoffs of the form d f X are monotonically increasing in d. Note that condition
(M3) is not implied by the other three conditions as the following example shows.
Example 3.11 Take the utility function equal to U;(x) - ~~ 1, x 1 -1, so that X~;Y if
and only if E(U;(X)) ? E(U;(Y)). Take X such that P({X - 0}) - P({X - 1}) - z.
Then E(U;(X)) -~(f ~- 1) and m;(X) - U;'(E(U;(X))) - z(~- z). Note that m;
satisfies ( M 1), (M2) and (M4) but that
s
m;(X - m;(X)) -~i( 4- zv~) -~ z( á - i~)) - 1--0.1714 ~ 0.
Conditions (M3) and (M4) are equivalent to condition (MS) below:
(MS) forall X E L1(R) and all d E R: m;(d ~ X) - d f m;(X).
Obviously, condition (MS) implies conditions (M3) and (M4). For the converse, suppose that
m;(d f X)~ d f m;(X ) for some d E R and some X E Ll (R). Then we get the following
contradiction,
0-m;(d ~ X -(m;(d ~ X))) ~ m;(d t X-(d -~ m;(X)))-m;(X - rn;(X)) -0.
Here the first and the last equality follow from condition (M3) and the inequality follows from
condition (M4). Of course, a similar argument holds if one would suppose that m;(d f X) G
d ~ m;(X).
Example 3.12 Consider the preferences based on a utility function of the form U(t) -(~.e-"t
( t E R), where ~3 G 0 and a~ 0. The certainty equivalent of X E L1(R) can be defined
by m(X )- U-1(E(U(X ))) . It is easy to check that m satisfies conditions ( M1), (M2) and
(M4). For condition ( M3), let X E Ll(R). Then U-1(t) --á log ~p) and
m(X - m(X)) - U-1(E(U(X - m(X))))
- -~ log ~~ I ~ . e-a(t-m(Xl)dFX(t)~
- -~ log ~eamlxl~ j Q, e-~sdFX(t)~
- -rn(X) - ~ log ~p(~,de asdFX(t)))
- -m(X) f m(X) - 0.
Finally, note that U is a monotonically increasing and concave function and thus implies risk
averse behavior.
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Example 3.13 Let the preferences ~~ be such that for X, Y E L' (R) it holds that X~aY
if ~~(X ) 1~a(Y), where a E (0,1). With the certainty equivalent of X E L'(R) given by
m(X )- fa(X ), the conditions (M1), (M2), and (MS) are satisfied. That (M1) and (M2) are
fulfilled is straightforward. For (MS) note that
~IX(d-F X) - sup{t E R~ P({d f X C t}) G a}
- sup{t E R~ P({X C t- d}) c a}
- sup{t -1- d E R~ P({X G t}) C a}
- d~- sup{t E R~ P({X c t}) C a}
- d f ~~(X),
for all d E R and all X E L'(R). Hence, m(d -~ X)- d f m(X ).
Note that condition ( MS) shows some resemblance with the transferable utility property
defined in 2.3. Transferable utility implies that utility is linearly separable in the amount
of money one receives while condition ( MS) states that the certainty equivalent is linearly
separable in the deterministic amount of money one receives. The similarities between (MS)
and transferable utility go even further. As was the case for transferable utility, we can represent
the stochastic benefits of each coalition by a single number if the preferences of each agent can
be described by certainty equivalents.
Let I' E SG(N) be a stochastic cooperative game satisfying conditions ( M1) -(M4).
Take S C N. An allocation (d; f riX )iES E~r(S) is Pareto optimal for coalition S if there
exists no allocation (cli f TiX)iES E~r(S) such that di f riX ~; di ~ r;X for all i E S.
Pareto optimal allocations are characterized by the following proposition.
Propositioo3.1 LetI' E SG(N)satisfyconditions(M1)-(M4). Then(d;~riX)iES E~r(S)
is Pareto optimal if and only if
~ mi(di ~- r;X ) - max {~ m;(di f riX )~ (di -~ riX );ES E í̀'r(S)~ . (3.8)
iES sES
PROOF: Let (d; -f r;X );ES E~r(S) be such that it is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists an
allocation (d; -}- r";X );ES E ~r(S) such that di ~ r;X ~i d; -~ r;X for all i E S. Since I'
satisfies ( M1) -(M4) this is equivalent to mi(d; } r";X )) mi(d; f r;X ) for all i E S. Hence,
L~ mi(di } riX )~~ mi(di ~ riX )'
iES iES
so that expression ( 3.8) does not hold.
Next, let (d; -I- r;X );ES E~r(S) be such that
~ m{(d{ ~ riX ) ~ m2.X {~ mi(di ~ riX)~ (di ~ riX)iES E ~I'(S)~ .
iES iES
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Then there exists (d; ~ r;X ) ;ES E~r(S) such that
~m;(di~-riX) C ~m;(d;fr;X).
iES iES
Define for each i E S
f)i - di - TTti(di ~ riX) ~ mi(di ~ riX )
f~S ~~ m;(d; f riX ) -~ mi(di f r;X )~ .
iES iES






- mi(dj ~ rtX) } ~s ~i~
mi(di ~ riX) - `[~ mi(di ~ riX )
1 m; ( d; -}. r; X),
where the first equality follows from (MS) and the inequality follows from (3.9). Since this
implies that 6; ~ r";X ~; d; ~ r;X for all i E S, the allocation (d; f r;X ) ;ES violates Pareto
optimality.
For interpreting condition (3.8), consider a particular allocation for coalition S. Now
suppose that each member pays the certainty equivalent of the random payoff he receives.
Then we know from condition (M3) that the initial wealth of each member has not changed.
Furthermore, this coalition still has to divide the certainty equivalents that have been paid by its
members. Since the preferences are strictly increasing in the deterministic amount of money
one receives, the more money a coalition can divide, the better it is for all its members. So, the
best way to allocate the stochastic benefits, is the one that maximizes the sum of the certainty
equivalents. Furthermore, we can describe the stochastic benefits of each coalition by the
maximum sum of the certainty equivalents they can obtain, provided that this maximum exists,
of course. This follows from the fact that for each S C N it holds that
{(m;(d; f r;X ));ES~ (d; ~- r;X);ES E ~r(S)} - {a E RS~ ~ ~; C vr(S)}, (3.10)
iES
where
vr(S) - max {~ mi(di f riX )~ (d: f r;X )ies E~r(S) 1 . (3.11)~ES
Expression (3.10) means that it does not matter for coalition S whether they allocate a random
payoff X E V(S) or the deterministic amount vr(S). To see that this equality does indeed
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hold, note that the inclusion `C' follows immediately from the definition of vr(S). For the
reverse inclusion `~', let y E {~ E Rs~ ~;ES x; C vr(S)}. Next, let (d; -~ r;X );ES E~r(S)
be such that ~;ES m;(d; f r;X)- vr(S) and define b; - y; f d; - m;(d; ~- r;X ) for each
i E S. Since ~;ES b; C 0 and
mt(ótfr:X) - m;(b~-dtfd;frtX)
- b; - d; f m; (d; ~- r;X)
- y; f d; - m; (d; ~ r;X)- d; -F m; ( d; -f r;X)- y;
for all i E S it holds that y E {(m;(d; f r;X));ES~ (d; f r;X);es E~r(S)}. Hence, the
benefits of coalition S can be represented by vr(S). So, if for a stochastic cooperative game
I' E SG(N) the value vr(S) is well defined for each coalition S C N we can also describe
the game I' by a TU-game (N, vr) with vr(S) as in (3.11). Let MG(N) C SG(N) denote the
class of stochastic cooperative games for which the conditions (M1) -(M4) are satisfied and
the game (N, vr) is well defined.
~~~ C~re, Superadditivity, and
Con~~exity
In this chapter we consider the core for stochastic cooperative games. Given its interpretation
for both TU- and NTU-games, the core extends fairly straightforward to the class of stochastic
cooperative games. A balancedness condition like the one for TU-games, however, does not yet
exist. We can only provide such a condition for the subclass MG(N) of stochastic cooperative
games for which certainty equivalents are well defined. Besides the core, we also extend the
definitions of superadditivity and convexity to the class of stochastic cooperative games. We
show that a convex stochastic cooperative game is superadditive and has a nonempty core.
Furthermore, we define marginal vectors and show that for each convex stochastic cooperative
game all marginal vectors belong to the core.
4.1 The Core of a Stochastic Cooperative Game
Section 2.3 and Section 2.4 considered the core for TU-games and NTU-games, respectively.
For these games, an allocation is a core-allocation if no coalition has an incentive to part
company with the grand coalition. This same principle is used to define a core for stochastic
cooperative games. Therefore, we need to specify under which conditions a coalition has an
incentive to leave the grand coalition. So, let I' E SG(N) be a stochastic cooperative game
and let (d; ~- r;X);E,v E~r(N) be an allocation for N. Coalition S has an incentive to
leave coalition N and start cooperating on its own if it can improve on the payoff of each of
its members. This means that there exists an allocation (d; -~ T;X);ES E ~r(S) such that
d; ~- r"; X}-; d; ~- r;X for all i E S. The core of a stochastic cooperative game I' E SG(N) is
thus defined by
T~l; ~bttlï; St~b1J3T'í~?3~Y~ ~17 C011ï?~X
C(~) - ~ ldi ~ r;X )iEN E ~[`(N)
dSCN f-~(d,}r;JC);ESE2r(S)diES :
d~ f rt~, ~-~ d~ f r,X
. (4.1)
A stochastic cooperative game I' E SG(N) with a nonempty core is called balanced. Further-
more, if the core of every subgame r ~s is nonempty, then I' is called totally balanced. T'he
subgame I'~S is given by (S, V~S, {~i };ES) where V~S(T) - V(T) for all T C S.
Proposition 4.1 The linear production games with stochastic prices defined in Example 3.4
are totally balanced if the agents are expected utility maximizers and the utility function U; is
concave for each agent i E N.
PftooF: Let I' E SG(N) be such a linear production game and define the corresponding
NTU-game ( N, V ) by
V(S) -{x E RS~ 3(d,}r,x),ESE~r(S)diES : x; G E(Ui(di f riX))},
for all S C N. We first show that C(I') ~ 0 if C(V) ~ 0. For this, suppose that C(I') - 0
and let x E V(N). From the definition of V(N) it follows that there exists an allocation
(d; ~- r;X );EN E ~r(N) such that x; C E(U;(d; ~ r;X )) for all i E N. Since C(I') - 0 there
exists a coalition S and an allocation (d; ~ r;X);ES E Sr(S) such that E(Ui(d; ~ riX)) 1
E(Ui(d; -}- r;X )) for all i E S. Define y E RS with yi - E(Ui(d; ~ riX )) for all i E S. Since
y E V(S) and y; ~ x; for each i E S it follows that x~ C(V). Hence, C(V) - 0. So, for
C(I') to be nonempty it suffices [o show that C( V) is nonempty.
In order to show that C( V) is nonempty we apply Theorem 2.7. Thus, for each balanced
map ~ we have to show that ~SCN ~(S)V(S) C V(N).
Let xs E V(S) for each S C N , let ~ be a balanced map, and define x-~scN ~(S)xs
Note that xs - 0 if i~ S. Hence, xi -~scN ~(S)xs -~SCN:iES ~(S)xs for all i E N.
Take YS E~r(S) such that E(U;(YS)) 7 xs for all i E S. Furthermore, let ys E C(S)
be a production plan such that ~iES Ys - PTys. Recall that ys E C(S) implies that
Ays c~iES b(i). Next, define z- ~SCN ~(S)ys and Z; -~sCN:ieS ~(S)YS for i E N.
Since
Az - A ~ ~(S)ys - ~ ~(S)Ays C ~ .~(S) ~ b(i)
SCN SCN SCN iES
- ~ b(i) ~ a(S) - ~ b(i),
iEN SCN:iES iEN
it follows that z E C(N). Furthermore, we have that
PTz - PT ~ ~(S)ys - ~ ~(S)PT ys
SCN SCN
~ ~(S) ~ Ys - ~ ~ ~(S)Ys - ~ Zi,
SCN iES iEN SCN:iES iEN
,
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so that Z E Zr(N) and, consequently, that ( E(U;(Z;)));EN E V(N). From
E(Ui(zi)) - E(~i( ~ ~(s)Ys)) ? E( ~ ~(S)i~i(Ys))
SCN:iES SCN:iES
- ~ ~(S)E(Ui(YS)) ~ ~ ~(S)2i - ~i,
SCN:iES SCN:iES
it then follows that ~ E V(N). Hence, C(V) ~ 0 and, consequently, C(r) ~ 0. Since each
subgame (N, V~S, {~i };ES) is also a linear production game with stochastic prices, we know
that C(I'~S )~ 0. This implies that these games are totally balanced. ~
For the class of TU- and NTU-games we saw that the core can be an empty set. The same
holds for the class of stochastic cooperative games. We will provide an example of a game
with an empty core later in this section, but first we take a closer look at the class MG(N).
Recall that for each I' E MG(N) there corresponds a TU-game (N, vr) with
vr(S) - max{~m;(d; ~-r;X)~ (d; ~r;X);ES E í~r(5')},
iES
for all S C N. Concerning the nonemptiness of the core of a game I' E MG(N) we have the
following result.
Theorem 4.2 Let I' E MG(N). Then C(I') - 0 if and only if C(vr) - 0.
PROOF: Let I' E MG(N) be such that C(vr) -~. Take (d; ~- r;X );EN E Zr(N). From
C(vr) - 0 it then follows that ~;ESm;(d; -~ r;X) G vr(S) for some S C N. Take (d; ~




for all i E S, so that
iES
mi(bifriX) - m;(b;-d;~d;friX)
- b; - d; ~- m; ( d; -I- r"; X)
- mi(di ~ riX ) ~ ,lc ~~ mi(di ~ TiX ) - ~ mi(di ~ riX)~
~J ,ES iES
) m; (d; f r;X )
for all i E S. Moreover, since ~;ES b; -~;ES d; G 0 it holds that (b; f r";X );ES E Zr(S).
From b; f r;X ~; d; - 1- r;X for all i E S it then follows that (d; f r;X)iEN ~ C(r).
Consequently, we must have that C(P) - 0.
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Next, let C(I') - 0 and let x be an allocation of vr(N), i.e., ~iEN ~i c vr(N). Take
(d; ~ r;X );EN E~r(N) such that ~;EN m;(d; f r;X )- vr(N). Define ó; - a; - m;(d; ~
r;X) f d; for all i E N, so that
mi(bi ~ riX ) - mi(Ói - di ~ di ~ riX )
- ó; - d; f m; (d; ~ r;X)
-~i - mi(di f riX ) f di - d; f mi(di f riX)-~i,
for all i E N. Furthermore, from ~;EN ó; C 0 it follows that (ó; f r;X );EN E~r(N). Since
C(I') - 0 there exists a coalition S C N and an allocation (d; -{- r";X );ES E~r(S) such that
d;~r";.Y Y-; ó;-Fr;X holdsforalli E S. Thisimpliesthatm;(d;~r;X) ) m;(ó;-}-r;X) -~;
for all i E S so that
~ ~i ~ ~ m;(di ~ TiX ) C v['(S)i
iES iES
Hence, ~~ C(vr) so that C(vr) - 0.
Theorem 4.2 can also be stated in terms of allocations: if (d; -~ r;X );EN E~r(N) and
~ E RN are such that m;(d; f r;X ) -~; for all i E N then
(d; ~ r;X );EN E C(I') if and only if ~ E C(vr).
Furthermore, we know that the core of the game (N, vr) is nonempty if and only if the
balancedness condition formulated in (2.10) is satisfied. Theorem 4.2 then provides an easy
way to construct a stochastic cooperative game with an empty core.
Example 4.1 Consider a three-person stochastic cooperative game I' E MG( N ) with V({i})-
{0}, i- 1, 2, 3 and V(S) - {XS} with XS ~ U(0, 2) if ~S ~ 2. Furthermore, let all agents
be risk neutral. This means that agent i's certainty equivalent of a random payoff X E L' (R)
equals m;(X )- E(X ). Consequently, we have for (d; f r;X );ES E~r(S) it holds that
~mi(difriX) - ~E(difr;X) -
~d;fE`~r'XIiES iE5 iES sES
- ~d; ~ E(X).
iES
The corresponding TU-game (N,vr) then equals vr(S) - 0 if ~S - 1 and vr(S) - 1 if
~S ? 2. For the game (N, vr) it holds that C(vr) - 0. Hence, by Theorem 4.2, thus also
C(I') - 0.
So, for the class MG(N) of stochastic cooperative games we can relatively easy check
whether the core is empty or not. For the more general class SG(N), however, necessazy and
sufficient conditions for nonemptiness of the core do not yet exist.
4.2 Superadditive Games
For introducing superadditivity for stochastic cooperative games recall that for both TU-
and NTU-games the underlying idea of superadditivity is that two disjoint coalitions can do
(weakly) better by forming one coalition. Therefore, we propose the following definition of
superadditivity, which conceptually is not only applicable to stochastic cooperative games, but
also to TU- and NTU-games. Le[ I' E SG(N). Then I' is called superadditive if for any disjoint
S,T C Nitholdsthatforevery(ds~rsXs);ES E~r(S)andevery(c~frTXT);ET E~r(T)
there exists an allocation (dsuT ~ rsuTXsuT)iESuT E~r(S U T) such that
dsuT ~ rsuTXsuT ~t ds -F rSX s for all i E S,
dSUT ~ rsuTXSuT ~t dr } rTXT for all i E T.
(4.2)
So whatever allocation the coalitions S and T agree on sepazately, they can always ( weakly)
improve their payoffs by forming one large coalition. Formulated in the context ofNTU-games
this definition reads as follows. For all disjoint S, T C N it holds that for each allocation
xs E V( S) and each allocation xT E V (T ) there exists an allocation xsuT E V(S U T) such
that xSUT 1 xs for all i E S and xsuT ) xT for all i E T. Then it is not difficult to check that
this definition is equivalent to the definition of superadditivity for NTU-games given in (2.18),
i.e., for all disjoint S, T C N it holds that V( S) x V(T ) C V( S U T).
With respect to superadditivity we can derive a similaz result as Theorem 4.2 for the class
MG(N).
Theorem 4.3 Let I' E MG(N). Then I' is superadditive if and only if (N, vr) is superadditive.
PROOF: Let I' E MG(N) be superadditive. Take S, T C N disjoint and let (ds ~ rsX s)iES E
~r(S) and (d;' f rTX);ET E z~r(T) be Pareto optimal, that is, ~;ES m;(ds -} rsX s) -
vr(S) and ~;ET m;(dT ~- rT XT )- vr(T). Then superadditivity implies that there exists
(dsuT ~ rSUTXSuT)íesuT E~r(S U T) such that dsuT ~ rsuTXsuT ~i ds ~ rsXs for all
i E S and dsuT ~ rsuTXsuT Zi dr .~ rTXT for all i E T. Hence,
vr(S U T) i ~ m,i(dSuT
~ rSUTXSUT)
- iESUT
~ ~mí(dS ~- rSXS) ~ ~rTti(dT ~ r~XT) - vr(s) ~ vr(T)
- iES iET
so that (N, vr) is superadditive.
Let (N, vr) be superadditive. Take S,T C N disjoint and let (ds f rSXs);ES E~r(S)
and (dT ~ rTXT )iET E~r(T). So, ~iES mi(ds f rsX s) c vr(S) and ~iET mi(c~ ~
rTXT ) C vr(T). Now, let (dSuT ~ rsuTXsuT)iESuT E ~r(S U T) be Pareto optimal and
define
~ mi(ds ~ rsXs) } dsuT - mí(dsuT ~ rsuTXsuT) if i E S,
b' - T T T SuT - SuT SuT SuTm;(d; -I- rí X)~- d; m;(dí f ri X ) if i E T.
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Then applying condition (MS) yields that m;(b; ~ rsuTXsuT) - m;(ds ~ rsX s) if i E S and
,nzi(b; ~ rsuzXsuT) -,r~ti(dr ~. rTXT ) if i E T. Hence, b; ~ rSuTXSUT ~~ds ~ rSXs for
all i E S and b; ~ rsuTXSuT ~~~r ~ rTXT for all i E T. So, for I' to be superadditive we
only need to prove that (b; ~ rsuTXsuT);ESuT E ~r(S U T). But this follows from
~ b; - ~m;(ds-frSXs) -~ ~mi(dT ~rTXT)
iESUT iES iET
~ ~ dsuT - ~ m.(dsuT } rsuTXsuT), ~ ~ ~
iESUT iESuT
c vr(S) f vr(T) - vr(S U T) C 0,
where the first inequality follows from ~;ESUT
dsuT ~ 0 and the second inequality follows
from the superadditivity of (N, vr).
Note that the game in Example 4.1 is superadditive. So, like for TU- and NTU-games
we need a stronger condition for nonemptiness of the core than superadditivity. One such a
condition is convexity.
4.3 Convex Games
For our definition of convexity, we take the convexity for TU-games as formulated in (2.6)
as a starting point. So, a TU-game ( N, v) is called convex if for each U C N and each
S C T C N`U it holds that
v(S u U) - v(S) ~ v(T u U) - v(T). (4.3)
This means that for a coalition it is more profitable to join a larger coalition. Now, we apply
this idea to stochastic cooperatíve games. Let I' E SG(N) and define for each S C N the set
of individually rational allocations by
7Rr(S) - {(d; -~ r;X);ES E ~r(S)~ diES ~YEV({i}1 : Y }i d; ~- r;X }.
Then I' is called convex if for each U C 1V and each S C T C N`U the following statement
is true: for all (ds f rsX s);ES E ZRr(S), all (dT f rT XT );ET E ZTZr(T) and all
(dsuu ~
rsuuXsuv)iESuu E~r(S U U) satisfying
dsuu } rsuuXsuu ~t ds f rsXs~
for all i E S, there exists an allocation (dTuu } rTuuXTuu)iETuu E ~r(T U U) such that
~ruu ~ rTuuXTuu ~~ ~r .~ rTXT for all i E T, and
~ruu ~ rTuuXTuu ~` dsuu } rsuu Xsuu for all i E U.
(4.4)
, ,
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So whatever individually rational allocation the coalitions S and T agree on separately, then
given an allocation for coalition S U U such that coalition S is willing to let coalition U join,
the members of coalition U can obtain (weakly) better payoffs by joining the larger coalition
T. By taking S- 0 in the definition of convexity it follows immediately that convex games
are superadditive.
For the next theorem, we need to define marginal vectors for stochastic cooperative
games. Recall that a marginal vector with respect to an order v E IIN gives each agent his
marginal contribution to the benefits of the coalition that is formed by the preceding agents.
Keeping this in mind we can define a marginal vector. For this purpose, take I' E CG(N) and
let us abbreviate the notation (dz f r;X );ES of an allocation to Y. Take i E N, S C N`{i}
with S ~ 0 and Y E~r(S)- Define
13(S,Y, i) -{Y E~r(S U{i})~b';ES : Y; ~~ Y;},
as the set of all allocations for coalition S U {i} which all members of S weakly prefer to
the allocation Y E~r(S). Note that there is no lower bound on agent i's payoff, the set
Ci(S,Y,i) is nonempty. Furthermore, let B(S,Y,i) E Ci(S,Y,i) be the most preferred
allocation for agent i in this set, that is, B;(S,Y,i) ~~ Yt for all Y E Xi(S,Y,i). Since
the preferences are assumed to be complete, transitive and weakly continuous such a best
allocation exists. A marginal vector Mo(V) E~r(N) with respect to order v E IIN is now
constructed as follows. Let ik E N be such that a(ik) - k for k- 1, 2, ... , n. Let Y' E
~r({ii}) be individually rational. Thus Yi E ZRr({ii}). Take Y~ E~r({ii, i2}) such that
Y~ - B({ii},Yi,iz). Next, take Y3 E~r({ii,í2ii3}) such that Y3 - B({ii,i2},Y~,i3).
Continuing this procedure yields an allocation Y~ E ir(N). Finally, define a marginal vector
with respect to order v by Mo(V) - Yn.
Theorem 4.4 Let I' E CG(N) be a stochastic cooperative game. If I' is convex, then all
marginal vectors Mo(V ), v E IIrv belong to the core. Hence, C(I') ~ 0.
PROOF: Let I' E CG(N) be convex and take Q E IIN. For ease of notation let us assume that
Q(i) - i for all i E N. Furthermore, let Y', Y2, ..., Yn be the n allocations that lead to a
marginal vector Mo(V).
In order to prove that Ma (V ) is a core allocation, we prove for k- 1, 2, ..., n that Y k
is a core allocation for the corresponding subgame I'k with agent set { 1, 2, ..., k}. The proof
of the latter statement goes by induction on k.
For k- 1 it is obvious that Y' belongs to the core ofI'1. Now suppose that Yk E C(I'k)
for k- 1, 2, ..., m- 1 and recall that Ym - B({1, 2, ..., m- 1}, Ym-1, m). To prove that
Ym E C(I'm ) consider a coalition S C{ 1, 2, ..., m- 1}.
Since Ym-1 E C(I'm-' ) and Y~ ~~ Y~ -' for all j E S it follows that coalition S has
no incentive to leave the coalition { 1, 2, ..., m}.
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Next, we show that also the coalition S U{m} has no incentive to leave the coalition
{ 1, 2, ..., m} if Ym is allocated. For this, let Ys E ZRr(S) be such that for each j E S
the following statement is true: YS ~~ X with X E ZRr ( { j}). So, agent j is indifferent
between receiving the payoff Y~ and the best payoff he can obtain on his own. Note that
Ys exists by the weak continuity of {~;};ES. Furthermore, let
ysu{„~} -
B(S, Ys, m). So
Ymu{m}
is the best payoff agent m can obtain when cooperating with coalition S. Next, let
T - {1,2,...,m-1}andU- {m}. SinceYm-1 EZRr({1,2,...,m-1})itfollowsfrom
convexity that there exists an allocation Z E Zr({1, 2, ..., m}) such that Z~ ~~ Ym-1 for
all j E{1,2,...,m - 1} and Zm ~m
Ymu{m}
Since Z E Ci({1,2,...,m - 1},Ym-',m)
and Ym - B({1 2... m- 1} Ym-' m) we have that Ym m Z m
mu{„~}
, , , , , m Z m ~ Y . From
the fact that
Ymu{„~}
is the best payoff agent m can obtain when cooperating with coalition
S, there exists no individually rational allocation for coalition S that yields agent m a strictly
better payoff than Ym. Hence, coalition S has no incentive to part company with the coalition
{ 1, 2, ..., m} if Ym is allocated. Consequently, we have that Ym E C(I'm ). Taking m- n
then gives that Yn E C(I'n) - C(I'). Thus, Mo(V) - Yn E C(I'). ~
The reverse of this theorem, however, is not true. The following example shows that
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Example 4.2 Let I' be a three-person stochastic cooperative game such that V(S) - {Xs}
for all S C N. Let X{;} - 0 for all i E N, Xs - ; for S-{1,2}, {1,3}, XN - 3'-z
and X {z,s} - Y, where Y is a random variable attaining the values 0 and 4 with probability
2 each. Furthermore, each agent maximizes his expected utility according to the following
utility function
2t , if t C 2,
U;(t)-
tf2 ,ift~2
The expected utilities the agents can obtain in the various coalitions are depicted in Figure 4.1.
Note that this game is superadditive. The marginal vectors of this game yield expected utilities
of (3 2, 3 2 , 0), (3 2 , 0, 3 2) and (0, 3 2 , 32), respectively. Moreover, the marginal vectors belong
to the core of the game. This game, however, is notconvex. To see this, let S-{3}, T-{2, 3}
and U- {1 }. Take (ds -I- rSXs);ES E ~r(S) arbitrary and take (dsuv ~ rsuuXsuu)tESUU E
~r(S U U) such that d-(0, 0) and r- (1, 0), i.e., agent 1 receives 4 and agent 2 receives
0. The expected utilities of this allocation equal 32 for agent 1 and 0 for agent 2(see also
the point ~ in Figure 4.1). Next, let (dT f rT XT );ET E ~r(T) be such that d- (0, 0) and
r-( 2, 2). So, both agents 2 and 3 receive z Y. The expected utilities then equal 2 for both
players (see also the point y in Figure 4.1). Now if the game is convex there must exist an
allocation (clruU ~ rTuUXTuU)1ETUu E~r(T U U) such that the expected utilities are at least
2 for agents 2 and 3 and at least 3z for agent 1. Since T U U- N this means that we have to
allocate XN - 32. If agents 2 and 3 must receive an expected utility of at least 2, this implies
that each of them receives at least 1. Since only 32 can be allocated this implies that agent 1
can receive at most 12, yielding a utility of at most 3. Hence, the game is not convex.
The above mentioned results also hold for NTU-games if we formulate convexity based
on (4.4) in the following way. An NTU-game (N, V) satisfies convexity if for every U C N
and every S C T C N`U the following statement holds. For every individually rational
xs E V(S), every individually rational xT E V(T ) and every ~suu E V(S U U) such that
~suu )~S for all i E S, there exists xTuu E V(T U U) satisfying
xTUu ~~?' for all i E T, and
xTuu )~suu for all i E U.
In this way, convex NTU-games are totally balanced and every marginal vector belongs to the
core. This also implies that our definition of convexity is not equivalent to ordinal or cardinal
convexity - see VII.KOV (1977) and SH,4RKEY (1981) for their respective definitions - since for
both notions of convexity not all marginal vectors belong to the core.
Finally, let us focus once more on the class MG(N) of stochastic cooperative games.
Theorem 4.5 Let I' E MG(N). Then I' is convex if and only if (N, vr) is convex.
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P[tooF: Let I' E MG(N) be a convex game. Take U C N and S C T C N`U. Next,
let (ds -~ rsXs);ES E Z1Zr(S) and (dT } rTXT);ET E ZRr(T) be Pareto optimal for
S and T, respectively. Note that such allocations exists since I' E MG(N). Now, take
(dsuu ~ rsuuXsuu)iESuu E~r(S U U) such that it is Pareto optimal and ds f rsXs ~;
dsuu ~ rsuuX suu for all i E S. By the convexity of I' there exists a Pareto optimal allocation
(~ruU ~ rTUUXTuU) E~r(T U U) which (weakly) improves everyone's payoff. This implies
that
vr(S U U) - vr(S) - ~ mi(dsuu ~ rsuuXsuu) - ~,R.Li(ds } rsXs)
iESuU iES






- vr(T U U) -~ mi(dTuv } rTuuXTuU)
iET
~ vr(T u U) - vr(T),
where the last equality follows from the Pareto optimality of (c~uU ~ rTuvXTuU)iETuu. The
last inequality follows from the fact that for all i E T the allocation (dTuU } rTuuXTuU)iETuu
is a weak improvement of the Pareto optimal allocation (dT f rT XT );ET. Hence, (N, vr) is
convex.
Let (N,vr) be convex. Since this implies that (N,vr) is superadditive, it follows
from Theorem 4.3 that I' is superadditive. Next, let U C N and S C T C N`U. Take
(ds ~ rsX s)iES E ZRr(S) and (dT f rT XT );ET E Z1Zr(T) such that each allocation is Pareto
optimal. Note that if we can show that condition (4.4) holds for Pareto optimal allocations,
then it also holds for all other allocations. Next, take (dsuu } rsuuXsuu)iesuu E í~r(S U U)
such that dsuu } rsuvXsuv ~1 ds ~ rsXs for all i E S. Note that such an allocation exists
by the superadditivity of I'. Moreover, superadditivity implies that
~ mi(dsuv ~ rsuvXsuu) C vr(S U U) - vr(S).
iEU
(4.5)
Next, take (dTuv -~ r?uuXTuu)iETUu E ~r(T U U) such that it satisfies Pazeto optimality and
such that díruU ~ rTuUXTvU ,~,i ~r ~ rTXT for all i E T. That such an allocation indeed
exists follows from the superadditivity of I' and the fact that the certainty equivalents satisfy
(MS). Define b; - dT uu for all i E T and
ê; - m;(dsuu ~ rsuuXsuu) ~ ~ruv - ,r~ti(druU ~ rTuUXTuu) ~
1 ( SuU SuU SuU~U I vr(T U U) - vr(T) -~ mi(di f ri X )~ ,
` iEU
R~MaRKs
for all i E U. From
~ ó; - vr(T U U) - vr(T) -~ ~ dTuU -~ mi(dTuU
~ rTuUXTUU)
iETuU iETuU iEU
G vr(T U U) - v~(T) -~ m;(dTuU
~ rTuUXTuU)
- iEU
- vr(T U U) - vr(T)
-[-` TuU TuU TuU TuU TuU TuU
L. m;(d; -~ ri X ) f~ mi(d; ~ ri X )
iETuU iET
- vr(T U U) - vr(T) - v~(T U U) f v~(T) - 0,
it follows that (ó; f rTuUXTUU)iETuU E ~r(T U U). Then applying condition (MS) yields for
all i E U that
mi(ói ~ rTuUXTuU) - mi(dsuU } rsuUXsuU) ~
~U I vr(T U U) - vr(T) -~ m;(dsuu } rsuuXsuv)1
` iEU J
Since v~(T U U) - vr(T) -~;EU m;(dsuU } rsuUXsuU) ) 0 by (4.5) and the convexity of
(N, vr), it follows that m;(ó; ~- rTuUXTuU) ~,~lti(dsuU ~
rsuUXsuU) and, consequently,
that ó; ~ rTuUXTuU ~t dsuU } rsuUXsuU for all i E U. Hence, I' is convex. ~
In a similar way as for Theorem 4.5 one can show that in the context of TU-games
the definitions of convexity provided in (2.6) and the TU-formulation of (4.4) are equivalent.
Hence, the convexity introduced in this section is an extension of the convexity definition for
TU-games.
4.4 Remarks
When introducing convexity for stochastic cooperative games we also defined mazginal vectors
for these type of games. This naturally raises the question if we can also define a Shapley
value for stochastic cooperative games. For TU-games, the Shapley value is defined as the
average of all mazginal vectors. For stochastic cooperative games though, taking the average
of the marginal vectors does not give the desired result. As is the case for NTU-games, the
average need no longer be Pareto optimal. Furthermore, for each order a E IIN the mazginal
vector is not necessarily uniquely determined. Although the expected utility levels are uniquely
determined, this need not be the case for the random payoffs itself. Hence, for each order there
can exist several, maybe even an infinite number of marginal vectors.
So, when extending the Shapley value to stochastic cooperative games one encounters
two major problems. First, the average of the marginal vectors can violate Pareto optimality
and, second, a margina] vector need not be unique.
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A Nuciéolus for
Stoch~stic Cooperative Games
The nucleolus, a solution concept for T'U-games, originates from SctnvtEmL~t (1969). This
solution concept yields an allocation that minimizes the excesses of the coalitions in a lexico-
graphical way. The excess describes how dissatisfied acoalition is with the proposed allocation.
The larger the excess of a particular allocation, the more a coalition is dissatisfied with this al-
location. For Schmeidler's nucleolus the excess is defined as the difference between the payoff
a coalition can obtain when cooperating on its own and the payoff received by the proposed
allocation. So, when less is allocated to a coalition, the excess of this coalition increases and
the other way round.
Since the nucleolus depends mainly on the definition of the excess, other nucleoli are
found when different definitions of excesses are used. Such a general approach can be found
in Po'['rEtts and Tus (1992) and Mnscfn,E[t, Po'[-rERS, and Tvs (1992). They introduced the
general nucleolus as the solution that minimizes the maximal excess of the coalitions, using
generally defined excess functions.
A similar argument holds for stochastic cooperative games. Ifwecan specify the excesses
we can define a nucleolus for these games. Unfortunately, this is not that simple. Defining
excess functions for stochastic cooperative games appears to be not as straightforward as for
deterministic cooperative games. Indeed, how should one quantify the difference between
the random payoff a coalition can achieve on its own and the random payoff received by the
proposed allocation when the behavior towards risk can differ between the members of this
coalition? Furthermore, the excess of one coalition should be comparable to the excess of
another coalition.
Cxnu~rES and GRAtvoT (1976) introduced a nucleolus for chance-constrained games.
There, the excess was based on the probability that the payoff a coalition can obtain when
cooperating on its own, exceeds the payoff they obtained in the proposed allocation. Indeed,
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it is quite reasonable to assume that a coalition is less satisfied with the proposed allocation if
this probability increases.
For the excess defined in this paper we interpret the excess of Schmeidler's nucleolus in a
slightly different way. Bearing the conditions of the core in mind, this excess can be intetpreted
as follows. Given an allocation of the grand coalition's payoff we distinguish two cases. In the
first case, a coalition wants to leave the grand coalition. Then the excess equals the minimal
amount of money a coalition needs on top of what they already get such that this coalition is
willing to stay in the grand coalition. In the second case, a coalition has no incentive to leave
the grand coalition. Then the excess equals minus the maximal amount of money that can be
taken away from this coalition such that this coalition still has no incentíve to leave the grand
coalition. This interpretation is used to define the excess for stochastic cooperative games.
5.1 Preliminary Definitions
In this section we go through some necessary preliminaries. Consider a stochastic cooperative
game I' -(N, V, {~i};EN) E CG(N). For ease of notation, assume that V(S) -{Xs}
for all S E N. The results presented in this chapter also hold though if V(S) is finite for all
S C N. Next, take i E N and define X; -{Xs~i E S, ~S ) 2} so that
,C(X;) - {d-frX~XEX;,dER,rE[0,1]}U{X{;}}
is the set of allocations that agent i can possibly receive in the game I'. Furthermore, define
.~(X;) - {Fz~ Z E G(X;)}.
Recall that P E CG(N) implies that ~; is continuous on .~(X;).
In order to define a nucleolus one needs to specify for each coalition S C N an excess
function Es. The excess function assigns to each allocation (d; f r;XN)iEN E ~r(N) of
the grand coalition N a real number representing the complaint of coalition S. The larger the
complaint of a coalition the more this coalition is dissatisfied with the proposed allocation. For
the excess function introduced in this chapter we need the following notation. Define
Ir(S) -{(d,r) E Rs x ~s~`diES : dt f rtXs ~;X{,}},
as the set of possibly nonfeasible individually rational allocations for coalition S. Note that
Ir(S) is a subset of Rs x ~s and not a subset of L' ( R)s. So it contains the pairs (d, r) that lead
to an allocation (d; f r;X s);ES instead of the allocations itself. In the remainder of this chapter
we refer to both ( d, r) and (d; ~- r;X s);ES as an allocation. An allocation (d, r) E Ir(S) is
called feasible if ~;ES d; C 0. So, define
IRr(S) -{(d,r) E Ir(S)~~d; c 0},
iES
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as the set of feasible individually rational allocations forcoalition S. We assume that IRr(S) ~
~ for all S C N. Note that this assumption is satisfied if I' is superadditive. Moreover, it should
be noted that a coalition S is unlikely to be formed when IRr(S) - 0. Since in that case
for every allocation of XS there is at least one member of S whose payoff is not individually
rational. Hence, he would be better off by leaving coalition S and forming a coalition on his
own. Furthermore, define
POr(S) -{(d,r) E IRr(S)I~ld~.,.~iErRrls~dties : d; ~ r;Xs ~; d, f r;Xs},
as the set of feasible Pareto optimal allocations for S. Note that assumption (C2) in Section
3.2.1 implies that ~;ES d; - 0 whenever (d, r) E POr(S).
For gaining a clearer insight into the situation and the ( forthcoming) mathematics in
particular, we make use of a simplified graphical representation of the problem. At the moment
this might seem a bit overdone, but for the remainder of this paper these figures might turn out




Figure 5.1 represents a stochastic cooperative game with two expected utility maximizing
agents. The axes represent the utility levels of the agents. For simplicity, we have assumed
that payoffs are individually rational if and only if the corresponding expected utility is greater
than or equal to zero. So, the utility levels of both agents conesponding to the set Ir(S) is
represented by the positive orthant. Furthermore, the utility levels corresponding to the sets
IRr(S) of individually rational allocations is depicted by the shaded area, and the utility levels
corresponding to the set POr(S) of Pareto optimal allocations is depicted by the bold printed
curve. Finally, note that this and the forthcoming figures do not arise from a concrete example.
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In Figure 5.1 the sets of utility vectors corresponding to IRr(S) and POr(S), respec-
tively are compact. The following propositions show that also the sets IRr(S) and POr(S)
are compact subsets for the class CG(N) of stochastic cooperative games. The proofs of both
propositions can be found in Appendix A.1.
Pmposition 5.1 IRr(S) is a compact subset of Ir(S) for each coalition S C N.
Proposition 5.2 The set of Pareto optimal allocations POr(S) is a compact subset of Ir(S)
for each coalition S C N.
Furthermore, we need to consider the following sets. Define for each S C N
PDr(S) -{(d,r) E Ir(S)I~(d~,r~)EPO~(S) dces - d; f r;Xs ~; dti f r;Xs}
as the set of ( possibly nonfeasible) allocations that are (weakly) dominated by a Pareto optimal
allocation, and
NPDr(S) -{(d,r) E Ir(S)~~td~,r~)EPOr(S) b;es : d; f riXs ~; d; f r:Xs}
as the set of (possibly nonfeasible) allocations that are not dominated by Pareto optimal
allocations. Note that IRr(S) C PDr(S). The reverse, however, need not be true, as the next
example shows.
Example 5.1 Consider the following two person example. Let X 5 be such that -X S is
exponentially distributed with expectation equal to 1 for all S C N. Furthermore let a-
gents 1 and 2 be expected utility maximizers with utility functions Ul(t) --e-o.st and
U2(t) --e-o.25t, respectively. Then E(U~(dl f r1X{i,z})) --e -d' ~-ó s~, and E(U2(d2 -
s{i,2})) - ' An allocation (d r) E I 1 2}) is individually rational ifr X -e d-'i-o.zsr,. , r({ ,
E(Ur(dr -} riX{i,z})) ~ -2 and E(Uz(dz ~- rzX{i,~})) ? -1.25. Furthermore, (d,r') is
Pareto optimal if and only if ri - 3 and r2 - 3(see WIISOIV (1968) or Proposition 6.1 for a
similar result). Now, consider the allocation ( d, r) with dl - 0.1, d2 - 0.1, rl - 1 and r2 - 0.
Since dl f d2 ) 0 this allocation is nonfeasible. However, the Pareto optimal allocation (d`, r' )
with di --0.9, d2 - 0.9, ri - 3 and r2 - 3 is feasible and preferred by both agents. Indeed,
E(Ui(di f riX{i,2})) --1.8820 1-1.9025 - E(Ui(di f riX{r,s}))
and
E(U2(d2 } r2X {1,2})) - -0.9582 1 -0.9753 - E(U2(d2 -~ r2X {i,z})).
So even nonfeasible allocations can be Pazeto dominated.
A 1'iUCL~L7Ll3s FQ7ft ST'oCHASTtC ~DOPx:íiaTTb~ CrA1vt~S 75
The next proposition states a rather intuitive result. Namely that for every Pareto domi-
nated allocation (d, r) and every non-Pareto dominated allocation (d', r'), which all members
of S weakly prefer to the Pareto dominated allocation (d, r), there exists a Pareto optimal
allocation such that for each agent the Pareto optimal allocation is weakly better than (d, r) but
weakly worse than (d', r').
Proposition 5.3 Let I' E CG(N). Take ( d, r) E PDr(S) and (d, r) E NPDr(S) such that
d; f r;Xs~td; f r";X s for all i E S. Then there exists (d, r") E POr(S) such that
d; -F r;Xs~; d; f r"; X s~; d; -F r;Xs
for all i E S.
PROOF: See Appendix A.1.
A direct consequence of this proposition is that for each allocation (d, r) E IRr(S) there
exists a Pazeto optimal allocation ( d', r') such that d; f r;X s ~t dz f r;X S for all i E S.
Moreover, since IRr(S) is assumed to be nonempty we have that for each (d, r) E NPD~(S)
there exists (d', r') E POr(S) such that d2 ~- r;Xs ~~ d; ~ r;X s for all i E S.
Finally, we introduce three sets. Therefore, let (d,r) E IRr(N) be an individually
rational allocation for the grand coalition N. Take S C N and define
Ws((d,r)) -{(d',r') E IRr(S)~d;es : d( t r2Xs ~; d; ~ r;xN}
as the set of individually rational allocations for coalition S which are weakly worse than the
payoff d; f r;X N for every member of S, and,
Bs((d,r)) -{(d',r') E IRr(S)~d;ES : d, -f r;Xs ~~ d; ~ r;XN}
as the set of individually rational allocations for coalition S which are weakly better than the
payoff d; -~ r;X N for every member of S. Furthermore, define
Pos((d, r)) -(ws((d, r)) u BS((d, r))) n Por(s),
as the set of Pazeto optimal allocations for coalition S which are either weakly worse than
d; ~ r; X N for all members of S or weakly better than d; -~ r;X N for all members of S. These
three sets are illustrated in Figure 5.2. Note that Bs((d, r)) can be empty.
5.2 A Nucleolus for Stochastic Cooperative Games
With the definitions and notions introduced in the previous section we can now define an excess
function and, consequently, a nucleolus for stochastic cooperative games. The excess function




ES : IRr(N) ~ R of coalition S is defined as follows. Take (d, r) E IRr(N). Then the
excess for coalition S is defined by
ES((d,r)) - min {~b;~b';ES : b; E Rand d; f r;Xs ~; d; -f r;XN -}-b;}.
(d',r')EPOs~~d,r))
iES
We will show later on that this minimum is well defined. For an interpretation of the excess,
let us focus on the core conditions. So, given a proposed allocation (d, r) does a coalition S
have an incentive to leave the grand coalition or not?
First, consider again the excess as used in ScxivtEID[.E[t (1969). There, the excess can
be interpreted as the minimum amount of money a coalition needs on top of what they already
receive from the proposed allocation, such that they are indifferent between staying in the
grand coalition and leaving the grand coalition. This interpretation is now applied to stochastic
cooperative games. For this, note that given an allocation (d, r) E IRr(N) a coalition S is
indifferent between staying in the grand coalition N and leaving if there exists an allocation
(d', r') E POs((d, r)) such that each agent i E S is indifferent between receiving the payoff
d; ~ r,Xs and the payoff d; ~ r;XN. So, coalition S cannot do strictly better by leaving
the grand coalition but if they do split off they can allocate their payoff in such a way that no
member is strictly worse off.
Now, suppose that a coalition S has an incentive to part company with the grand coalition
N. So, there exists an allocation (d, r") E IR~(S) such that each agent i E S strictly prefers
the payoff d; ~- r;X S to the payoff d; f r;X N. To keep this coalition in the grand coalition the
payoff to the members of S must increase. This can be done by giving each member i E S a
deterministic amount of money b;. Hence, their payoff becomes d; f b; -~ r;X N. The excess
of coalition S then equals the minimal amount of money they need so that they are just willing
to stay in the grand coalition.
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Next, suppose that a coalition S does not have an incentive to split off from the grand
coalition. Hence, this coalition receives at least what they can achieve on their own. Con-
sequently, one can decrease the payoff of each member i E S with a deterministic amount
S;. Then the excess equals the maximal amount of money that can be taken away from this
coalition such that they are still staying in the grand coalition.
Summarizing, a positive excess Es((d, r)) represents the minimum amount of money
that coalition S needs in order to be satisfied with the allocation ( d, r). Moteover, if (d, r) and
(d', r') are allocations of X N such that each agent i E S prefers d; -F r;X N to d; f r;X N then
Es((d,r)) C Es((d',r')). Hence, the excess decreases when each agent i E S improves his
payoff. So, in a specific way the excess Es((d, r)) describes how much coalition S is satisfied
with the allocation (d, r). Finally, since all agents' preferences are monotonically increasing
in the amount of money d they receive (see assumption ( C2)) it is reasonable to say that one
coalition is more satisfied with a particular allocation than another coalition if the first coalition
needs less money to be satisfied than the latter one, or, in other words, if the excess of the
first coalition is less than the excess of the latter. This last observation leads to the following
definition of a nucleolus.
Let I' E CG(N) be a cooperative game with stochastic payoffs and let
Es((d,r)) - min {~bi~ diES : d( ~- r;Xs ~i di -~ riXN f b;} (5.1)(d~,r~)EPOS((d,r)) iES
describe the excess of coalition S at allocation (d,r) E IRr(N). Next, denote by E((d,r))
the vector of excesses at allocation ( d, r) and let B o E((d, r)) denote the vector of excesses
with its elements arranged in decreasing order. The nucleolusN(I') of the game I' E CG(N)
is then defined by
N(1,) -{(d, r) E IRr(N)~d(d~,r'IE~R~(N) : 6 o E((d, r)) c~er B o E((d', r'))}, (5.2)
where C~ex is the lexicographic ordering. Next, we show that the nucleolus is a well defined
solution concept for the class CG(N) of stochastic cooperative games.
Theorem 5.4 Let I' be a stochastic cooperative game. If I' E CG(N) and IR~(N) ~ 0 then
N(I') ~ 0.
PxooF: In proving the nonemptiness of the nucleolus N(I') we make use of the results stated
in MASCHL.ER, Po1'rERS and TUS (1992). They introduced a nucleolus for a more general
framework and showed that the nucleolus is nonempty if the domain is compact and the excess
functions are continuous. Thus, we have to show that IRr(N) is compact and that Es((d, r)) is
continuous in (d, r) foreach (d, r) E IR~(N) and each S C N. The compactness of IR~(N)
follows immediately from Proposition 5.1. The continuity proof is a bit more complicated and
consists of the following parts.
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First, it follows from Lemma A.1 in Appendix A.1 that POs((d, r)) is a nonempty
compact subset of POr(S). Next, let us introduce the following multifunction
Es((d,r)) -{~ó;~3(d',T' )EPOS((d ,~)) ~ d~ } r:Xs ~; d; f r;XN -f b;}.
;ES
Hence, ES((d, r)) - min ÉS((d, r)). Lemma A.2 shows that ÉS((d, r)) is a compact subset
of R for each allocation (d,r) E IRr(N). This implies that the minimum in (5.1) exists.
Subsequently, Lemma A.3 and Lemma A.4 show that this multifunction is upper and lower
semi continuous, respectively. From Lemma A.5 it then follows that the excess function ES is
continuous. ~
5.3 The Nucleolus, the Core and Certainty equivalents
For deterministic cooperative games it is known that the nucleolus as defined in Sct-nvtEIDLEtt
(1969) is a core allocation whenever the core is nonempty. A similar result can be derived for the
nucleolus N(I') introduced in this chapter. For this, recall that an allocation (d, r) E IR~(N)
is a core allocation for the game I' if for each coalition S C N there exists no allocation
(d,r) E IRr(S) such that d; f r;Xs ~; d; f r,XN for all i E S. The set of all core
allocations is denoted by C(I').
Theorem 5.5 Let I' E CG(N). If C(I') ~ 0 then N(I') C Core(I').
PROOF: Take (d, r) E IR~(N) and S C N. Let (ds, r"S) E Ir(S) be such that ds f r"SXs -~;
d; f r;XN for all i E S. Moreover, let (d, r) E POs((d, r)) and ó E RS be such that
á; f r;Xs ~; d; f r;XN ~ ó; for all i E S and ~;ES ó; - ES((d, r)). Regarding the sign of
the excess, we distinguish three cases.
First, suppose (ds,TS) E PDr(S)`POr(S). Then d; ~ rtXs ~ids } rsXs for all
i E S. Hence, b; ~ 0 for all i E S. Since ( ds, rs) is not Pareto optimal there exists j E S
such that d~ f r~ X S~~ d~ ~ r~X S~~ d~ -I- r~X N. Then ê~ ~ 0 and, consequently,
Es((d, r)) - ~;ES ó; ~ 0.
Second, suppose (ds, r"S) E PO~(S). This implies that 0 E ÉS((d, r)). Hence,
ES((d, r)) C 0.
Third, suppose (ds, r"S) E NPDr(S)`POr(S). Then d; f r;XS~tids .~ rSX S for all
i E S. Hence, ê; C 0 for all i E S. Moreover, since ( ds, rs) is not Pareto optimal there exists
j E S such that d~ f r;X S~; ds f r~ X S~; d; ~ r;X N. So, ó; c 0 and, consequently,
Es((d, r)) -~;ES ó; c 0.
Now we show that the excess vector corresponding to a core allocation is lexicograph-
ically smaller then the excess vector corresponding to an allocation that dces not belong to
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the core. This implies that the latter allocation cannot belong to the nucleolus of the game
whenever core allocations exist. Hence, the nucleolus must be a subset of the core.
Take (d, r) E C(I') and (d', r') ~ C(I'). Since (d, r) E C(I') it follows from the core
conditions that (ds, rs) E NPDr(S) for all S C N. Hence, ES((d, r)) C 0 for all S C N.
Since (d', r') r;{ C(I') there exists a coalition S C N and an allocation (d, r") E IRr(S) for S
such that d; ~ r";XS ~; d; } r~XN for all i E S. Hence, (d'S, r"'S) E PDr(S)`POr(S) and,
consequently, Es((d',r')) ~ 0. This implies that B o Es((d,r)) C~ex 8 o Es((d',r')). Thus
(d~~ r ) ~ N(r). 3~
Next, consider the class MG(N) of stochastic cooperative games introduced in Section
3.2.2. Recall that each stochastic cooperative game I' E MG(N) gives rise to a TU-game
(N, vr) with
vr(S) - max{~m;(d; ~-r;X)~(d; ~-r;X);ES E ~r(S)}
iES
for all S C N. Furthermore, recall that an allocation (d; ~- r;X );ES E~r(S) is Pazeto optimal
if and only if
~mi(di ~ riX) - vr(S).
iES
We will show that an allocation (d, r) E IRr(N) belongs to the nucleolus N(I') if and only
if the corresponding allocation (m;(d; -}- r;XN));EN is the nucleolus of the corresponding
TU-game (N, vr).
Theorem 5.6 Let I' E MG(N) such that IRr(S) ~ 0. Take (d; ~ r;XN);EN E~r(N) and
let y E RN be such that m;(d; f r;XN) - y; for all i E N. Then (d; ~ r;XN);EN E N(I') if
and only if y- n(vr).
PROOF: Let I' E MG(N) and take (d, r) E IRr(N). Let y E RN be such that m;(d; f
r;XN) - y; for all i E N. The excess of coalition S then equals
min {~ bi~biES - d; ~ r(Xs~; di ~- riXN f 6i}(d',r')EPOS((d,r)) iES
min {~ ÁiIdiES . mi(d; ~ riXS) - mi(d; ~ r;X nr ~ ói)}(d',r')EPO'g((d,r)) iES
min {~óildiES : mi(d; ~ riXS) - ói ~ mi(di -~ riXN)}(d',r')EPOS((d,r)) iES
min ~(m;(d; f r;XS) - mi(di f riXN))
(d',r')EPOS((d,r));ES
vr(S) - ~ y;.
iES
So, the excess ofcoalition S at allocation (d; f r;X N);EN equals the excess E(S, y) introduced
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by ScxMEIDt.F.tt ( 1969) of coalition S for the TU-game (N, vr) ( see page 31). Moreover, for
each allocation (d,r) E POr(N) in I' the vector ( m;(d; -f r;XN));EN is an allocation of
vr(N) in (N,vr) and, vice versa, for each allocation x of vr(N) there exists an allocation
(d,r) E POr(N) in I' such that m;(d; f r;XN) - ~; for all i E N. Hence, an allocation
(d; f r;X N) ;EN belongs to the nucleolus N(I') of the game I' if and only if the corresponding
allocation (m;(d; f r;XN));EN - y equals the nucleolus n(vr) of the corresponding TU-game
(N, vr). ~
Example 5.2 Consider the following three person game I'. Let -X {;} ~ Exp(1) for i- 1, 2, 3
and let X s -~;ES X{~} if ~S~ ? 2. So, each agent individually faces a random cost which is
exponentially distributed with expectation equal to 1. The cost of a coalition then equals the
sum of the cost of the members of this coalition. Furthermore, all agents are expected utility
maximizers with utility functions UI(t) - -e-o.st U2(t) - -e-o.33t and U3(t) --e-o.2s~
respectively. For the certainty equivalent m; it holds that m;(d; f r;Xs) - U; '(E(U;(d; f
r;X s ))). For the corresponding TU-game ( N, vr ) of I' we then get vr( { 1})--1.3863,
vr({2}) - -1.2164, vr({3}) - -1.1507, vr({1,2}) - -2.2314, vr({1,3}) - -2.1878,
vr({2,3}) -- 2.1582 and vr({1,2,3}) --3.1800. The nucleolus n(vr) of this game
is equal to (-1.0933, -1.0633, -1.0234). To determine the nucleolus N(I') note that an
allocation (d; f r;X N);EN~r(N) is Pareto optimal if and only if r- 9(2, 3, 4). Then the
only allocation (d; 4- r;XN);EN for which (m;(d; -~ r;X,.;));EN - n(vr) is the allocation
(d; f r;X N) ;EN with (di, d2, d3) -(-0.3865, -0.0034, 0.3899) and ( ri, r2i r3) - '-s(2, 3, 4).
Hence, N(P) - {(d; f r;X N);EN}.
Classical actuarial theory has mainly focused on insurance problems from the insurer's point
of view. Most of the attention is dedicated to the determination of an appropriate premium
for the insured risk. Obviously, the nature of the risk is a substantial factor in this process.
In this respect, there is an important difference whether the risk arises from the `life' or the
`non life' sector. For the first, there is a profusion of statistical data on the expected remaining
life available, which makes the calculation of an appropriate premium relatively easy. For the
latter, however, things are a bit more complicated. In `non life' insurance the risk is not always
easy to capture in a statistical framework. Therefore, several premium calculation principles
have been developed to serve this purpose, see for instance Goova,ERTS, DE VYLDER and
HAEZEivDOrrcx (1984).
These calculation principles, however, only take into account a part of the insurer's side
of the deal. More precisely, they consider whether the premium is high enough to cover the
risk. Competition arising from the presence of other insurers on the one hand, and the interests
of the insured, on the other hand, are mostly ignored. It is, of course, better to consider
all these aspects in an insurance deal, since the premium should not only be high enough to
compensate the insurer for bearing the individual's risk, it should also be low enough so that
an individual is willing to insure his risk (or a part of it) for [his premium. The economic
models for (re)insurance markets, which were developed from the 1960's on (cf. BoRCx
(1962A) and BUHLNtA1~11v (1980), (1984)), consider indeed the interests ofboth the insurers and
the insured. These models incorporate the possibility to study problems concerning fairness,
Pareto optimality and market equilibrium. BuHLMnNtv (1980), for example, shows that the
Esscher calculation principle results in a Pareto optimal outcome.
More recently, also game theory is used to model the interests of all parties in an
insurance problem. Especially when insurance companies incorporate subadditive premiums,
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individuals can save on the premium if they decide to take a collective insurance instead of
an individual one. This situation is discussed in ALEGRE and MEFtCÈ CLARAIvtutvT (1995).
Other applications of cooperative game theory in insurance can be found in BoRCx (19628)
and LEMAIRE (1991).
Cooperative game theory, however, still has to establish itself as an appropriate tool for
exploring insurance problems. A reason for this is due to the inability of traditional cooperative
game theory to incorporate the uncertainties, which play such an important role in insurance.
Indeed, in classical theory the gains coalitions can obtain by cooperating aze assumed to be
known with certainty. In the preceding chapters, however, we have introduced and developed
a model, which overcomes this problem.
This chapter shows how this new game theoretical model applies toproblems in insurance.
Our game theoretical approach allows for insurance of personal losses as well as reinsurance
of the portfolios of insurance companies. By cooperating with insurance companies individual
persons aze able to transfer their future random losses to the cooperating insurance companies.
Thus in doing so, individual persons conclude an insurance deal. Similarly, by cooperating
with other insurers an insurance company can transfer (parts of) her insurance portfolio to the
other insurers. So, the insurance company concludes a reinsurance deal.
In this model our attention is focused on Pareto optimal allocations of the risks, and on
the question which premiums are fair to charge for these risk exchanges. A Pareto optimal
allocation is such that there exists no other allocation which is better for all persons and insurers
taking part in the game. We show that there is essentially a unique Pareto optimal allocation of
risk. It will appear that this Pazeto optimal allocation of the risk is independent of the insurance
premiums that are paid for these risk exchanges. For determining fair premiums, we look at
the core of the insurance game. A core allocation divides the gains of cooperation in such a
way that no subcoalition has an incentive to split off. We show that the core is nonempty for
insurance games. Moreover, we show that the zero utility principle for calculating premiums
(see GOOVAERTS, DE VYLDER and HAEZINDONCK (1984)) results in a core allocation.
6.1 Insurance Games
For modeling insurance problems we use a slightly modified version ofour model ofa stochastic
cooperative game as introduced in Chapter 3. We show that by cooperating, individuals and
insurers can redis[ribute their risks and, consequently, improve their welfaze. First, we need
to specify the agents that participate in the game. An agent can be one of two types; an agent
is either an individual person or an insurer. The set of individual persons is denoted by NP
and the set of insurers is denoted by NI. Hence, the agents of the game are denoted by the set
NIUNP.
Next, all agents are assumed to be risk averse expected utility maximizers. This means
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that an agent prefers one risk to another if the expected utility of the first exceeds the expected
utility of the latter. Note that insurers aze also assumed to be risk averse. Furthermore, we
assume that the utility function for each agent i E NI U NP can be described by U; (t)- Q;e-a,t
(t E R), with Q; C 0, a; ) 0. Since ~; C 0 and a; 1 0 imply concavity for the utility functions
U;, we have that each agent is risk averse. Recall that risk aversion implies that for each random
loss X an agent prefers receiving the expected loss E( X) with certainty to receiving the random
loss X . By changing the signs of the parameters ~; and a; the utility function becomes convex,
and, as a consequence, the agent will be risk loving. Regarding the situations where one or
more risk neutral~oving insurers are involved we confine ourselves to a brief discussion later
on. Finally, note that since the utility functions are exponential the expected utility of a random
loss X need not always exist. In this chapter, however, we implicitly assume that the risks are
such that the expected utility exists.
To describe the future random losses of an agent, we introduce the following notation.
Let {Yk ~ Exp(~k)~k E K} be a finite collection of independent exponentially distributed
random variables. These variables can be interpreted as describing the random losses that
could occur to individuals. They describe, for example, the monetary damages caused by cars,
bikes, fires, or other people. The loss X; for agent i then equals
X; - ~ fikYk, (6'1)
kEti
where 0 C f;k C 1 for all k E lï. In particular we define K; -{k E K~ f;k ~ 0} for all
i E NI U NP. So, if agent i is an insurer, then the loss X; represents the loss of insurer i's
portfolio. Moreover, the insurance portfolio X; can be a combination of many random losses.
In fact, they are the fractions f;k of the losses that individuals have insured at this particular
insurer. If agent i is an individual person then X; represents the random loss this individual
might want to insure. Note that the portfolios of different agents may be stochastically
dependent, albeit in a very specific way; an individual can insure part of his loss at insurer i
and another part of the same loss at insurer j.
Now, let us focus on the possibilities that occur when agents decide to cooperate.
Therefore, consider a coalition S ofagents. If the members of S decide to cooperate, the total
loss X s E Ll(R) of coalition S equals the sum of the individual losses of the members of S,
i.e., X s-~;ES X;. Subsequently, the loss X s has to be allocated to the members of S.
In Chapter 3 we described an allocation of the random payoff Xs to the members of
coalition S by means of a pair (d, r). Applying this definition to insurance games, however,
raises a problem. Given an allocation ( d, r) we have that agent i E S fl NP receives d; f r;Xs.
Thus Xs not only consists of the future random losses of agent i, but also of the future random
losses of all other individuals j E S fl NP. Hence, if agent i receives d; f r;Xs he receives
(part of) the random losses of his fellow agents j E S fl NP. Furthermore, this means that
an agent j E S fl NP transfers (part of) his random losses to agent i, or, put in other words,
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agent j insures ( part of) his random losses at agent i. But this is rather unusual; agents only
make insurance deals with insurance companies and not with other individuals. So, we need
to modify our definition of an allocation so as to incorporate transfers of random losses from
individuals to insurance companies only. The option we choose for is to replace the vector
r E Os by a matrix R E RsXs. An element r;; then represents the fraction ofagent j's random
loss that he transfers to agent i. Then by imposing the right conditions on R we can guarantee
that individuals cannot transfer any risks among each other.
For explaining an allocation of the loss Xs in more detail, we distinguish between the
following three cases. In the first case, coalition S consists of insurers only. So, S C N~.
Such a coalition is assumed to allocate the loss Xs in the following way. First, a coalition
S allocates a fraction r;~ E [0,1] of the loss X~ of insurer j E S to insurer i E S. So,
insurer i bears a total loss of ~~ES r;~X~, where r;~ E[0,1] and ~kES rk~ - 1. This is called
proportional ( re)insurance. This part of the allocation of Xs for coalition S is described by
a matrix R E R~Xs where r;; represents the fraction insurer i bears of insurer j's loss X;.
Second, the insurers are allowed to make deterministic transfer payments. This means that
each insurance company i E S also receives an amount d; E R such that ~~ES d~ C 0. These
transfer payments can be interpreted as the aggregate premium insurers have to pay for the
actual risk exchanges.
In the second case, coalition S consists of individual persons only. So, S C NP. Then
the gains of cooperation are assumed to be nil. That is, we do not allow any risk exchanges
between the persons themselves. For, that is what the insurers are for in the first place. As a
result, the only allocations (d, R) of X s which are allowed are of the form r;; - 1 for all i E S
and r;~ - 0 for all i, j E S with i~ j.
In the third and last case, coalition S consists of both insurers and individual persons.
So, S C N~ U NP. Now cooperation can take place in two different ways. First, insurers
are allowed to exchange (parts of) their portfolios with other insurers, and, second, individual
persons may transfer (parts of) their risks to insurers. Again, individual persons are not allowed
to exchange risks with each other. Moreover, we assume that insurers cannot transfer (parts
of) their portfolios to individuals.
Summarizing we can say that there are several restrictions on allocations. To be more
precise, denote by Sr the set of insurers of coalition S, i.e., S, - S n NI, and by SP the set
of individuals of coalition S, i.e., SP - S n NP. Then an allocation (d, R) E Rs x RtXs is
feasible for the coalition S if for all i E SP and all j E S with i~ j it holds [hat r;; - 0 and
~;ES r;; - 1 for all j E S. Furthermore, given an allocation (d, R) of the random loss X s,
agent i E S receives d; f~;ES r;;X; - d; f R;X s, where R; denotes the i-th row of R and
Xs - (Xi)iES-
Example 6.1 Let NI -{ 1, 2}, NP - {4, 5} and Ií - {a, b, c, d, e}. So, there are five
independent exponentially distributed risks. Next, suppose that X 1- 3Ya f Yb, X z-
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3Ya f Y~, X4 - Yd and XS - Ye. Consider the coalition S-{1,4,5}. Then XS -
X 1-~ X 4~- X s- 3 Ya -~ Y6 ~- Yd -F Ye. A feasible allocation for S is the following. Let




and individual 5 receives
d5~R5XS - -1-SX,--1-SYe.
So, individuals 4 and 5 pay a premium of 2 and 1, respectively, to insurer 1 for the insurance
of their losses.
In conclusion, an insurance game I' with agent set NI U NP is described by the tuple
(NI U NP, V, (U;)iENfuNp), where NI is the set of insurers, NP the set of individuals, V(S) -
{~;ES X; } the random loss for coalition S, and Ui the utility function for agent i E NI U NP.
The class of all such insurance games with insurers NI and individuals NP is denoted by
IG(Nr, NP).
6.1.1 Pareto Optimal Distributions of Risk
Since the preferences of both an individual and an insurer are described by means of a utility
function we can look at the certainty equivalent of random payoffs for each of them. The
certainty equivalent of a random payoff is the amount of money for which an agent is indifferent
between receiving the random payoff and receiving this amount of money with certainty. For
the utility functions considered in our model, we can define the certainty equivalent ofa random
payoff X by mi(X) - U;i(E(U;(X ))) provided that the expected utility exists. Then for all
these random payoffs X it holds that E(U;(m;(X)) - Ui(m;(X)) - E(U;(X)). Since the
expected utilities equal each other, agent i is indifferent between receiving the random payoff
X and the deterministic payoff m;(X ). Moreover, for the insurance games introduced in the
previous section the exponential utility functions aze such that the results stated in Section
3.2.2 on certainty equivalents apply. One of these results concerns the Pareto optimality of an
allocation. For insurance games this result reads as follows.
Proposition 6.1 Let I' E IG(N~, NP) and S C Nr U NP. An allocation (d; f R;X S);ES E
~r(S) is Pareto optimal for coalition S if and only if
~mi(di f R;XS) - max {~mi(di f RiXs)~ (di f RiXs)iES E.~r(S) }. (6.2)
iES IiES JJJ
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So, an allocation is Pareto optimal for coalition S ifand only if this allocation maximizes
the sum of the certainty equivalents. To determine these allocations, we first need to calculate
the certainty equivalent of an allocation (d; f R;Xs);ES E~r(S) for agent i E S. Therefore,
let S C Nr U NP and (d; f R;Xs);ES E~r(S). The random loss coalition S has to allocate
equals Xs -~;ES X;. Given a feasible allocation (d; -~ R;Xs);ES E ~r(S), the random
payoff to agent i E S equals
d;~R;Xs-di-~rijXi
jES
if i E SI and
d;fR;Xs-di-riiXi
if i E Sp. Consequently, we have that the certainty equivalent of (d; -}- R;X s);ES equalst
d; ~ ~ ~, log ~1 - ,;; a;r;; f;k) , if i E Sp,
m;(d ; -~ R;XS) - kEK 1 1
di ~~ ~ a. 1og ( 1 - vk airijfjk) i if i E SI.
jES kEK
The sum of the certainty equivalents then equals
~mi(di ~ 1GSXs) - J~d; ~ ~ ~ a. l~g ( 1 - Nka;riifik)
iES iES iESp kEIC




Since ~;ES d; - 0 for Pareto optimal allocations, we have for these allocations that [he
sum of the certainty equivalents is independent of the vector of transfer payments d. Intuitively,
this is quite clear. For since ~hES dh - 0, an increase in d; for agent i implies that dj decreases
for at least one other agent j. Consequently, Pareto optimality is solely determined by the
choice of the allocation risk exchange matrix R of the random losses. In fact, the next theorem
shows that there is a unique allocation risk exchange matrix R' inducing Pareto optimality.
Theorem 6.2 LetI' E IG(NI, NP) andS C NIUNp. Anallocation (d;~-R;Xs);ES E~r(S)









1The proof is stated in Appendix A.2.
LN3f.iRAAt~ fsAiví~S ~?
PltooF: We have to show that R` is the unique solution of
IIlaX ~ ~ tr~ log (1 - vk~iriifik) ~ ~ ~ ~ a, log (1 - NkCY'rijf)k)
iESp kEK iESf jES kEK
s.[.: rjj f~;ES~ r;j - 1, for all j E SP,
~;ES~ r;j - 1, for all j E Si,
r;; ~ 0, if i E Sp,
r;j ~ 0, ifiESlandjES.
Since the objective function is strictly concave in r;j for all relevant combinations of i, j E S,
it is sufficient to prove that R' solves this maximization problem. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
conditionsz tell us that this is indeed the case if there exists ~j E R(j E S), vjj ~ 0(j E SP)







-~j - vjj, for all j E SP,
-~; - v;;, for all i E SI and all j E S,
v;;r;; - 0, for all i E SP,
v;;r;j - 0, for all i E SI and all j E S.
Substituting r;j gives v;j - 0 for all relevant combinations of i, j E S and
~j - - ~kEK~ Jjk ~~k - ~~` J i` LhEStU{~} ~h
-1
for all j E SP,
~j - - ~kEK~ fjk ~~k -~(~f-~ , for all j E SI.
` LhESr ah
Consequently, R' solves the maximization problem.
So, for a Pareto optimal allocation of a loss X j within S one has to distinguish between
two cases. In the first case the index j refers to an insurer and in the second case j refers to
an individual. When X; is the loss of insurer j E SI, the loss is allocated proportionally to
á; among all insurers in coalition S. When X; is the loss of individual j E SP, the loss is
2 The Karush-Kuhn-1Lcker conditions read as follows:
If f(x) - ma.xy f(y)
s.t. gk(y) ~ 0, k E K
gJ(y) - 0, ! E L
then there exist vk 1 0(`dk E K) and ai E R(d! E L) such that
~f(x) - ~kEK uk ' 09k(x) } ~IEL ~! ' Ogf (x)
vk ' gk(x) - 0, for all k E K.
-1
Moreover, if f is strictly concave and gk (k E K), g~ (! E L) aze convex then [he reverse of the statement also
holds and the maximum is unique.
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allocated proportionally to á, among all insurers in coalition S and individual j himself. Note
that by the feasibility constraints nothing is allocated to the other individuals. Furthermore,
Pareto optimality does not depend on the parameters ~k of the losses Yk (k E K). Finally,
remazk that if only reinsurance of the insurance portfolios is considered, that is, NP - 0 then
the Pazeto optimal allocation coincides with the Pazeto optimal allocation of (re)insurance
mazkets discussed in BUHLMAIJN (1980).
Example 6.2 In this example all monetary amounts can be assumed to be in thousands of dol-
lars. Consider the following situation in automobile insurance with three insurance companies
and two individual persons. So, N~ - {1, 2, 3} and NP - {4, 5}. The utility function of each
agent can be described by U,(t) - e-~'t with al - 0.33, c~z - 0.1, a~3 - 0.25, a4 - 0.4
and a5 - 0.25, respectively. Each insurance company bears the risk of all the cars contained
in its insurance portfolio. A car can be one of two types. The first type corresponds to an
average saloon car which generates relatively low losses. The second type corresponds to an
exclusive sportscar generating relatively high losses. Formally, the monetary loss generated by
a caz is described by the exponential probability distribution Exp(5) when it is of type 1 and
by Exp(0.5) when it is of type 2. Thus the expected loss of a type 1 car and a type 2 car equal
~ 0.2 and ~ 2, respectively.
The insurance portfolio of insurer 1 consists of 1800 cars of type 1 and 10 cars of type
2. For insurer 2 the portfolio consists of 900 cars of type 1 and 25 cars of type 2. Finally, the
portfolio of insurer 3 consists of 300 cars of type 1 and 90 cars of type 2. The expected loss for
insurer 1 then equals 1800 . 0.2 ~- 10 . 2-~ 380. The expected losses for insurer 2 and 3 then
equal ~ 230 and ~ 240, respectively. The two individual persons each possess one car. Player
4's caz is of type 1 and player 5's car is of type 2. So, the expected losses are ~ 0.2 and ~ 2,
respectively.
Next, let X; denote the loss of agent i. If all agents cooperate, the Pareto optimal risk
allocation matrix of the total random loss X 1~- X z f X 3} X 4~ X 5 equals
R' -
3 3 3 6 3
17 17 17 39 21
10 10 10 20 10
17 17 17 39 21
4 9 4 8 4
17 17 17 39 21
0 0 0 39 0
0 0 0 0 21
Consequently, a Pareto optimal allocation (d; f R~ X N);EN E .~r(S) yields the payoffs
d1fRiXN - dl- ~(X1fXz-4-X3)-39X4- 1X5,
dz f R2XN - dz - io(X1 f Xz f Xs ) - 39X9 - 21X5,
d3 ~ R3XN - d3 - 7(X 1~ X2~ X3) - 39 X4- 21 X5~
Ir~sur~~~~~ ~.~~s ~~
d4 ~ R4 X N - d4 - 39 X4,
ds ~- RSXN - ds - z~Xs.
The determination of the allocation risk exchange matrix is, of course, only one part
of the allocation. We still have to determine the vector of transfer payments d, that is, the
premiums that have to be paid. Although an allocation (d; -~ R,'X s);ES may be Pareto optimal
for any choice of d, not every d is satisfactory from a social point of view. An insurer will
not agree with insuring the losses of other agents if he is not properly compensated, that is,
if he does not receive a fair premium for the insurance. Similarly, insurance companies and
individuals only agree to insure their losses if the premium they have to pay is reasonable.
Consequently, there is a conflict of interests; both insurance companies and individuals want to
pay a low premium for insuring their own losses, while insurance companies want to receive a
high premium for bearing the losses of other agents. So the question remains which premiums
are reasonable? This is the subject of the next subsection.
6.1.2 The Core of Insurance Games
In our quest for fair premiums we look at core allocations of insurance games. The core is
one of the most important solution concepts in game theory. It is generally accepted by game
theorists that if the core is a nonempty set of allocations, then the allocation on which the agents
agree should be a core allocation. The core contains allocations that induce a form of stability
for the coalition of all agents involved. In the context of insurance games, an allocation is
a core allocation if there is no subcoalition that has an incentive to part company with the
grand coalition N- NI U NP because this subcoalition can achieve a better allocation on their
own. Formally, this means that an allocation (d; f R;XN);EN E~r(N) is a core allocation
if for each coalition S C N there exists no allocation (d; f R;X s);ES E~r(S) for coalition
S such that each agent i E S prefers the payoff d; -}- R;X s to the payoff d; ~- R;X N, i.e.,
E(U;(d; ~ R;Xs)) ~ E(U;(d; ~ R;XN)) for all i E S. The set of all core allocations for a
game I' E IG(NI, NP) is denoted by C(I'). Note that a core allocation is Pareto optimal for
NI U NP. Hence, (d; ~ R;XN);EN E C(I') implies that the allocation risk exchange matrix
R has the structure of the Pareto optimal allocation risk exchange matrix R` as described in
Theorem 6.2 with S- NI U Np.
We will show that insurance games are totally balanced, that is, the core of an insurance
game is nonempty and the core of every subgame is nonempty. This means that there always
exists an allocation of NI U Np which is stable in the sense as described above. To prove this
result, we make use of the results stated in Section 3.2.2 and Section 4. I.
First, we associate with each insurance game I' E IG(NI, NP) a TU-game (N, vr) with
N- NI U NP. Let S C NI U NP. The value vr(S) of coalition S in the game (N, vr) is
defined by
~Q I~VSUi2A3v~E GA11~~~
vr(S) - max{ ~mi(di f RiXN)~ (di f RiXN)iEN E~r(N) 1 . (6.5)I iES
Recall that the payoff vr(S) is based on Proposition 6.1, which states that an allocation is
Pareto optimal for S if and only if the sum of the corresponding certainty equivalents equals
vr(S). The following result is a consequence of Theorem 4.2.
Proposition 6.3 Let I' E IG(NI, NP) be an insurance game and let (N, v~) be the conespond-
ing TU-game. Then C(I') ~ 0 if and only if C(v}-) ~ 0. Moreover, let (d; f R;XN)iEN E
~r ( N) and let y E RN be such that m; ( d; ~ R;X N)- y; for all i E N. Then
(d; f R;XN);EN E C(I') if and only if y E C(v~).
So, to prove nonemptiness of the core of insurance games it is sufficient to prove that
the core of the corresponding TU-game is nonempty. For this we can apply the Bondazeva
Shapley T'heorem (see 2.3) to check nonemptiness of the core.
Theorem 6.4 Let I' E IG(N~, NP). Then C(I') ~ 0.
PROOF: First, recall that Kj -{k E Ií ~ f;k ~ 0} for all j E N- 1V~ U NP. Then for S C a'
we have for all d E RS that
vr(S) -~ mi(di f R;X S)
iES
- ~ ~ ~ á~ log~l - ~. 1 , ~ f
iESt jESt kEKt ` l~k ~hESj an
L.~ L~ ~ a, lUg ~1 - 1 1
iESt jESp kEKi ` I~ ~hESru{j} án
~ ~ a' l~g ~1 - 1 1 ~
iESp kEK, ` 1~ ~hEStu{i} án
a, log 1 - ~ ~-~~~1
i
iESt jESf kEK~ !ik ~hESt an
(6.6)
1
} ~ ~ ~ a. log (1 - ~,-. t
jESp;EStu{j}kEKt lik ~hESIU{j} an
~ I
! 1 !ik ~hESt an
- ~ ~ f`-logll- ~
jESf kEKt ~k ` I~ ~hESt trR
~[ ' ~ 1
1 !iw LhEStu{~} a~
[L~~ 10 ~1 - ~
} j~ kEKt ~4 g` l~ ~hESIU{j} a,,
(6.7)
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where the second equality follows from Theorem 6.2 and expression ( 6.4). Next, let
~: 2NiUNp ~ Rt be a balanced map. Then
y~ 1
1 Jik ~hESI an
~ ~~s)xs - ~ ~ ~ ~~S) v log ~1 - . i ~
SCN SCN jESr kEKi 1~ ~hES7 an
~ 1
I Jik ~hES~U{~} an
~ ~ ~ ~ ~~S)~ log ~1 - ~ ~ ~
SCN jESp kEK~ lik ~hEStU{j} an
~ C'` 1
r 1 Jik LhEN~ an
C~~ ~~~S) ~ log 1 1- k i~
SCN jESr kEK~ ` !~n ~hENf an
~~` 1
( I Jit L~hEN~u{~} an
~ ~ ~ ~ ~~S)v log ( I - k i )
SCN jESp kEK~ ` I~ ~hENtU{j} an
~ 1
1 Jik ~hEN~ an
~ ~ ~ ~~S) ~ ~ log ~I - ~ ~jENI SCN:jES kEK~ 1~n ~hENt
ln
~ ~` ?
1 Jin LhENtu{~} ~n
-F ~ ~ ~(S) ~ ~ log ~I - ~ , ~
jENp SCN:jES kEK~ ` Jik ~hENtU{j} an
~n 1
1 Jik ~hENi áA
- ~ ~ N log ~1 - ~ 1 ~
jENr kEK~ Jik ~.hEN7 an
~ 1
( 1 Jin ~hENju{i} an
~ ~ ~ ~ log I 1 - ~
jENp kEK~ ~k ` 1~ ~hENtU{j} an
- vr~N)
where the inequality follows from Lemma A.6 with c- 0 and the third equality follows from
~scN:jES ~~S) - 1 for all j E N. Applying Proposition 6.3 and Theorem 2.3 then completes
the proof. ~
Example 6.3 Consider the situation described in Example 6.2. In order to calculate the
certainty equivalent of this insurance game, note that since fjk - 1 for all k E Kj and all
j E NI we have
vr~S) - ~ ~ I~á. J logll- 1 l~fjESf kEK~ ` iES~ ` ~k ~iES~ ~~
~ ~~ ~ ~ á~~ log (1 - 1 ? )
jESp kEK iEStU{j} Í~k ~iESrU{j} a~
,,
;::?'.::I~t~. lu.~~:~t~~:.;:.;:.:.:.;;;;:.;;:.;:.;;:.;:;:::::;::.;:.;:.,.;::.;:::::.;::::;;::;:::::;.;:::::::;::::;::,:;::::::;;.:-:.;; ',;;::; ;: ::;;::::::;:::::::s::::::;:::::;:;::::::::;:::::::::::;::::::-':-:; :.:..::.............................. .. ......................................................................................................................
for all S C NI U NP ( cf. expression ( 6.7)). Hence, we get
vr({1}) - 1800 . 31og (1 - 5'-3~ f 10 - 31og (1 - os.3~--405.52.
Similarly, one can calculate the value vr(S) for each coalition S. These values are presented
in Table 6.1.
S vr(S) S vr(S) S vr(S)
{1} -405.52 {2, 5} -239.77 {2, 3, 4} -490.11
{2} -237.61 {3, 4} -311.28 {2, 3, 5} -492.03
{3} -311.08 {3, 5} -313.38 {2, 4, 5} -239.97
{4} -000.21 {4, 5} -002.98 {3, 4, 5} -313.58
{5} -002.77 { 1, 2, 3} -869.53 { 1, 2, 3, 4} -869.73
{1,2} -620.21 {1,2,4} -620.41 {1,2,3,5} -871.63
{1,3} -661.65 {1,2,5} -622.34 {1,2,4,5} -622.14
{1,4} -405.72 {1,3,4} -661.85 {1,3,4,5} -664.06
{1, 5} -407.88 {1, 3, 5} -663.86 {2, 3, 4, 5} -492.23
{2, 3} -489.91 { 1, 4, 5} -408.08 { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} -871.83
{2, 4} -237.81
Table 6.1
The core of this game is then defined by
s
C(vr) - {y E R5~ ~y; - -871.83 , dSCN7uNP : ~y ; ? ~s}.
j-1 íES
Next, note that for a Pareto optimal allocation (d; ~- R;XN);EN E ~r(N) we have that
ml(dl ~- R;XN) - d, - 153.77,
m2(d2 f RzXN) - dz - 512.59,
m3(d3 f R3 X~` ) - d3 - 205.04,
m4(d4 f R9XN) - d4 - 0.03,
ms(ds f RSXN) - ds - 0.40.
Next, take do -(-229.65, 278.33, -46.81, -0.17, -1.70). Then the resulting payoffs equal
rn;(do ~ R; XN);EN - (-383.42, - 234.26, -251.85, -0.20, -2.10). It is easy to check that
this allocation is in the core of the TU-game (N, vr). Hence, (do f R; XN);EN E C(I').
So, since the core is nonempty, we know that if all agents cooperate then there exist
allocations such that this cooperation is stable. Moreover, from the Pazeto optimality of a core
allocation it follows that the allocation risk exchange matrix is uniquely determined. A similar
INStí1R.ANCt; GAM~S ~)3
argument, however, does not hold for the allocation transfer payments (i.e., the premiums that
have to be paid). Since the number of core allocations will mostly be infinite, the number
of premiums resulting in a core allocation will also be infinite. Consequently, the insurers
still have to agree on the premiums that have to be paid. A possibility is considering existing
premium calculation principles and check if they result in core allocations for insurance games.
This approach is elaborated in the next subsection.
6.1.3 The Zero Utility Principle
Premium calculation principles indicate how to determine the premium for a certain risk. In
the past, various of these principles were designed, for example, the net premium principle,
the expected value principle, the standard deviation principle, the Esscher principle, and the
zero utility principle (cf. GOOVAERTS, DE VYLDER and HAEZErrDOrrcx ( 1984)). In this
section we focus on the zero utility principle. A premium calculation principle determines
a premium a;(X) for individual i for bearing the risk X. The zero utility principle assigns
a premium ~;(X) to X such that the utility level of individual i, who bears the risk X,
remains unchanged when the wealth w; of this individual changes to w; -~ ~Z(X) - X.
Since individuals are expected utility maximizers this means that the premium ~rt(X ) satisfies
U;(wZ) - E(U;(w; -F ~r;(X) - X)). Note that the premium of the risk X depends on the
individual who bears this risk and his wealth w~.
Now, let us return to insurance games and utilize the zero utility principle to determine
the allocation transfer payments d E RN'"NP. At first this might seem difficult since the zero
utility principle requires initial wealths w; which do not appear in our model of insurance games.
The exponential utility functions, however, yield that the zero utility principle is independent
of these initial wealths wt. To see this, let I' E IG(N~, NP) be an insurance game. Since utility
functions are exponential we can rewrite the expression U; (w;)- E( Uti ( w; ~~r; ( X)- X)) as
follows
w; - U;'(E(U;(w; ~- ~,(x) - x))) - w; -~ ~;(x) -~ ~~~(E(U:(-X))).
Hence, ~r;(X) --U;i(E(U;(-X))) - -m;(-X) which indeed is independent of the
wealth wt. Given this expression we can calculate the premium individuals receive for the risk






, tf z, ~ E SI,
J~` ~ , if i E SI U { j} and j E SP,
LhESIU{~} ~h
0 , otherwise.
Consequently, the risk that insurer i bears equals ~;EN~~NP r~;X;. The premium he should
receive for bearing this risk according to the zero utility principle equals
Irisitx ~~ct: G;~:~t~s
~i( j~ rijXi) - ~i( [~ ~ rijJjkYk)
jEN1uNp jEN~uNp kEK
- -m'(- L L rijfjkYk)
jENtuNp kEK
- - ~ ~ a. log (1 - N.airijfjk~
iENtuNp kEK
- - ~ ~ a' log
`1 - 1 ~jENf kEK~ J~ ~hENt an
- ~ ~ tr, log rl - 1
jENp kEK~ ` I~ ~hEN~U{j} an
where the third equality follows from expression ( 6.3) with d; - 0.
Note that for these type of games the zero utility principle satisfies additivity, [hat is,
~~(~jENIUNp i~Xj) -~jENfuNp~i(r;jXj). As a consequence, we let the premium that
insurer i has to pay for reinsuring the fraction r~; of his own portfolio X; at insurer j, equal
the premium that insurer j wants to receive for bearing this risk, that is,
~rj(r~iX;) - -mj(- ~ r~;fikYk) - - ~ tr; log (1 - ~ 1 1
kEK kEK, ` Rn ~hENr an
Then the premium insurer i receives in aggregate equals
~r;(rijXj) - ~rj(rj2X;).~ ~
jENIUNp jENI
Similazly, the premium that individual i E NP has to pay for insuring his loss at insurer j
equals the zero utility premium that this insurer wants to receive for bearing this risk. Hence,
individual i pays insurer j an amount
~ 1
~rj(r~;X;) - - ~ ~; log 1 - ~ i
kEK; I~n ~hEN~u{i} an
Because individuals are not allowed to bear (part of) the risk of any other individual~insurer he






~ ~ ~i(rijX i) - ~ ~i(r,jiX i) - L~ ~ ~j(rjiX i) - ~i
iENr jEN~uNp jEN~ iENp jEN7
the zero utility principle yields an allocation transfer payments vector do where
IAiSLt~AAFCE Cs̀kMËS ;::
at - ~ ~i(rijXj) - ~ ~ilrjiXi)
jENIUNP jENf
--~ ~ o-,l0 1-
1 1 -~ ~ 1 1
g ~ 1 J ~, log ~1-~ ijENr kEK~ Iik ~hENf ~n jENp kEK~ ` lin ~hENtU{j} an ~
}~ ~ Q~ log `1 - k 1 1 IjENl kEK; ~ ~hENl an
for all i E NI and
(6.8)
Qz -- ~~j(rjiX i) - L~ L~ ai log 1- k 1 1 (6.9)~
jENj jEN7 kEfi; I~n ~hENtu{i} án
for all i E NP.
Example 6.4 Consider again the situation described in Example 6.2. Applying the zero utility




-1200 . 31og ~1 - 5i,) - 115 . 31og (1 - o.s.i,~ - 1 . 31og ~1 - 539~
-1 . 31og ~1 - 0.5.21~ f 1800 . lO log (1 - si~~ ~- 10 . lOlog ~1 - o.s.iv~
~1800 . 41og (1 - 5i~)~- 10 - 41og (1 - 0.5.1~~
Similarly, we get for insurers 2 and 3 and individuals 4 and 5
~- 248.52 ~ 125.17 f 0.10 f 1.00 - 31.95 - 9.39 - 42.60 - 12.52 - 278.33
~-127.81 f17.53~0.04~0.40-10.65-33.79-35.50-112.65--46.81
d4 - -0.03-0.10-0.04 - -0.17
do--0.3-1.00-0.40--1.70.
So, do -(-229.65, 278.33, -46.81, -0.17, - 1.70). From Example 6.3 we know that the
resulting allocation (do f R;XN);EN is in the core of the game.
In Example 6.4 it is seen that the allocation corresponding to the zero utility principle is
a core allocation. The next theorem shows that this is not a coincidence.
Theorem 6.5 Let I' E IG(NI, NP). If do is the vector of transfer payments determined by the
zero utility premium calculation principle and R' is the Pareto optimal risk exchange matrix
then (do -1- R; XN);EN E C(I').
TNSL32;~hTo~ Ciitilll~~:.
PxooF: By Proposition 6.3 it suffices to show that (m;(do f R; X N);EN E C(vr). Hence, we
must show that ~;ES m;(do ~ R;XN) ~ vr(S) for all S C N. Since for i E NI it holds that
m; ( do ~ R; X N)-
-~ ~ á~log(1-~ ?)-~ ~ á~log(1-~ 1 '-
jEN kEK 1in ~hENt an ,7ENp kEK Iik ~hEN~u{j} trn
~ ~ ~ aj lop ~1 - ~
jENf kEK; 1~ hENf trn ~
f~ ~ 1 1 l~~ ~ á. log (1- 1
jENj kEK~ tr~
lOg I 1- f~
~hENj trn I jENp kEK~ ` I~n ~hEN~u{j} trn
-~~ tr' log `1 -~ 1 1 IjEN~ kEK; f~k ~hEN~ trn
~~` 1
1 i,k LhENr trn
- ~ L l0 ( 1 - ~ 1
kEK, g ` I~n ~hENt trn
and for i E Np that
mi(~ f R;XN) -
~ ~ á~ log (1 - ~ 1 ~ ) } ~ á, log
jENl kEK; J.n ~hENru{i} trn kEh';
- ~ ~ a' log `1 - ~ 1 1 ~jEN~u{i} kEh'; f~k ~hENlu{i} an
~~` !
1 f,n LhENIU{,} trn
- ~ F~k 10 (1 - ~ 1
kEK; g ` f~n ~hEN~u{i} an
we have for S C NI U Np that
í 1~ 1)~n ~hENrU{i} trn
t~n 1
i j~k ~hENt trn
~ mi(~ ~- Ri X N) - ~ ~ v log ~1 - ,
sES iES~ kEK; Í~ ~hENj an
~-~ ~ ~ logll- n
iESp kEK, ` 1~ ~hE ~ { }
~ C~ 1
1 i~k L~hES~ an
~` ~ L r
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where the inequality follows from Lemma A.6 with c- 0.
Example 6.5 Consider the insurance game introduced in Example 6.2. Now, let us take
a closer look at the changes in insurer 1's utility when the allocation (do -}- R; X N);EN ~s
realized. In the initial situation insurer I beazs the risk X1 of his own insurance portfolio. The
certainty equivalent of X1 equals
mi(Xi) - 1800 . 31og ~1 - si3~ f 10 - 31og ~1 - o,s.3~ --405.52.
To allocate the total risk in a Pareto optimal way, insurer 1 bears the fraction ri2 -; of the
risk X 2 of insurer 2. For this risk he receives a premium al (; X 2) determined by the zero
utility principle. From the definition of the zero utility calculation principle it follows that
mi(Xi f iXs -~i(iX2)) --405.52. So insurer 1's welfare does not change when he
insures a part of the risk of insurer 2. A similar azgument holds when he insures a part of the
risks of the other agents. Hence
mi(Xi - i~Xz -F ~i(i X2) - i~Xs ~ ~i(i~Xs)
-ásX4 f ~i(39X4) - z Xs f ~i(iXs)) - -405.52.
The increase in insurer 1's welfare arises only from the risks ;oX1 and ,'-,X1 he transfers to
insurers 2 and 3, respectively:
~1( Í7 - ~2( 17X1) - ~3( 7X1) ~ X1 - 17X2 ~ ~1( 17X2) - 7X3 ~ ~1( 17X3)
-39X4 ~ ~1(39Xq) - 21X5 ~ 7~11 1X5)) - TYE1(do -I- RiXN) - -229.65 .
1 -405.52
The situation described in the example above is subsistent in the definition of the zero
utility principle. This means that the welfare of an insurer always remains the same when
he bears the risk of someone else in exchange for the zero utility principle based premium.
An increase in welfaze only azises when he transfers (a part of) his own risk to someone else.
Consequently, the insurers' welfaze does not increase when individuals insure their losses.
Hence, the insurers' íncentives to insure the individual's losses is low. To increase these
incentives it may be better to utilize other premium calculation principles. One could, for
example, consider subadditive premiums. In the next section we give another reason why it
could be desirable that insurance companies employ subadditive premiums.
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6.2 Subadditivity for Collective Insurances
In the insurance games defined in the previous section individual persons are not allowed to
cooperate; they cannot redistribute the risk amongst themselves. Looking at the individuals'
behavior in everyday life, this is a justified assumption. People who want to insure themselves
against certain risks do so by contacting insurance companies, pension funds etc. We show,
however, that when this restriction is abandoned then the mere fact that risk exchanges could
take place between individuals implies that insurance companies have incentives to employ
subadditive premiums. Whether or not such risk exchanges actually do take place is not
important. As a consequence, collective insurances become cheaper for the individuals.
Let NP be the set of individuals. A premium calculation principle ~r is called subadditive
if for all subsets S,T C NP with S fl T- 0 it holds that ~r(Xs) -~ ~r(XT) 1 a(Xs -} XT).
Here, X s denotes the total loss of the coalition S. So, it is attractive for the individuals to take
a collective insurance, since this reduces the total premium they have to pay.
Next, consider a game with agent set NP only where the individuals are allowed to
redistribute their risks. This situation can be described by an insurance game I' E IG(NP, 0).
So, the individuals NP can now insure their losses among each other. Then we can associate
with I' the TU-game (N, vr), with
vr(S) - max{ ~mi(di ~ R;rXs)~ (di ~ RiXs)iES E~r(S) 1lll ,ES
for all S C NP. Note that this maximum is attained for Pareto optimal allocations (d; ~
R,Xs);ES E~r(S) for coalition S. For this game, the value vr(S) can be interpreted as
the maximum premium coalition S wants to pay for the insurance of the total risk Xs. To
see this, suppose that the coalition S can insure the loss Xs for a premium ~r(Xs) that
exceeds the valuation of the risk Xs, that is, -~(Xs) C vr(S). Then for each allocation
y E Rs of the premium -~r(Xs) there exists an allocation (d; ~ R; Xs) E~r(S) such that
E(U;(d; -~ R; Xs)) ~ U;(y;) for all i E S. Indeed, let (d; f R; Xs);ES E~r(S) be such that
~;ESm;(d; f R; Xs) - vr(S). Define
ái - d; - mi(di -~ R; xs) ~ yi ~ ~ (vr(s) ~ ~(Xs)) ,
for all i E S. Since
~di - ~di-~mi(difRiXs)f~yifvr(S)f~(Xs)
iES iES iES iES
- ~iES d; c 0
it follows that (d; f R;Xs);ES E~r(S). Then by the lineazity of m; in d; (cf. expression
(6.3)) we have for all i E S that
mi(di f R; Xs) - yi f ,~s (vr(S) -1- ~r(Xs)) ~ yi.
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Hence, the members of S prefer the allocation (d;f R; X 5);ES of X 5 to an insurance ofX 5 and
paying the premium ~r(XS). Consequently, they will not pay more for the insurance of the risk
X5 than the amount -vr(S). The next theorem shows that this maximum premium -vr(S) is
subadditive,i.e.,-v~(S)-vr(T) ) -vr(SUT),orequivalently,v~(S)fvr(T) c vr(SUT),
for all disjoint subcoalitions S and T of NP.
Theorem 6.6 Let S, T C NP such that S fl T- 0. Then
vr(S) f v~(T) c vr(S U T).
PttooF: Define for all S C NP, all j E NP, and all k E K
ajk(S) - í~ ~, an ~
hES
Recall from expression (6.7) that for all S C NP it holds that









- ~ ~ ~„1,` log ( 1 -
jES kEK~ ` ajk(s)
Now, take S, T C NP such that S ~ T- 0. We have to show that vr(S) -~ vr(T) C vr(S U T).
vr(T U S) - vr(S) - vr(T) -
- ~ ~ N log(1 - a;kcTUS
)a~k(Tus) - ~` r` ~ log(1 - a;kls )a~k(5)
jE(TuS) kEK~ jLE.S kELK,
- ~ ~ ~ log(1 - aik1T))a'k(T)
jET kEK~
-~~ ( N log(1 - a;k Tu )a~k(Tus) - u log(1 - ajkl ) a~k(5)~ i-
jES kEK~
~~ (~
10 p ' 1 1
alk(TUS)
- L 10 1- a 1 a~k(T)~l~k O( - alk~TUS ) Vk g( ik T))
jET kEK~
- ~~ i k p 1 a~k(TUS) a~,k~(g. ~. a~k(5)
V 100 ~(~ - alk TUS ~ (ójk(J)-1~ ~
jESkEK; `
Ijk
lo I(1 - 1
)a~k(Tu5) ~ a k T `a~k(T)~
~~~k g ` 6;k TUS 6;k T)-1J
jET kEK~
-~~ 110 ~(1 - 1
)a~k(T)fa7k(S) r a k s `a~k(S)1
I{k g` b;k T}ajk Jr 161k S)-1 J J~
jES kEK~
~ ~ ~ 10 p' ~(1 -
'
)a~k(T)falk(5) ~ a~k T ~a)k(T)~
l~k b ` 6jk~T }a;k 3) a~k(T 1 ! ~,
iET kEK~
I~ INSU12;z~rC~ GA;vtl;s
where the second and the fourth equality follow from S fl T- 0 and the inequality follows




)a7k~Tl~a7k~s1 ~a kkss 1~a7k1s1 ~ I'
1 n7k~Tl~alk~sl a~t T~ a7k~T1 ~
I.(I - aik~TJ-FO~k~S)) ( 61k T -1) -
Recall that insurers do not benefit from insuring the risks of the individuals when utilizing
the additive zero utility principle; this premium calculation principle yields the lowest premium
for which insurers still want to exchange risks with the individuals (cf. Example 6.5). So, from
a social point of view, it might be best to adopt a middle course and look for premiums where
both insurers and individuals benefit from the insurance transaction. Interesting questions then
remaining are: are these premiums additive or subadditive and do they yield core allocations?
6.3 Remarks
In this chapter (re)insurance problems are modelled as cooperative games with stochastic pay-
offs. In fact, we defined a game that dealt with both the insurance and the reinsurance problem
simultaneously. We showed that there is only one allocation risk exchange matrix yielding
a Pareto optimal distribution of the losses and that a core allocation results when insurance
premiums aze calculated according to the zero utility principle. Moreover, we explained why
subadditive premium calculation principles might be attractive to use for insurance companies.
An issue only briefty mentioned in this paper concerns the insurers' behavior. What if
an insurer is risk neutral or risk loving instead of risk averse? Thus, there is at least one insurer
whose utility function is lineaz or of the form u;(t) -~3;e-~~` (t E R) with ~; 1 0, a; C 0.
Although the proofs are not provided here, most of the results presented in this paper still hold
for these situations. This means that the conesponding games have nonempty cores and that
the zero utility principle still yields a core allocation. The result that does change is the Pareto
optimal allocation of the risk. The allocations that are Pazeto optimal when all insurers aze risk
averse are not Pareto optimal anymore when one or more insurers happen to be risk loving. In
fact, they are the worst possible allocations of the risk one can think of. In that case, allocating
all the risk to the most risk loving insurer is Pareto optimal. This would actually mean that only
one insurance company is needed, since other insurance companies will ultimately reinsure
their complete portfolios at this most risk loving insurer.
This appendix contains the proofs that are omitted in the text. Furthermore, it states some
additional results referred to in the previous chapters. The appendix is divided in sections, each
section contains the proofs belonging to one particular chapter only. Therefore, each section
title is the same as the title of the corresponding chapter.
A.1 A Nucleolus for Stochastic Cooperative Games
Proposition 51 IRr(S) is a compact subset of Ir(S) for each coalition S C N.
P[tooF: Since IRr(S) C Ir(S) C Rs x Rs it is sufficient to prove that IRr(S) is closed and
bounded in Rs x Rs. Since
IRr(S) -{(d,r) E Ir(S)~~d; c 0}
iES
and Ir(S) is closed by the weak continuity of ~; for all i E S it follows that IRr(S) is closed.
To see that IR~(S) is bounded, define for each i E S and each r; E [0,1]
d (r,) - min{d,~d; } r;Xs Z;X{,}}.
Note that d ( r;) exists by assumptions (CS) and ( C3) and that d(r;) -F r;Xs ~; X{;}. To
show that min,.;E~o,l~ d;(r,) exists it suffices to show that d;(r,) is continuous in r;. Therefore,
consider the sequence ( rk)kEN with rk E[0,1] and limk~~ rk - r;. By definition we have for
all k E Hv that d(r;)~ r;`X s~; X{i}. Hence, d;(rk) ~ rkX s~; d;(r;) ~- r,X s for all i E S.
Since ~; is weakly continuous it follows that
lim ~d(r~) f rkXs~ - lim d(rk) -}- r,Xs ~; d(r,) f r;Xs
kyoo k~oo
PRÈ]E?~S
Then assumption (C2) implies that limk~.~ d(rk) - d;(r;). Consequently, d(r;) is continuous
in r; and
d - min d(r;)
r,E10,1]
exists and is finite for all i E S.
Since (d, r) E 1Rr(S) implies that d; f r;Xs~~X {;} for all i E S it follows by condition
(C2) that d; 7 d for all i E S. Hence, (d, r) E IR~(S) implies that
d E {d E Rs~d;ES : d; 1 d;, ~d; c 0}
- ~ES -
and r E ~s. Since both sets are bounded, we have that IR~(S) is bounded.
Proposition 5.2 The set of Pareto optimal allocations POr(S) is a compact subset of Ir(S)
for each coalition S C N.
PttooF: Since POr(S) C IRr(S) and IR~(S) is compact it is sufficient to show that
POr(S) is closed in IRr(S). L.et (d, r) E IRr(S) be such that (d, r) ~ POr(S). Then
there exists (d,r) E IRr(S) such that d; f r;Xs ~; d; f r;Xs for all i E S. Next,
consider the set {(d',r') E IRr(S)~d; ~- r;Xs ~; á; f r;Xs}. By the weak continu-
ity of ~; this set is open in IRr(S). Indeed, by the continuity of ~; we have that
{Y E j~;ESG(X;)~3;ES : Y; ,r;á; -{- r;Xs} is closed. Hence, Proposition 5.1 implies that
{(d', r') E IRr(S)~3;ES : d; f r;Xs ~;d; ~ r;Xs} is closed in Ir(S). Hence, it is also closed
in IRr(S). Consequently, {(d', r') E IRr(S)~t1;ES : d; -}- r,Xs ~; d; f r;Xs} must be open
in IRr(S). Since ( d, r) belongs to the latter set there exists an open neighbourhood O of (d, r)
in IRr(S) such that O C {(d', r') E IRr(S)~F1;ES : d; -F r~Xs ~; d; f r;Xs}. This implies
that (d,T) ~ POr(S) whenever (d,r) E O. Hence, IRr(S)`POr(S) is open in IRr(S) and,
consequently, POr(S) is closed in IRr(S). ~r
Proposition 5.3 Let I' E CG(N). Take (d,r) E PDr(S) and (d,r) E NPDr(S) such that
d; ~- r;Xs~;á; -{- r";Xs for all i E S. Then there exists (d, r") E POr(S) such that
d; -~ r;X s~; d; f r"; Xs á; d; f r;X s
for all i E S.
PROOF: L,et (d,r) E PDr(S) and (d,r") E NPDr(S). Without loss of generality we may
A Nt~~~JLïS3 I~Qfi S7Y5Cï~il~'I'tC:~JO~~ ~~Mir~ I:
assume that (d, r) E IRr(S).' Take b; E R be such that d; f b; ~ r;Xs ~; d; f r";Xs. Note
that b; ) 0 by condition (C2). Next, take r E Os and t E [0,1]. Let d;(r, t) be such that
d;(r, t) -~ r;Xs ~; d; f tb; f r;Xs. Note that the allocation (d(r, t), r) is feasible if and only
if ~;ES d;(r, t) G 0. First, we show that d;(r, t) is continuous in (r, t). Let ((Tk, tk))kEN be a
convergent sequence with limit (r, t). We have to show that limk-,~ d;(rk, tk) - d;(r, t). Note
that d;(rk, tk) f r;`X s~; d; f tkó; f r;Xs for all k E 1N. Define for e 1 0
CJ;-{YE,C(Xi)~dtftb;-fr;Xs-e-~;Y~tdt-FtbtfrtXsfe}.
Since tk ~ t there exists K` E ~1 such that d; ~ tkb; f r;Xs E(~; for all k) Iie.
Consequently, we have that d; (Tk, tk) f rkX s E C~; for all k~ KE. This implies that
limk~oo (d;(rk, tk) f rkX s) E flE~o(~; . So,
lim (á;(rk, tk) ~- r;`Xs) - lim d;(rk, tk) -~ r;Xs ~; d; f tó; -~ r;Xs.
k~oo k~oo
Since d; (r, t)}r;X s~; d;f tb; ~-r;X s it follows from condition (C2) that limk-,~ á; ( rk, tk) -
d;(T, t).
Next, define f(t) - minTEOs ~;ES d;(r, t) for all t E [0,1]. Then f is a continuous
function. Moreover, since (d, r) E IRr(S) and d; (r, 0) - d; for all i E S it follows from
the feasibility of (d, r) that f(0) C ~;ES d;(r, 0) -~;ES d; G 0. Furthermore, since d; -}-
b; f r;Xs ~; á; -F r;Xs for all i E S and (d,r) E NPDr(S) it follows that (d ~ b,r) E
NPDr(S). This implies that f(1) 1 0. For, if f(1) G 0 then there exists r' E Os such that
~;ES á;(r',1) G 0 and d;(r',1) -F r;Xs ~; d; ~- b; -~ r;Xs for all i E S. Consequently, the
allocation yielding the payoffs
d;(r',1) - ~~d;(r',1) fr;Xs
iES
for each i E S is feasible and preferred to d; ~ b; ~ r;X s by all agents i E S. Clearly, this
contradicts the fact that (d ~- b, r) E NPDr(S). Thus, f(0) G 0 G f(1). The continuity of f
then implies that there exists t such that f(t) - 0.
Let r" E Os be such that ~;ES d;(r, t) - 0. Then the allocation (d(r", t), r") is Pareto
optimal. To see this, first note that ~;ES d;(r, t) ~ 0 for all r E Os. Second, note that the
definition of d; (r, t) implies that
d;(T,t) f r;Xs ~; á;(r,t) f r;Xs (A.1)
for all i E S and all r E ~s. Next, take r E Os. If ~;ES d;(r, t) ) 0 then the allocation
(d(r, t), r) is not feasible. From expression (A.1) it then follows that there exists no feasible
iIf (d, r) ~ IRr(S) then there exists (d', r') E IRr(S) such that d; f r,Xs ~; d; ~- r,Xs for all i E S. If
ó; G 0 is such that d; f ó; t r(X 5~; d; ~- r;X S for all i E S then (d' -} ó', r') is still a feasible allocation. Thus,
(d' ~ ó', r') E IRr(S). Continuing the proof with the allocation ( d, r) replaced by (d' f ó', r') would yield the
same result.
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allocation ( d, T) which all agents i E S prefer to the allocation ( d(r, t), r). If ~;ES d;(T, t) - 0
then the allocation (d(r, t), r) is feasible. Moreover, an allocation ( d, r) that all agents i E S
prefer to d(T, t), r) must be infeasible by condition (C2) and expression (A.1). Hence, there
exists no feasible allocation (d, r) which all agents i E S prefer to (d(r", t), r). Consequently,
(d(r, t), r) is Pareto optimal. 0 C t C 1 then implies that
d~fraXs~;d~(T~t)-fr~Xs~;dti-~óti-1-r~Xs~~d,fr;Xs
for all i E S.
Lemma A.1 POS((d, r)) is a nonempty compact subset of POr(S).
PROOF: That POs((d, r)) is compact follows from the facts that Ws((d, r)) and Bs((d, r)) are
closed by the continuity condition (CS) and POr(S) is compact. To show that it is nonempty
let us distinguish two cases.
First, let Bs((d, r)) ~ 0. Then there exists (d', r') E IRr(S) such that d,. f r;Xs~~d; f
r;Xs for all i E S. Since (d',r') E IRr(S) we know from Proposition 5.3 that there exists
(d, r) E POr(S) such that d; f r,Xs ~id; f r(Xs for all i E S. Hence, (d, r) E POr(S)
and (d,r) E Bs((d,r)). Consequently, (d,T) E POS((d,r)).
Second, let Bs((d,r)) - 0. Take (d,r) E Ir(S) such that d~ ~ r";Xs ~; d; -f r;XN
for all i E S. From Bs((d, r)) -~ it follows that (d, r') E NPDr(S). Proposition 5.3 then
implies that there exists (d,r) E POr(S) such that d; f r;Xs ~;á; ~ r';Xs for all i E S.
Hence, (d, r) E Ws((d, r)) and, consequently, (d, r) E POS((d, r)). ~}:~
Lemma A.2 Let (d, r) E IRr(N). Then És((d, r)) is a compact subset of R.
PROOF: We have to show that Es((d,r)) is closed and bounded. That És((d,r)) is bounded
follows from the compactness of POS((d, r)) and the fact that for each (d', r') E POS((d, r))
the number ó; is uniquely determined by conditions (C3) and (CS). To see that És((d, r)) is
closed, let (~{ES ók)kEN be a convergent sequence2 in És((d, r)) with limit ~;ES ó;. We have
to show that ~;ES ó; E És((d, r)). Therefore, let ((dk, rk))kEN be a sequence in POS((d, r))
such that d~ f rkXs ~; d; f ók f r;XN for all i E S. Since POs((d,r)) is compact there
exists a convergent subsequence ((d~, r~))~EN with limit (d, r) E POS((d, r)). Take ó; E R
such that d; -}- r;Xs~; d; -~ ê; f r;X N for all i E S. Note that ~;ES ó; E És((d, r)). The
ZFormally, it would be more correct to start with a convergent sequence ( ak)kEN in ÉS((d,r)). Then
ak E ÉS((d, r)) and [he definition of ÉS imply that there exist ó; such that d; f bk f r;XN ~; d; f r;Xs
(i E S) for some (d', r') E POS((d, r)) and ~;ES b~ - ak. Consequently, the sequence ( ak)kEN can be
replaced by a sequence (~;ES Sk)kEN.
~ ~tu~tvi~~~s:r~tz smocra~s~c ~t1o~i:A~ ~nM~s '': :' 1 ~s
proof is finished if we can show that b; - b; for all i E S. Therefore, let e) 0 and i E S.
Define
C~~ -{Y E G(X:)~d; ~ r;Xs - e~; Y~t d; -~ rtiXs ~- e}.
Since C~; is open by the weak continuity of ~;, (d~, r~) --~ ( d, r) and d; f r;X s E C); there
exists L` E 1[V such that d; f riX s E C); for all 1~ L`. This implies that d; ~ b, ~ r; X N E C~~
for all 1 1 L`. Since e ) 0 was arbitrarily chosen it follows that
lim ~d; f b; f r;X~v) - d; ~- bt ~- rtXrv E nE~oO;.~y~
Hence, d; ~ b; ~- r;XN ~; á; ~ r;Xs. Since by definition it holds that d; -{- r;Xs ~;
d; f b; ~ r;X N it follows by assumption (C3) that b; - b;.
Lemma A.3 Ës((d, r)) is upper semi continuous in (d, r) for all (d, r) E IRr(N).
PROOF: Let (( dk, rk))kEN be a sequence in IRr(N) converging to (d, r). Take ~iES ók E
És((dk, rk)) such that ~;ES b;` converges to ~;ES b;. For upper semi continuity to be satisfied
it is sufficient to show that ~;ES b; E És((d, r)).
F1rSt, táke (dk,rk) E POs((dk,rk)) such that d;` ~- r;`Xs ~; d;` f bZ -f- r;`XN for
all 2 E S. Since ((dk, rk))kEN is a sequence m the compact set POr(S) there eX1stS a
convergent subsequence ((d~, rl))iEN with limit (d, r) E POr(S). Moreover, it holds that
á; f r;X s~; d; -1- ó; ~ r;X N for all i E S. To see this, take e] 0 and i E S. Define
c~; -{YE,c(Xt)~d;fr;Xs-E-~;Y~;dtfr;XsfE}.
Since C~; is open by the continuity of ~;, (d~, r~) -3 ( d, r) and d; -~ r;X s EO, there exists
L` E 1N such that d; ~ r;Xs E(~, for all I) L`. This implies that d,. ~ b; ~ r;XN E C); for
all d 1 L`. Since e 1 0 is arbitrary we have that
i~~~d'}ó`~r'XN) -dtfb;frtXN d; f r;Xs.
The proof is finished if we can show that (d, r) E POS((d, r)). Therefore, take e) 0
and define
Ws((d, r)) - {(d~, r~) E IRr(S)Id;ES : d; -~ r;Xs~;d; f r~XN-~ e},
B`s((d,r)) -{(d',r~) E IRr(S)Id~ES : d; f r;Xs ~;d, f r;XN - e},
POs((d, r)) -(Ws((d, r)) u Bs((d, r))) n POr(S).







nnoWs((d, r)), Bs((d, r)) - ne~oB`s((d, r)) and PO's((d, r)) - nvoPOs((d, r)). Fur-
thermore, define
C~` -{Y E ~,C(Xt)~d;ES : d; f r;XN - E ~; Y; -1; dt f rtXN -F e}.
iES
Since C)` is open by the weak continuity of ~ti, (di, r~) -~ ( d, r) and (d; f r;XN);ES E O`
there exists L` E N such that (d; f r;XN);ES E C)~ for all l 1 LE. This implies that
(d~,r~) E WS((d,r)) and (d~,r~) E BS((d,r)) for all I) L` (see also Figure A.2). Hence,
Ws((d~, r~)) C Ws((d, r)) and Bs((d~, r~)) C Bs((d, r)) for all 1 1 L`. Consequently, we
have for all I~ L` that POs((d~,r~)) C POs ((d,r)). In particular, we have (d~,r~) E
POS ((d, r)) for all 1, L`. Hence,
~1~~(d~, r~) -(d~ r) E n~~oPOs ((d, r)) - POs((d, r)).
Lemma A.4 És((d, r)) is lower semi continuous in (d, r) for all (d, r) E IRr(N).
PttooF: Let ((dk, rk))kEN be a sequence converging to (d, r) and let ~;ES b; E És((d, r)). To
prove lower semi continuity it suffices to show that there exists a sequence (~;ES bk)kEN with
~;ES bk E És((dk, rk)) for all k E N such that ~;ES bk converges to ~;ES b;.
First, note that since IR~(N) is compact and És is upper semi continuous that
Es(IRr(N)) - U(d,r)ElRr(N)ES((d,r))
is a compact subset of R. Second, note that if there exists a sequence (~;ES b;`)kEN w~th
~iES bk E ES((dk, rk)) for each k E N such that every convergent subsequence (~;ES b;)iEN
converges to ~;ES b; then the compactness ofÉs( IRr(N)) impliesthat the sequence (~;Es bk )kEN
converges to ~;ES ó;.
U,
A 1'íf3Ci;~tJL~1S 1~ÈXli a~Tf~T3AS~fC ~tJiJ~~:~Á1~S:
Take (d,r) E POs((d,r)) such that d; f r;Xs ~; d; f b; f r;XN for all i E S. Let
~ ] 0 and define
O` - ~Y E ~.C(Xi)Illl , E S
diES : Yi } ; d; f riXs - e or
diES . Y i ~i di ~ riX S~~
}
Note that OE is open by the weak continuity of ~~ for each i E S. Next, we show that if
(dk ~- rkX N)iES E i7E then there exists (dk, rk) E POs((dk, rk)) such that (dk f rkXs)iES E
OE. Therefore, let k E W be such that (dk, rk) E OE and let (d, r") E Ir(S) be such that
d; -}- r;Xs ~; d; } rkXN for all i E S. We distinguish the following three cases.
First, suppose that (d,r) E NPDr(S). Since (d; f r;Xs)iES E OE it holds that
d; -~ r";Xs ~-; d; ~ r;Xs - e for all i E S. From (d - Z(E,e,...,s),r) E PDr(S) and
Proposition 5.3 it follows that there exists (ák, rk) E POr(S) such that
di~riXs- z~'J;d~~r~Xs.J; di~TiXs
for all i E S. Thus, (dk f r;`Xs)iES E C~`. Since d; f r;Xs ~; dk -~ rkXN for all i E S it
holds that (dk, rk) E Ws((dk, rk)). Hence, (dk, rk) E POs((dk, rk)).
Second, suppose that (d, r) E PDr(S) and that d; f r;Xs ~; d; f r;Xs -}- e for all
i E S. Since the Pareto optimality of (d, r) implies that (d ~ z(e, e, ..., E), r) E NPDr(S) it
follows from Proposition 5.3 that there exists (dk, rk) E POr(S) such that
di~riXS~;d~~rkXS'.~;di~riXSf 2E
for all i E S. ThUS, (dk f rkXs)iES E OE. Since d; -~ r"iXs ~; d;` -~ rkXN for all i E S it
holds that (dk, Tk) E Bs((dk, rk)). Hence, (dk, rk) E POS((dk, rk)).
Finally, suppose that (d,r) E PDr(S) and that d; f r;Xs ~; d; -~- r;Xs - e for all
i E S. Then Proposition 5.3 implies that there exists (dk, rk) E POr(S) such that
difr;Xs-E~;di-~riXS~;dk~-rkXs
for all i E S. Thus, (d~`, rk) E Bs((dk, rk)). Therefore we have that (dk, rk) E POS((dk, rk)).
Moreover, (d;` f rkXs)iES E (JE.
Now we are able to construct a sequence (~iES bk)kEN with ~iES ók E POS((dk, rk))
for each k E IlV such that each convergent subsequence converges to ~;ES b;.
Let (e~`)mEN be a strictly decreasing sequence such that em ~ 0 for all m E lN and
lim„~-,~ em - 0. Hence, (C~`m)mEN is a decreasing sequence in the sense that O`~` C C~`m if
m~ m'. Define Oo - flE~oOE. From (d, r) E POs((d, r)) it follows that (d; -F r;XN);ES E
C)o. Hence, (d; ~- r;X N);ES E O` for all e 1 0. Since ( dk, rk) converges to (d, r) there exists
Kl E N such that for all k~ Kt it holds that (d;` -}- rkX s)iES E(~`' . Next, take k E 1N. If
k C K1 then take ~;ES bk E És((dk, rk)) arbitrary. If k~ K1 we distinguish the following
two cases.





In the first case, suppose that (d;' ~ rkX N);ES E Oo. Then (d, r) E POS((dk, rk)) and
(d; ~ r;X s);ES E Oo. So, we can take (dk, rk) equal to (d, r) (See Figure A.3).
In the second case, let (dk -}- r;`XN);ES ~ Oo. Then there exists m(k) E 1[~i such that
(d, -f rkXN);ES E O~~~k~~O~~~k~~~ Subsequently, take (dk,rk) E POS((dk,r~`)) such that
(d~` ~ TkXs);ES E Oem~k~ (See Figure A.4, where the bold printed curve represents the set of
allocations that belong to both POS((dk,rk)) and O~~~k~) That such (dk,i-k) exists can be
seen as follows. Let (d', r') E Ir(S) be such that d; ~ r;Xs~; d~ ~ rkX N for all i E S. Then
either (d', r') E PDr(S) or (d', r') E NPDr(S).
For the case that (d',r') E PDr(S) then (d;` ~- rkXN);ES E Of~`~k~ implies that (d; -~
r;Xs);ES E C~~~`~k~ and, consequently, that
d; f r;Xs ~;d; ~- riXS - Em(k)
for all i E S or
d;~r;Xs~;d;~riXsfem(k)
for all i E S. If the first statement is true then it follows from Proposition 5.3 that there
exists (dk, rk) E POr(S) such that dk f rkX s~id; f r;X s for all i E S. This implies that
(d;` f r;`X s)ies E O~~~k~ and (dk, rk) E POS((dk, rk)). If the second statement is true then
it follows from (d',r') E PDr(S) and Proposition 5.3 that there exists (dk,rk) E POr(S)
satisfying
dk } rkXN ."i
di ~ riX S..~; d~ ~- TkX S,~; di ~ riX S~-
Em(k)
for all i E S. Hence, (dk,1'k) E POS((dk, rk)) and (dk ~ rkX S)iES E O! fm~k~
For the case that (d', r') E NPDr(S) a similar argument holds.
Next, let b;` be such that d;` f TkXs ~; dk ~ rkX,v f b;` for all i E S. Note that for
k) K' we have ~iES ói E ES((dk, rk)) and (dk ~- rkXS)iES E O~ If (dk -~ rkXN)iES E UO
ZA1SiiR,~NCi fiAM~S I
and (d~ f rkXs)iES E C~`~`~k~ if (dk -}- rkXN)iES ~~o. Since (~iESók)kEN 1S a Seqllence
in the compact set És(IRr(S)) there exists a convergent subsequence (~;ES b;)iEN with limit
~ies ó;. Corresponding to this convergent subsequence there is a sequence (d;. ~- r;Xs)IEN
such that (d; f r;Xs)iES E C~o if (d,. -}- r;XN)iES E C~o and (d; ~- T;Xs)iES E C~`~`"~ if
(d; ~- riX N)iES ~ C~o. Moreover, it holds that d~ f r;Xs~i d; -~ riX N-~ S; for all i E S. This
impliesthat(d;fr;XNfb;)ies E C)oif(d;-~r;XN);ES E C~oand(d;.-}-r,XNfó,)iES E C~~~~`~
if (d; ~- r;XN);ES ~ C~o. From C~o - fI;ENU`~`~`~ it follows that
lim (d; ~- r;XN ~ a~)iES -(di f riXN f bi)iES E C)o.t-.~
This implies that d; ~ r;X N-~ b; ~i d; f r;X s for all i E S. Since di ~ r; X s~i d; f riX N} bi
for all i E S assumption (C2) implies that bi - b; for all i E S. Consequently, it holds that
lim~b;-~b;-~b;.
~~~ iES iES iES
SO, each convergent subsequence (~;ES ói)iEN conVergeS t0 ~iES bi. Hence, (LiES ~k)kEN
converges to ~;ES b;, which completes the proof.
Lemma A.5 The excess function Es((d, r)) is continuous in (d, r) foreach (d, r) E IRr(S).
P1zooF: Let ((dk, rk))kEN be a sequence in IRr(N) converging to (d, r) E IRr(N). We have
to show that limk-.~ Es((dk, rk)) - Es((d, r)). Since (ES((dk, rk)))kEN is a sequence in the
compact set És(IRr(N)) there exists a convergent subsequence
(Es((d~; r~)));EN with limit r). Note that the upper semi continuity of Es implies that
~ E És((d, r)). Since És is lower semi continuous there exists a sequence (~iES b;)!EN
such that ~iES ó; E És((d~, r~)) for all l E 1N and lim;y~ ~;ES b; - Es((d, r)). Then
lirr4-.~ Es((dl, r~)) G lim~-.~ ~iES ói - Es((d, r))
G r~ - lim;-.~ Es((di, r~)).
Hence, lirruy~ ~;ES Es((d~, r~)) - Es((d, r)). Thus, every convergent subsequence of
(Es((dk,rk)))kEN converges to Es((d,r)). The compactness of És(IRr(N)) then implies




f(~) (1 -- ` xfc
for ~ ) 1 and c~ 0. Then f is a non decreasing function in x.
í:i:il PRfiE~F~
P[tooF: The result follows from
f( ) x}c
ddx - Cl-x~-cl `xfc-l~log`1-x~-c~I
i
1- 1
x}~ 1 ~. lo (x-~ c- 1 ll
C xfc~ `x~c-1 g` xfc IIC 1 ~x}c ~ 1 x~ C ~
1-xfC xfC-1~1-x-~C-1
1 x}` 1 1C l-x~C~ ~x~C-1 - x-}-C-1~ - O~
where the inequality follows from log(x) ~ 1- i for x) 1.
Lemma A.7 Let
.f(x) - `x ~ l~x `1 - x f
C~x}c
for x 1 1 and c ) 0. Then f is a non increasing function with f(x) 1 1 for all x 1 1.
PttooF: Since limx~~ f(x) - e-le' - 1 it is sufficient to prove that f is non increasing in x.
This follows from











x-1-(x-Fc-1) ~log~ x(xfc-1) 1
(x-1)(xfc-1) (x-1)(x-}-c)J
-c xZ f cx - x
(x-1)(x-{-c-1) ~log(x2 fcx-x-c
-c ~ log ~1 f 2 c J(x-1)(x-1-c-1) ` x fcx-x-c
-c c
(x-1)(x-Fc-1) } x2 f cx-x-c
(x - 1)(x f c- 1) ~(x - 1)(x f c) ~ 0'
f ZN~t.tRAi~t~~ ~x̀~Y1wiFS 1 t 1
where the first inequality follows from log(1 ~~) C x and the second inequali[y follows from
xllandc~0. ~;
Lemma A.8 Let I' E IG(NI, NP). Let S C N and (d; ~ R;XS);ES E~r(S). Then for all
i E S it holds that
- 1 dt ~~kEK a. l~g (1 - ykairiiJik i
mi(di ~ RiXs)
SIl
PROOF: Let i E S. Then
d;f '-lo ~1- 1ar f~jES ~kEK a, g ~k i s7 jk i
ifiESP,
ifiESl.
mi(di f R;XS) - U; 1 1 E(Ui(di -~ riiXj)) I
` jES ll
- -á; log (Á,E(~ie-~i(di-~jESri~Xj)))1
- -tr; IOg ~fi ~e-a'd'e~'~7ES~kEIíT~~J~k JYkJI
- -á; lOg ~e-a`d' ~ ~ E(ea'''7f7kYk)~
` jES kEK
- -tr; log(e-aidi) - á; ~ ~ log (E(e"'TijljkYk)I
jES kEK
- di - tr. ~ ~ log (E(ea'r'~1,kYk)I
jES kEK
~
- di - á. ~ ~ log f
~ke-t(~k-airi,l,k)dt
jES kEK 0
where the fourth equality follows from the independence of the random losses Yk,
(k E K). Since we implicitly assumed that the expected utility exists, we must have that
~k - a;rijf;k 1 0 for all j E S and all k E K. Then
~i(di ~ RiX S) - di - á; ~jES ~kEK l~g ( ~k )Ilk-aiTiji~k
1 1
- di -~ ~ ~ á. log ~
jES kEK 1- vk airij fjk
- di ~~ ~ o; log (1 - Nk air;jfjk~ .
jES kEK
Using r;j - 0 for all i E SP and all j E S with i~ j gives the desired result.
,~
Prbbabili~y Theory
This appendix provides the reader with a brief introduction into probability theory. We will
confine with explaining those terms that are needed to understand this monograph. Further-
more, we will refrain from any mathematical details on this subject. For an extensive discussion
on measure theory and probability theory in particular we refer to BuxRn,L (1972) or FELLE1t
(1950), (1966).
A stochastic variable describes asituation or experiment whose outcome is determined by
chance. For instance, the number of points one obtains when throwing a die can be described
by a stochastic variable. Before giving a general definition of a stochastic variable, let us
elaborate on this example.
Example B.1 When throwing a fair die, the outcome can be any integer between 1 and 6.
Let us denote these outcomes by the set SZ. So, St -{ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. Obviously, one does
not know the outcome of this experiment beforehand. What one does know, however, is the
probability with which each outcome occurs. For instance, the chance that the experiment
results in three points is 6. In other words, the event that the die ends up with three dots faced
upward occurs with probability 6. This, of course, is only one particular event. We can think of
many other events, for instance, the event that the number of points is even, or that the number
of points is less than 4. Such events can be described by subsets of outcomes. For example,
E-{2, 4, 6} C S2 describes the event that the outcome is an even number of points. Now, let
7-l denote the set of all possible events. Thus,
~-( - {E~ E C SZ}.
For each event E E ~-l we know the probability that this event occurs. We already noted that
the event E-{3} occurs with probability s. The probabilities with which these events occur
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are described by a function P:?{ -~ (0,1]. For this case this implies that P({w}) - 6 for all
w E S2. Furthermore, we have that
P(the outcome is even) - P({2, 4, 6}) - 2,
and
P(the outcome is less than 4) - P({1, 2, 3}) - 2.
Summazizing, the experiment of throwing a die is described by the triple (f2, 9-l, P).
The triple (S2, 9-l, P) in Example B.1 is called a probability space. In general, each
chance experiment is described by a probability space (f2, 7-l, P), where S2 is the outcome
space, ~-l is a Q-algebra on ft, and P is a probability measure on the Q-algebra ~-l. The terms
Q-algebra and probability measure need some further explanation. Let 7-l be a set of events.
Then ~-l is called a Q-algebra on S2 if the following three conditions are satisfied:
(i) 0 E 7í,
(ii) if E E ~-l then f2`E E ~-l,
(iii) if Ek E 1-( for k- 1, 2, ..., then Uk1 Ek E?í.
Example B.2 Let S2 -{1, 2, 3, 4}. An example of a a-algebra on 52 is
~-l - {0, {2}, {3}, {2, 3}, {1,4}, {1, 3,4}, {1,2, 4}, {1, 2,3,4}} .
Example B.3 Let 52 - R. The smallest a-algebra on R is ~-Ll -{0, R}. A a-algebra that
contains 7-11 is the a- algebra 7-[2 given by ~-l2 -{0, A, R`A, R}, with A any subset of R. The
largest v-algebra on R one can construct consists ofall subsets ofR, that is, ?-l3 -{A ~ A C R} .
Note that 7-ll C?{s C ~-l3.
A probability measure P is a function assigning to each event E E ~-l a nonnegative
number such that
(i) P(0) - 0 and P(S2) - 1,
(ii) for any mutually disjointevents Ek, k- 1, 2, ..., it holds that P(U~-~ Ek) -~ P(Ek ).
k-1
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Condition (ii) implies that for any disjoint events El and E2, the probability that either of the
two occurs equals the sum of the sepazate probabilities. For instance, consider in Example B.1
the events {3} and {4}. The probability that one of the two events occurs equals P( {3} U{4} )-
P({3}) -{- P({4}) - s~ s-;. Note that the events must be disjoint. For if we consider the
events { 3} and { 3, 4} then
3- P({3,4}) - P({3} U{3,4}) ~ P({3}) f P({3,4}) - s f s- z.
Let (S2, 7-L, P) be a probability space and let El, E2 E S2. The events EI and E2 are
called independent if
P(E, n E2) - P(E,)P(Ez). (B.1)
Independence implies that occurrence of the event El gives no additional information on the
occurrence of the event E2, and the other way around.
Example B.4 Consider the experiment described in Example B.1. The events El -{2} and
E2 -{2,4, 6} aze not independent because 6- P(El n EZ) ~ P(El)P(E2) - 6. 2-,'-2.
Indeed, if one knows that the event El has occurred, then the outcome is even. Hence, one
knows with certainty that the event E2 has also occurred. Furthermore, if one knows that E2
has occurred, that is, the outcome is even, then the probability that event EI occurs equals 3
instead of 6.
Now that we are familiar with probability spaces, we can in[roduce stochastic variables.
For this purpose we need to introduce the Borel Q-algebra. The Borel Q-algebra Li is the
smallest Q-algebra on R containing all half open in[ervals ( a, 6] with -oo G a G b G oo.
Furthermore, an element B E l3 is called a Borel-set. Exactly which sets the Borel Q-algebra
contains is difficult to say. Besides all the half open intervals, it also contains all singletons
{a}, a E R. Other examples of Borel sets are (-oo, b] with b E R, [a, oo) with a E R, and
[a, b] with -oo G a G b G oo.
A stochastic variable X is a measurable function assigning to each outcome w E S2 a
real number X(w). A function X is measurable with respect to 9-l if for all B E Ci it holds
that {w E SI~X (w) E B} E rl. Measurability thus means that all outcomes w that map into
a Borel set B constitute an event E E ~l. Consequently, we can determine the probability
that X E B for every B E Ci. For ease of notation, the event {w E f2~X(w) E B} is often
abbreviated to {X E B}.
Example B.5 Let us retum to the experiment presented in Example B.1. The stochastic
vaziable X defined by X(w) - w for all w E S2 describes the experiment of throwing a die.
So dces the stochastic variable Y with Y(w) - 7- w for all w E f2. The difference, however,
is in the interpretation of the realizations. If x - 5 is a realization of X this means that the
outcome is five, but if y- 5 is a realization of Y then the outcome of the experiment is only
two.
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Let (~, ~-l, P) be a probability space and let X and Y be two stochastic variables on the
outcome set S2. Then X and Y are independent if for any two Borel sets BI , B2 E l3 it holds
that
P((x,Y) E B, x Bz) - P(x E B~)P(Y E B2). ~B.z)
Independence of stochastic variables implies that the outcome of one stochastic variable pro-
vides no additional information on the outcome of another one.
A stochastic variable X is called nonnegative if X(w) ) 0 for all w E S2 and is denoted
by X 1 0. Similarly, we have that X 1 Y if X(w) 1 Y(w) for all w E S2. Furthermore, if
a, ~i E R we define the stochastic variable Z - aX f~Y by Z(w) -~X (w) ~- ~3Y(w) for
all w E S2.
Corresponding to each stochastic variable X we define the probability distribution
function FX : R -~ [0,1) by
FX(t) - P({X C t}) - P({w E S2~ X(w) c t}), (B3)
for all t E R. So, FX(t) denotes the probability that the value of X is less than or equal to
t. Note that for every probability disitribution function FX it holds that limty-~ FX(t) - 0,
limty~ FX(t) - 1, and that Fx is continuous from the right. Furthermore, probability
distribution functions are (weakly) increasing and therefore discontinuous in at most countably
many points.
Example B.6 Consider the stochastic variable X defined in Example B.S. The probability







A stochastic variable is uniquely determined by its probability distribution function. By
this we mean the following. Given two probability spaces (521, 9-h, P1) and (SZ2i 9-t2, P2) and
two stochastic variables X : S21 -~ R and Y : SZ2 -j R, we have that
P~({w E 52~~ X(w) E B}) - Pz({w E S2z~ Y(w) E B})
for all B C a if and only if
Fx(t) - FY(t)
for all t E R. So, when working with stochastic variables, it suffices to know the distribution
function; as a consequence, the underlying probability space is often left unspecified.
A stochastic variable X is called degenerate if it attains exactly one value with positive
probability. So, there exists y E R so that P({X - x} - 1 if x- y and P({X - x} - 0 if
x~ y. In particular, we denote by 1 the degenerate stochastic variables with value 1. For ease
of notation, we will use both x and xl to denote the degenerate stochastic variable xl.
A stochastic variable X is called discrete if it can attain only countably many values.
This means that there exists numbers xk E R and pk E[O, lJ, k- 1, 2, ..., such that
P( { X- xk } ) - pk for k- 1, 2, ..., and ~k1 pk - 1. Note that for any Borel-set B E Li it
holds that
P({X E B}) - ~ pk.
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The stochastic variable X, introduced in Example B.5 to describe the outcome of throwing a
die, is an example of a discrete stochastic variable. X only attains six different values, namely,
xk - k, k- 1, 2, ..., 6. Furthermore, we have that pk - 6 for k- 1, 2, ..., 6.
A stochastic variable X is called continuous if there exists a continuous function fx :
R --~ R such that
Fx(t) - ft fx(t)dt,~
(B.4)
for all t E R. The function fx is called the density function of the stochastic variable X. For
any interval [a, b] it then holds that
P({X E[a,b]}) - fb fx(t)dt.
a
Note that in the expression above we can replace the interval [a, b] by the intervals (a, b],
[a, b), and (a, 6). Examples of continuous stochastic variables are provided at the end of this
appendix.
When throwing a die for numerous times in a row, the average of all the outcomes will
be around 3z, that is, the average of the numbers 1 through 6. Therefore, we say that the
expectation of the outcome equals 32. If X is a discrete stochastic variable, the expectation of
X is given by
E(X) - ~é,k~k.
k-1
If X is continuous with density function fX, the expectation is given by
E(X ) - f ~ t fX(t)dt.
m
Example B.7 Consider the following two lotteries X and Y given by
- r 0, with probability 2
20, 000, with probability ZX Sl ,
and
~, - J -10, 000, with probability ;
100, 000, with probability ;
So when playing the lottery X, there is a 50qo chance of winning ~ 20, 000. But when playing
the lottery Y there is about 18qo change of winning no less than ~ 100, 000. On the darker side
though, there is also about 82qo chance that one has to pay ~ 10, 000. Both lotteries, however,
have the same expected value of ~ 10, 000.
Although both lotteries defined in Example B.7 yield the same expected revenue, most
people will prefer the lottery X to the lottery Y. The risk of paying ~ 10, 000 in the second
lottery is too high compared to ~ 100, 000 one can win. So, when choosing between two
different lotteries, not only ihe expected value plays a role, but also the variation in the
different outcomes. A measure for the variation in the outcomes of a stochastic variable X is
the variance V(X ). For discrete random variables X the variance is defined as
V(X) - L~k(~k-E(X))Z~
k-1
while for continuous stochastic variables with density function fX it is defined as
V(X ) - f~ (t - E(X ))2 fX(t)dt.
~
For the lotteries defined in Example B.7 we thus have that
v(x) - 2(l0,000)2 ~ 2(l0,000)2 - l. log,
and
v(Y) - s(-20, ooo)~ ~- ; (so, ooo)~ - 17 -108.
As the variance shows, the outcomes for the lottery Y vary much more than for the lotter X.
Other characteristic values of stochastic variables are quantiles. For example, the 10~0-
quantile of a stochastic variable X is the largest value ~ such that the outcome of X will be less
than ~ with at most 1001o chance. Of course, the quantile can be determined for any percentage
between 0 and 100. Formally, the a-quantile of a stochastic variable X is defined by
~a(X ) - Sllp{t~ P(X C t) G!Y}, (B.5)
where a E (0,1). In particular, the 0.5-quantile is called the median of X. Figure B.2 shows





Let L'(R) denote the set of all real valued stochastic variables with finite expectation,
that is, E(~X ~) c oo. Let FX denote the probability distribution function of X E L'(R).
Furthermore, define ,F - { FX ~ X E L' ( R) }. Then (.F, p) with
P(F, G) - f~ IF(t) - G(t)~e-Itldt (B.6)
~
for all F, G E .F is a metric space. Next, let (Fk)kEN be a sequence in .F. Then the sequence
(Fk)kEN weakly converges to F E .F, denoted by Fk ~ F, if limk~~ Fk(t) - F(t) for
all t E {t' E R~F is continuous in t'}. Note that since probability distribution functions are
continuous from the right, this limit is unique. Moreover, we have that FXk ~ FX if and only
if limk~o, p(FXk, FX) - 0.
We say that a sequence (X k)kEN of random variables in L' (R) converges to the random
variable X E L1(R) if and only if the corresponding sequence (FXk)kEN of probability
distribution functions weakly converges to the probability distribution function FX of X. The
following theorem is known in the literature as one of the Helly theorems.
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Theorem B.1 Let (Xk)kEN be a sequence in L'(R) weakly converging to X E L'(R), i.e.,
Fxk ~ Fx. If g: R--~ R is a continuous and bounded function then limky~ E(g(Xk)) -
E(g(X)).
The next two results are of particulaz interest for this monograph.
Lemma B.2 Let X E L'(R) and let (dk)kEN and (rk)kEN be sequences in R and [0,1],
respectively. If limk~~ dk - d and limkti~ rk - r then Fdk}rkx ~ Fd}rx.
PROOF: We have to show that limk-.,~ Fdk}rkx(t) - Fd}rx(t) for all continuity points t of
F Note that F k k t F (~) if rk ~ 0. We distinguih two cases, r- 0 andd}rX . d}r X()- X r
r~~.
First, suppose that r- 0. Then Fd}rx(t) - 0 if t G d and Fd}rx(t) - 1 if t? d.
Take t) d so that t is a continuity point of Fd}rx. I-et e~ 0. Since dk --~ d there exists
k
K E W such that t- dk ) e for k) Ií. Since rk -~ 0 we have that t~ -~ oo. Hence,
limky~ F(t~)- 1. Similarly, one can show that limky~ F( t~ ) - 0 if t G d.
Next, suppose that r~ 0. Let t E R be such that t~d is a continuity point of Fx. Since
2-dk i-d t-dk t-d~-~ r it follows that limky~ F(~) - F(;. ). ~r
Lemma B.3 Let X E Ll(R) and let ( dk )kEN and (rk )kEN be sequences in R and [0,1],
respectively. If Fdk}rkx ~ G then there exist numbers d E R and r E [0,1] such that
w
Fdk},.kx -1 Fd}rx.
PROOF: Since ( rk)kEN is a sequence in the compact set [0, 1] there exists a convergent subse-
quence ( r~)~EN. Let us denote its limit by r E [0,1]. Lemma B.2 then implies that Frtx ~ F,.x.
Since Fdk}rkx ~ G we also have that Fdt}r~x ~ G. Next, we show that the sequence (d~)~EN
is bounded. This implies that the sequence (dt )~EN has a convergent sequence (dm )„iEN. If we
denote its limit by d E R it follows from Lemma B.2 that Fdm}rmx ~ Fd}rx. Since the limit
G is unique, it also holds that Fdk}rkx w. Fd}rx-
So, we aze left to prove that ( d~)~EN is a bounded sequence. Therefore, suppose that it is
not bounded, then there exists a subsequence (d„t)mEN with either dm -~ o0 or dm -~ -oo.
Let us start with considering the first possibility, that is, dm -~ oo. Note that without loss
of generality we may assume that dl G dz G d3 G.... Take t E R such that t is a continuity
point of Frx and Frx(t) C 1. Let e~ 0 be such that Frx(t) ~- e G 1. Since Frmx ~ Frx
there exists Ml E~1 such that Frmx(t) G Frx(t) f zr for all m~ Ml.
Let T E R be a continuity point of G. Since dm ~ oo there exists M2 ~ MI such
that t f dm 1 r for all m~ M2. From Frmx(t) G Frx(t) ~ e and Fdm}rmx(T) -
Frmx(T - dm) G Frmx(t) it then follows that Fdm}rmx(T) ~ Frx(t) f e for all m 1 M2.
Hence, lim,,,~.~ Fdm}rmx(T) - G(T) implies that G(T) G Frx(t) ~ e. Since r is an arbitrary
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continuity point of G and FrX(t) f e c 1 it holds that limr-.~ G(r) c 1. But this contradicts
the fact that G is a probability distribution function.
Next, consider the case that dm -~ -oo. Again, we may assume without loss of
generality that the sequencing is monotonic, i.e., d' ) d2 1 d3 1 .... Take t E R such that t
is a continuity point of FrX and FrX(t) ) 0. Let e 1 0 be such that FrX(t) - e) 0. Since
FrmX ~ FrX there exists Ml E IIV such that FrmX(t) ~ FrX(t) - e for all m? Ml.
Let r E R be a continuity point of G. Since dm --~ -oo there exists M2 1 Ml
such that t f dm G T for all m~ M~. From FrmX(t) ) FrX(t) - e and Fdm~,mX(r) -
FrmX(T - dm) ~ FrmX(t) it then follows that Fdm~,mX(r) 1 FrX(t) - e for all m 1 M2.
Hence, lim„iy~ Fdm~rmX(r) - G(r) implies that G(T) ~ FrX(t) - e. Since r is an arbitrary
continuity point of G and FrX(t) - e 1 0 it holds that lim,~-~ G(r) ~ 0, which contradicts
the fact that G is a probability distribution function. ~
We end this appendix with two types of continuous probability distributions that are
frequently used in this monogroaph.
Example B.8 A continuous stochastic variable X iscalled uniformly distributed on the interval
(a, b), denoted by X~ U(a, 6), if
0, if t G a
FX(t) - 6-a, if a G t C 6
1, if b C t.
(B.7)
A corresponding density function equals fX(t) - ~ for t E(a, b) and zero otherwise. The
interpretation of the uniform distribution is that each outcome in the interval ( a, b) occurs
equally likely.
Example B.9 A continuous stochastic variable X is exponentially distributed with parameter
~ on [0, oo), denoted by X~ Exp(a), if
FX(t) -
~ 0, if t c 0
1- e'~t, if t~ 0.
(B.8)
A density function of the exponential distribution equals fX(t) - .~e'ai for t E (0, oo) and
zero otherwise. The exponential distribution is often used to describe the time between two
arrivals in a queueing model or to describe the lifetime of technical components like light bulbs.
;
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Samenvatting
Cotiperatieve speltheorie beschrijft vanuit een wiskundig standpunt situaties waazbij meerdere
personen betrokken zijn die voordeel kunnen behalen door met elkaaz samen te werken. Ter
illustratie beschouwen we hei volgende voorbeeld.
Ter verhoging van hun levenstandaazd willen de inwoners van een dorp hun woningen
voorzien van een kabelaansluiting voor de televisie zodat ze elke avond hun favoriete soap-
serie kunnen volgen. Het tv-signaal wordt geleverd door een kabelmaatschappij waarmee elke
woning verbonden dient te worden. Vanzelfsprekend is het aanleggen van een verbinding niet
kosteloos. Elke verbinding heeft een eigen kostprijs afhankelijk van bijvoorbeeld de lengte
van de verbinding. Laten we nu voor het gemak veronderstellen dat er slechts drie inwoners
zijn, genaamd Linda, Roos en Jessica. Een manier om dan zo'n netwerk te maken is door
middel van drie directe verbindingen tussen de maatschappij en elke woning, zoals afgebeeld
in Figuur 1. De totale kosten van dit net zijn gelijk aan fl. 140, waarbij het duidelijk moge zijn
dat Linda voor haar verbinding fl. 30 mcet betalen, Roos fl. 50 en Jessica fl. 60.
Door met elkaar samen te werken kunnen Linda, Roos en Jessica echter een gcedkoper
net aanleggen dat iedereen verbindt met de kabelmaatschappij. Naast de directe verbinding
tussen een woning en de kabelmaatschappij, is het namelijk ook mogelijk om woningen met
elkaar te verbinden. Deze verbindingen, en de daarbij behorende kosten, zijn weergegeven in
Figuur 2.
Laten we nu de situatie voor Linda en Roos eens nader beschouwen. In de huidige ,
waarbij zowel Linda als Roos een directe verbinding met de kabelmaatschappij hebben, zijn
de totale kosten fl. 80. Door met elkaar samen te werken kunnen ze echter een gcedkoper
net aanleggen. Immers, als Roos gebruik mag maken van Linda's verbinding met de kabel-
maatschappij, dan volstaat een verbinding tussen Linda en Roos om Roos kabel-tv te geven.





maatschappij en fl. 30 voor de verbinding tussen Roos en Linda. Dus Linda en Roos kunnen
fl. 20 uitspazen door met elkaar samen te werken.
Hetzelfde geldt voor Linda, Roos en Jessica samen. Door van elkaars verbindingen
gebruik te maken kunnen ze een goedkoper net aanleggen. Het goedkoopste net dat ze kunnen
aanleggen is afgebeeld in Figuur 3. Hier is Linda direct verbonden met de kabelmaatschappij,
Roos is verbonden met Linda en Jessica is verbonden met Roos. De kosten van dit net bedragen
fl. 90. Dus door samen te werken kunnen Linda, Roos en Jessica tegen lagere kosten kabel-tv




Het hierboven beschreven probleem, kan beschouwd worden als een co~peratief spel.
De spelers van dit spel zijn Linda, Roos en Jessica en de kazakteristieken van dit spel zijn
de minimale kosten waartegen een groep van spelers kabel-tv kan aanleggen. Voor Linda
bedragen deze kosten fl. 30, de kosten van een directe verbinding met de kabelmaatschappij.
Laten we deze kosten noteren met cL. Evenzo geldt dat cR - fl. 50, c~ - fl. 60, cLR - fl. 60,
c~~ - fl. 70 en cR~ - fl. 80. Tenslotte zijn de kosten voor Linda, Roos en Jessica tesamen
gelijk aan cLR~ - fl. 90.
Het doel van de codperatieve speltheorie is nu te bepalen wie met wie zal gaan samen-
werken en hoe de daarbij behorende kosten verdeeld zullen worden. De meeste aandacht gaat
hierbij echter uit naar de laatstgenoemde doelstelling: wat is een eerlijke verdeling van de
kosten onder de aanname dat alle spelers met elkaar samen willen werken?
Laten we weer terugkeren naar het voorbeeld met Linda, Roos en Jessica. Een manier
om de kosten te verdelen is de volgende: de kosten van een verbinding worden gelijk verdeeld
over de gebruikers van deze verbinding. De verbinding tussen Linda en de kabelmaatschappij
kost fl. 30 en wordt gebruikt door zowel Linda als Roos als Jessica. Verdelen we de kosten
gelijk over deze gebruikers, dan betekent dit dat ieder fl. 10 bijdraagt. Van de verbinding
tussen Roos en Linda maken alleen Roos en Jessica gebruik. Zij betalen dus ieder de helft van
de kosten; fl. 15 voor Roos en fl. 15 voor Jessica. De verbinding tussen Roos en Jessica wordt
alleen door Jessica gebruikt. De kosten van deze verbinding zijn dus voor haar rekening. In
totaal betaalt Linda dan fl. 10, Roos fl. 25 en Jessica fl. 55.
Een belangrijke eigenschap van deze verdeling is dat iedereen bereid is de samenwerking
in stand te houden. Zo kost voor Jessica de goedkoopste verbinding met de kabelmaatschappij
ft. 60, wat meer is dan de 55 gulden die ze nu moet bijdragen. Hetzelfde geldt voor Linda en
Roos samen. Nu moeten zij fl. 10 f fl. 25 - fl. 35 bijdragen. Dit is echter minder dan fl. 60,
wat de laagste kosten zijn om Linda en Roos met de kabelmaatschappij te verbinden. Kortom,
deze verdeling van de kosten maakt de samenwerking stabiel: er is geen groep van spelers die
tegen lagere kosten een kabe]-tv netwerk kunnen aanleggen dan het bedrag dat zij nu moeten
betalen. Dergelijke verdelingen worden in de speltheorie core-allocaties genoemd. Naast de
verdeling fl. 10, fl. 25, en fl. 55 zijn er in dit voorbeeld nog meer core-allocaties, zoals fl. 20,
fl. 30 en fl. 40 voor achtereenvolgens Linda, Roos en Jessica of de verdeling waarbij ieder fl.
30 betaalt.
Een belangrijke aanname in dit voorbeeld is dat de kosten van elke verbinding met
zekerheid bekend zijn. Linda, Roos en Jessica weten vooraf - wanneer zij beslissen welk
netwerk ze gaan aanleggen - exact hoeveel elke verbinding kost. Er is dus geen onzekerheid.
Dit maakt het relatief eenvoudig om het goedkoopste netwerk te bepalen. De aangelegde
verbindingen zouden echter ook stuk kunnen gaan. In dat geval moet de verbinding opnieuw
worden aangelegd voor er weer een tv-signaal van de kabelmaatschappij ontvangen kan worden.
Aangezien vooraf niet bekend is of een verbinding stuk gaat of niet, zijn de kosten van een
verbinding dus ook niet meer met zekerheid bekend. Beschouwen we nu een periode van twee
jaaz, dan is van elke verbinding bekend wat de directe aanlegkosten zijn én de kans dat deze
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verbinding na een periode van een jaar stuk is. De situatie die dan ontstaat zou kunnen zijn
zoals afgebeeld in Figuur 4, waarbij het cursief afgedrukte percentage bij elke verbinding de
kans is dat deze verbinding na een jaar stuk is.













De verbinding tussen Linda en Jessica bijvoorbeeld, kost fl. 40 en gaat met 5007o kans na
een jaar kapot. Wanneer de verbinding stuk gaat moet deze opnieuw worden aangelegd voor
fl. 40. De totale kosten bedragen dan fl. 80. Over een periode van twee jaar kost de verbinding
tussen Linda en Jessica dus fl. 40 met 5001o kans en fl. 80 met 50`1o kans.
Aangezien de kosten nu niet meer met zekerheid bekend zijn, wordt het moeilijker om
te bepalen welk netwerk het goedkoopste is. Naast de hoogte van de kosten speelt nu ook het
risico in de kosten een rol, dat wil zeggen, welke kosten komen met welke kans voor. Laten
we ter illustratie Linda en Jessica beschouwen en twee mogelijke manieren waarop zij een
verbinding met de kabelmaatchappij kunnen maken.
De eerste manier verbindt zowel Linda als Jessica direct met de kabelmaatschappij en
is afgebeeld in Figuur 5. De kosten van dit netwerk bedragen fl. 30 f fl. 60 - fl. 90 met
25qo kans en fl. 60 -~ fl. 60 - fl. 120 met 75qo kans. De tweede manier is afgebeeld in
Figuur 6. De kosten van dit netwerk bedragen fl. 30 f fl. 40 - fl. 70 met 12, 5~I'o kans, fl.
60 f fl. 40 - fl. 100 met 37, 501o kans, fl. 30 -}- fl. 80 - fl. 110 met 12, 5PIo kans, en fl.
60 f fl. 80 - fl. 140 met 37, 5~I'o kans. Het is niet direct te zeggen welke van deze twee het
'goedkoopste' is. Dit hangt vooral af van hoeveel risico Linda en Jessica bereid zijn om te
nemen. Willen zij veel risico nemen, dan kiezen zij wellicht voor het tweede netwerk omdat
deze met 12, 5~ kans slechts fl. 70 kost. Willen zij daarentegen maar weinig risico nemen,
dan ligt het eerste netwerk misschien meer voor de hand omdat deze maximaal fl. 120 kost.
Kortom, de beslissing over welk netwerk zij aanleggen wordt nu mede bepaald door het risico





De situatie weergegeven in Figuur 4 geeft net als de situatie in Figuur 2 aanleiding tot
een coáperatief spel. De kosten waartegen de spelers nu kabel-tv kunnen aanleggen zijn echter
geen vaste bedragen meer maar kansvariabelen, ook wel stochastische vaziabelen genoemd.
Dergelijke spelen worden daarom codperatieve spelen met stochastische uitbetalingen genoemd
en zijn het onderwerp van dit proefschrift.
Een coóperatief spel met stochastische uitbetalingen beschrijft vanuit een wiskundig
standpunt een situatie waarbij meerdere personen betrokken zijn die voordeel kunnen behalen
door met elkaaz samen te werken. Het voordeel dat men kan behalen is nu echter niet
meer met zekerheid bekend, maar wordt beschreven met behulp van kansvariabelen. In de
wetenschappelijke literatuur is deze tak van de coóperatieve speltheorie nauwelijks onderzocht.
Het dcel van dit proefschrift is dan ook om voor deze spelen een theorie op te bouwen, waarbij
de (traditionele) coóperatieve speltheorie als leidraad dient. De nadruk ligt hierbij op het
verdelen van de opbrengsten~kosten onder de aanname dat iedereen bereid is met elkaar samen
te werken.
Het proefschrift is als volgt opgebouwd. Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een beknopte inleiding in de
codpera[ieve speltheorie. Het behandelt enkele basisbegrippen die nodig zijn voor een goed
begrip van de daazopvolgende hoofdstukken.
Hoofdstuk 3 introduceert coóperatieve spelen met stochastische uitbetalingen. Naast
de formele definitie worden enkele voorbeelden gepresenteerd op het gebied van productie,
machinevolgorde problemen en de financiële markten. Verder wordt besproken hoe men de
preferenties van de spelers over kansvariabelen kan beschrijven en hce men uit deze preferenties
het gedrag ten opzichte van risico kan afleiden.
Hoofdstuk 4 introduceert enkele nieuwe begrippen voor coáperatieve spelen met uitbe-
talingen. Het betreft hier de core, superadditiviteit en convexiteit. De core van een coáperatief
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spel bevat stabiele verdelingen van de opbrengsten~kosten. De begrippen superadditiviteit en
convexiteit zeggen iets over de wijze waarop de opbrengst van samenwerking afhangt van de
grootte van de groep die samenwerkt. Zo kunnen in een superadditief cobperatief spel twee
afzonderlijke grcepen hogere opbrengsten behalen door samen een groep te vormen.
Hoofdstuk S introduceert de nucleolus. De nucleolus beschrijft een methode om de
opbrengsten te verdelen. Gegeven een verdeling van de opbrengstenikosten wordt voor elke
grcep van spelers bepaald hce ontevreden deze groep is met deze verdeling. Deze mate van
ontevredenheid wordt uitgedrukt met een getal, ook wel de klacht genaamd. Hoe hoger het
getal, hce hoger de klacht van een groep is. De verdeling die de nucleolus dan voorschrijft is die
verdeling waarvoor de grootste klacht minimaal is. Verder laten we zien dat wanneer er voor
een bepaald spel core-allocaties bestaan, dan resulteert de nucleolus ook in een core-allocatie.
Tenslotte wordt in Hoofdstuk 6 een toepasssing van een theorie in de verzekeringswereld
besproken. Een verzekering wordt hierbij geïnterpreteerd als samenwerking tussen een individu
en een verzekeringsmaatschappij. We laten voor deze spelen zien da[ er core-allocaties bestaan.
Bovendien tonen we aan dat het zogeheten `zero-utility principle' voor het berekenen van
verzekerinspremies tot een core-allocatie leidt.
Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Dissertation Series
No. Author Title
1 P.J.J. Herings Static and Dynamic Aspects of General Disequilibrium
Theory; ISBN 90 5668 001 3
2~ Erwin van der Krabben Urban Dynamics: A Real Estate Perspective - An
institutional analysis of the production of the built
environment; ISBN 90 5170 390 2
3 Arjan Lejour Integrating or Desintegrating Welfare States? - a qualitative
study to the consequences of economic integration on social
insurance; ISBN 90 5668 003 x
4 Bas J.M. Werker Statistical Methods in Financial Econometrics;
ISBN 90 5668 002 1
5 Rudy Douven Policy Coordination and Convergence in the EU;
ISBN 90 5668 004 8
6 Arie J.T.M. Weeren Coordination in Hierarchical Control; ISBN 90 5668 006 4
7 Herbert Hamers Sequencing and Delivery Situations: a Game Theoretic
Approach; ISBN 90 5668 005 6
8 Annemarie ter Veer Strategic Decision Making in Politics; ISBN 90 5668 007 2
9 Zaifu Yang Simplicial Fixed Point Algorithms and Applications;
ISBN 90 5668 008 0
10 William Verkooijen Neural Networks in Economic Modelling - An Empirical
Study; ISBN 90 5668 O10 2
11 Henny Romijn Acquisition of Technological Capability in Small Firms in
Developing Countries; ISBN 90 5668 009 9
12 W.B. van den Hout The Power-Series Algorithm - A Numerical Approach to
Markov Processes; ISBN 90 5668 O11 0
13 Paul W.J. de Bijl Essays in Industrial Organization and Management Strategy;
ISBN 90 5668 012 9
~ Copies can be ordered from Thesis Publishers, P.O. Box 14791, 1001 LG Amsterdam, The
Neiherlands, phone f 31 20 6255429; faz: f31 20 6203395; e-mail: thesis~thesis.aps.nl
No. Author Title
14 Martijn van de Ven Intergenerational Redistribution in Representative
Democracies; ISBN 90 5668 013 7
15 Eline van der Heijden Altruism, Faimess and Public Pensions: An Investigation of





20 Edwin van Dam
21 Henk Oosterhout
22 Jan Lemmen
23 Chris van Raalte
24 Bas van Aarle
Competition in Spatial Location Models;
ISBN 90 5668 O15 3
Essays in Competition with Product Differentiation and
Bazgaining in Mazkets; ISBN 90 5668 016 1
Three-Gap Analysis of Structural Adjustment in Pakistan;
ISBN 90 5668 017 x
A Treatise on Labour: A Matching-Model Analysis of
Labour-Mazket Programmes; ISBN 90 5668 018 8
Graphs with Few Eigenvalues - An interplay between
combinatorics and algebra; ISBN 90 5668 019 6
Takeover Barriers: the good, the bad, and the ugly; ISBN 90
5668 020 x
Financial Integration in the European Union: Measurement
and Detenmination; ISBN 90 5668 021 8
Market Formation and Market Selection;
ISBN 90 5668 022 6
Essays on Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction:
Applications to EMU and Eastern Europe; ISBN 90 5668
023 4
25 Francis Y. Kumah Common Stochastic Trends and Policy Shocks in the Open
Economy:Empirical Essays in International Finance and
Monetazy Policy; ISBN 90 5668 024 2
26 Erik Canton Economic Growth and Business Cycles; ISBN 90 5668 025 0






32 Anurag N. Banerjee





Numerical Analysis of Eigenvalue Algorithms Based on
Subspace Iterations; ISBN 90 5668 026 9
Essays in Behavioral Economics; ISBN 90 5668 028 5
Limited Dependent Variable Models for Panel Data; ISBN
90 5668 029 3
Empirical Studies on Individual Labour Market Behaviour;
ISBN 90 5668 030 7
The Sensitivity of Estimates, Inferences, and Forecasts of
Linear Models; ISBN 90 5668 031 5
Essays on Testing for Spanning and on Modeling Futures
Risk Premia; ISBN 90 5668 032 3
Product Differentiation, Collusion and Standardization;
ISBN 90 5668 033 1
On Income Expectations and Other Subjective Data: A
Micro-Econometric Analysis; ISBN 90 5668 034 X
Cooperative Decision Making in a Stochastic Environment;
ISBN 90 5668 035 8
Bibliotheek K. U. Brabant
! ! ~ IIï~ R~ I~~lL~ ~l III E~ III I !
.IEROEN SUIJS StUd, ~~ 000 O~ 404985 3
graduation he became a Ph.D. student at CentER, the Graduate
School of Tilburg University. As of March 1998, he will be taking up a
position at the CentER Accounting Research Group.
Cooperative game theory is a mathematical tool to analyze situations
involving several individuals who can obtain certain benefits by
cooperating. The main questions this theory addresses are who will
cooperate with whom and how will the corresponding benefits be
divided. Most results of cooperative game theory, however, only apply
to cases where these benefits are deterministic. In this thesis we
abandon this assumption and allow for stochastic benefits. Examples
of such situations can be found in linear production situations,
sequencing and financial markets. The aim of this work is then to
develop a theory on games with stochastic payoffs using traditional
game theory as a guideline.
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